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INTRODUCTION

The landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright' was rendered in 1963 -just over forty years ago. Guaranteeing the right of legal representation to indigent defendants in state felony
prosecutions, the decision launched what might be called this country's

"right to counsel revolution" in criminal and juvenile proceedings.'
In 1967, in In re Gault,3 the Supreme Court recognized the right to
legal representation in juvenile delinquency proceedings; this was followed in 1972 by Argersinger v. Hamlin,4 in which the Court extended
the right to counsel "to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived
of his liberty."5 Rejecting the argument that the seriousness of the case
should determine whether the right to counsel attaches, the Court held
that "absent a knowing, and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or fel6
ony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.",

I. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This decision also spawned a classic book by renowned New York Times
journalist, Anthony Lewis, see ANTHONY LEWIS, GIoEON's TRUMPET (9

6

4), as well as a made-for-

television movie starring Peter Fonda, see Gideon's Trumpet (CBS television broadcast Apr. 30, i98o).
2. On the same day that Gideon was handed down, the Supreme Court held in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963), that convicted indigent defendants accorded the right to an appeal are
constitutionally guaranteed appellate counsel if they cannot afford a lawyer.
3. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
4. 407 U.S. 25 (972).
5. Id. at 32.

6. Id.
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Although there are decisions in which the Court has refused to extend the right to counsel in criminal cases,7 these decisions are the exception. Even today, despite a Supreme Court clearly more conservative
than during the Warren era, a majority of the Court continues to recognize the enormous importance of counsel. Thus, in 2002-thirty-nine
years after Gideon and thirty years after Argersinger-in Alabama v.
Shelton,9 the Court extended Argersinger, holding that a suspended sentence may not be imposed unless the defendant was offered an attorney.
No longer is Argersinger's requirement of "actual imprisonment" critical
in order for the right to counsel to attach.
In Gideon, Justice Black eloquently explained why lawyers for the
accused must be available in criminal cases:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him ....

Governments, both state and federal, quite properly

spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential
to protect the public interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the
best lawyers they can to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.' °
Just after the above passage, Justice Black quoted often-cited language from Powell v. Alabama," in which the Supreme Court offered
additional, compelling justifications for furnishing counsel to the accused:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
7. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. I, 4 (1989) (no right to court-appointed counsel in
post-conviction hearings); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (state not required to appoint
counsel where defendant is charged with an offense punishable by fine only); Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411
U.S. 778. 790-91 (1973) (indigent probationer or parolee has no unqualified right to be represented by
counsel at revocation hearings).
8. Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President
Eisenhower and took the oath on October 5, 1953 and departed the Court on June 23, t969. During
his tenure as Chief Justice, in addition to Gideon, In re Gault, and Douglas, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (extending the right to counsel to post-indictment
lineups).
9. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). Shelton was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy,
and Thomas dissenting.
io. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
11. 287 U.S. 45, 68 (932) (state trial court is required to appoint counsel in a capital case).
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educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge to
adequately prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 2
The goal in providing lawyers, as Gideon emphasized, is to assure
fairness in our adversary system of justice and prevent the conviction of
innocent persons. Yet, forty years after Gideon, this nation is still struggling to implement the right to counsel in state criminal and juvenile proceedings. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that systems of indigent

defense routinely fail to assure fairness because of under-funding and
other problems. 3 It is also more evident now than ever before that innocent persons, sometimes represented by incompetent, unqualified, or
overburdened defense lawyers, are convicted and imprisoned.'4
On every major anniversary of Gideon, it has become a ritual for national organizations concerned with providing adequate legal representation to recall the extent of the nation's problems in furnishing counsel for
the indigent. To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Gideon, the
American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a public hearing, the results of which were summarized in 1982 in a booklet titled, Gideon Undone: The Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding.5 The ABA report
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
13. See infra notes 44-122 and accompanying text.
12.

14. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
15. See ABA, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISES IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (John Thomas Moran
ed., 1982). The following problems in indigent defense services were listed:
(i)
The financing of criminal defense services for indigents is generally inadequate,
constituting only 1.5% of total expenditures for criminal justice matters by state
and local governments.
(2)

Nationally, public defenders have too many cases and lack support personnel.

(3)

Compensation for private, appointed counsel is insufficient, and payments are
administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

(4)

On the misdemeanor level, defendants are often not advised of their right to
counsel, and their waiver of counsel often fails to meet constitutional standards.

(5)

Indigent defense caseloads are increasing. The rate of felony defendants requiring
appointment of counsel has gone from 48% in the recent past to a current rate of

55% to 6o%.
(6)

County officials, concerned about rising costs and shrinking budgets, are considering various alternatives, such as a second public defenders' office, or contract sys-
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concluded that the "financing of criminal defense services
6 for indigents is
generally inadequate," resulting in numerous problems.'
During 2003, the ABA held a series of hearings in various parts of
the country in an effort once again to document the many problems involved in furnishing effective indigent defense representation." Similarly,
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) published a special commemorative issue of its magazine -The Championtitled, The Right to Counsel: Gideon v. Wainwright at 4o. I8 In an introduction to the magazine, the Executive Director of NACDL explained that
Gideon could not really be celebrated because the resources for "meaningful representation" were unavailable. 9
This Article derives from my dismay with the continued failure of
states and counties to provide truly effective defense services for the
poor. In the fall of 1963, just a few months after Gideon was decided, I
tems in lieu of a public defender. In the latter situations, there have been some serious abuses.
(7)

State financing, rather than county funding, is a more viable option: counties are
generally underfunded.

(8)

Adequate funding of defense services is very unpopular in this era of Proposition
13 and demands for tougher sentencing.

(9)

Inadequate compensation puts pressure on appointed private lawyers to plead
their cases out as quickly as possible.

Id. at I. The emphasis during this ABA hearing was on defense services for adults in criminal courts.
This Article also focuses on criminal defense for adults. However, the problems of legal representation
in juvenile delinquency proceedings, due to a lack of adequate funding, are equally distressing, if not
worse. In December 1995, the Juvenile Justice Center of the ABA, in cooperation with other organizations, issued a lengthy national assessment of juvenile defense representation funded by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR.ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 7--2, 67 (1995), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/

juvjus/cfj.html. The report's findings, inter alia, were that "public defenders carry enormous
caseloads," which are "the single most important barrier to effective representation"; a large percentage of youths waive their right to counsel, but probably many waivers are constitutionally deficient
because not knowing and intelligent; few appeals are taken of juvenile court delinquency findings; and
there are inadequate budgets for training of defenders and insufficient staffs of social workers and
other necessary personnel essential for juvenile defenders to do their work effectively. Id. The report's
number one recommendation was that "[s]tate and local jurisdictions should increase the resources
available to support representation in juvenile delinquency proceedings." Id.
16. ABA, supra note 15, at I.
I7. Information about these hearings is available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/projects.html.
i8. CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003.
19. Ralph Grunewald, CommemoratingGideon at4o, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003 at 5.In an editorial commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Gideon, The New York Times also noted how much
still needs to be done to implement effectively the Gideon decision. See Gideon's Trumpet Stilled, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at A18.
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represented indigent defendants in criminal cases in Washington, D.C.2"
Since then I have studied defense systems in the United States" and assisted in developing standards for providing legal representation of indigents." Currently, I chair both a state public defender commission 3 and
an ABA group that deals with indigent defense issues nationwide. After
forty years in search of Gideon's promise, I have come to believe that
unless there are fundamental changes in this nation's approach to providing defense services to the poor, the struggle to do so will continue indefinitely.
In an effort to explore alternative ways of providing indigent defense
representation, I undertook a study of criminal legal aid in England during 2002-2003.2 What I discovered was a different approach to providing
20. This representation was undertaken during 1963-1964 in Washington, D.C. as a member of
the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowship program at the Georgetown University Law Center.
21. During the early i98os, I undertook a national study of indigent defense services on behalf of
the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. My research was published in
NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING

LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (ABA 1982). In the introduction to
the study, I offered the following summary:
Overall, there is abundant evidence in this report that defense services for the poor are inadequately funded. As a result, millions of persons in the United States who have a constitutional right to counsel are denied effective legal representation. Sometimes defendants
are inadequately represented; other times, particularly in misdemeanor cases, no lawyer is
provided or a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel is accepted by the court. Defendants suffer quite directly, and the criminal justice system functions inefficiently, unaided by
well trained and dedicated defense lawyers. There also are intangible costs, as our nation's
goal of equal treatment for the accused, whether wealthy or poor, remains unattained.

Id. at 2.
22. During the late 1970s I served as the reporter for the second edition of the ABA Standards
Relating to Providing Defense Services, The Defense Function, and The Prosecution Function. I also
chaired the Task Force that developed the ABA's current editions of these standards, which were approved in 199 o . See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES]; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUnON FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA, PROSECUTION FUNCTION or
ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION].
23. Since 199o I have served as chairman of the Indiana Public Defender Commission, which is
established pursuant to IND. CODE § 33-9-13-I (2003).
24. The committee-the Indigent Defense Advisory Group (IDAG)-functions under the auspices of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. The primary responsibility of IDAG is to oversee the activity of the Bar Information Program, which encompasses the
ABA's efforts throughout the country to improve indigent defense services.
25. Throughout this Article, the reference to England also includes Wales because legislation
enacted by Parliament in the legal aid area extends to both. On the other hand, Scotland and Northern
Ireland have considerable legislative autonomy. See http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/CitizenSpace/GuideToGovernmentArticle/fs/en?CONTENTID= 400262i&chk=OzsoCA (Devolution in the UK).
Parliament enacts primary legislation for all of the United Kingdom, except for matters that are devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. See Overview of UK Government, at http://www.ukoiline.gov.uk/CitizenSpace/GuideToGovernmentArticle/fs/en?CONTENT-ID
=40028&hk=wtv/a 4 . The Scottish Parliament and Executive have responsibility for most aspects of
domestic, economic, and social policy, while the UK Parliament retains control of foreign affairs, de-
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legal services to the accused, but one that contains certain elements that
may be suitable for replication in the United States, as discussed later.26
Moreover, the description of the English system contained in this Article
can be useful to persons in the United States who want to consider alternative modes of delivering defense services to the indigent accused.
One of the ways in which England and the United States differ relates to the source of funding, in that all financing of defense services in
England is provided by the central government.27 In the United States,
the change that could have the greatest positive impact on indigent defense would be for the federal government to provide financial support
to assist state and local governments in fulfilling their duty to implement
the right to counsel. Almost twenty-five years ago the ABA endorsed the
creation of an independent, federally funded program to help state and
local governments discharge their obligation to provide counsel for indigent defendants 5 The arguments in support of such a program are just as
persuasive today as they were in the late 1970s when the ABA embraced
the concept of federal support for indigent defense. It is the same logic,
moreover, that has led many members of Congress to support adoption
of an Innocence Protection Act applicable to death penalty prosecutions
in state courts.29
fense and national security, macro-economic and fiscal matters, employment and social security. Background Information on the Devolution Settlements, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of UK, at
http://www.devolution.odpm.gov.uk/ (last visited May 15, 2003). In contrast, the responsibilities and
authority of the National Assembly of Wales are not as broad as the Scottish Parliament. In particular,
the National Assembly of Wales does not have the power to enact primary legislation, and the UK
Government retains responsibility for the police and legal system. Id. The Northern Ireland Assembly
has legislative and executive powers similar in range to the Scottish Parliament. Id. The populations of
England and Wales in 2001 were 49,138,831 and 2,903,085, respectively. United Kingdom Census 2001,
at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2ooi/default.asp (last visited July 2. 2003). The populations of
Scotland and Northern Ireland in 2001 were estimated at 5,o62,01 I and 1,685,267, respectively. Id.
26. See infra notes 467-546 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
28. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, REPORT TO THE HousE OF
DELEGATES (Feb. 1979) available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/121.pdf.
29. The Innocence Protection Act is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 508-12.

It was
first introduced during the io6th Congress. Innocence Protection Act, S. 2073, io6th Cong. (2000);
Innocence Protection Act, H.R. 4078, io6th Cong. (2000). At the close of the Io7th Congress in November 2002, the Senate version of the bill (S. 486) was supported by thirty-two Senators, and the
House version of the bill (H.R. 912) was supported by 250 Representatives. Kyle O'Dowd, It's Not All
Bad: io8th Congress Offers Hope of Indigent Defense Improvements, CHAMPION, Mar. 2003, at 41. During the io8th Congress, the bill was re-introduced in the Senate on January 7, 2003, and referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003, S. 22, io8th
Cong., § 6201 (2003). In addition, a House subcommittee has held hearings concerning some of the
same subject matters dealt with in the Senate bill. See Advancing Justice through the Use of Forensic
DNA Technology: Oversight HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the House Comm'n on the Judiciary,io8th Cong. (2003) (statement of Peter J. Neufeld, CoDirector, Innocence Project).
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Before discussing the English system of criminal legal aid and lessons we may want to borrow from England, I first summarize the current
state of indigent defense in the United States and comment on the provision of adequate defense representation and its importance in preventing
wrongful convictions. At the end of the Article, I return to the subject of
federal financial support for defense services.
I.
A.

CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES

STRUCTURE OF DEFENSE SERVICE PROGRAMS

Neither in Gideon nor in any of its other right to counsel decisions
has the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the way in which defense services
for the indigent should be structured nor the unit of government responsible for paying lawyers.30 The expense of providing counsel also was ignored in Gideon, but in several subsequent right to counsel decisions the
Court demonstrated some concern both for the cost of counsel and the
availability of sufficient numbers of lawyers to provide the necessary representation. For example, in a footnote in Argersinger, responding to
comments in Justice Powell's concurring opinion, the majority said that it
was satisfied that "the Nation's legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce today.' 3'
While the majority in Argersinger was correct-there were then and
there are now sufficient numbers of lawyers to provide the required legal
representation 3 -the cost of providing counsel is quite another matter.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell labeled "available funding,"
30. The unit of government responsible for compensating counsel, as well as the organization of
defense services, has sometimes been litigated. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. The
ABA's position on funding and the governmental unit responsible for footing the bill is contained in
ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-1.6 ("Government has the responsibility to fund the full cost of quality legal representation for all eligible persons ....
The level of government that funds defender organizations, assigned-counsel programs or contracts for services depends
upon which level will best insure the provision of independent, quality legal representation.").
Gideon also failed to address "the broad outlines of what might serve as a benchmark of [effective] representation.... What we know with the benefit of hindsight is that the Court missed an important moment to use the Gideon decision as a vehicle to shape expectations of what effective
representation entails." Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1461, 1463 (2003).
31. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972).
32. In 1972 there were 355,200 attorneys in the United States, which amounted to one attorney
for every 600 persons. Id. at 56.Based on a current population estimate of 281,421,9o6, infra note 559,
and a current estimate of 1,058,662 attorneys, MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, ABA, NAT'L LAWYER POPULATION BYSTATE (2003), availableat http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2oo2nbroflawyersbtstate.pdf,
the current ratio is approximately one attorney for every 265 persons.
In my forty years of discussing indigent defense issues with lawyers from all over the United States, I
have never heard persons suggest that there are not enough lawyers to handle the cases so long as
governments provide reasonable compensation for their services.
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among others, as an "acute problem" in making counsel available for indigents in misdemeanor cases.3 In a footnote, Justice Powell elaborated:
"The successful implementation of the majority's rule would require
state and local governments to appropriate considerable funds, something they have not been willing to do."34 Similarly, thirty years later-in
Alabama v. Shelton-the Court's majority implicitly conceded that some
states might be "unable or unwilling" to shoulder "the costs of the rule
we confirm today."35 The most extensive discussion in a Supreme Court
opinion of compensation and the right to counsel is contained in Justice
Blackmun's dissent in McFarland v. Scott,,6 dealing with the right to

counsel in capital cases. There Justice Blackmun bitterly complained that
"the absence of funds to compensate lawyers prevents even qualified
lawyers from being able to present an adequate defense."37
When considered together, the U.S. Supreme Court's historic decisions, designed to implement the federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, constitute an enormous
unfunded mandate imposed upon the states. 8 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that not only have states resisted adequate funding of
indigent defense systems, but they also have differed about whether state
33. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 59 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 61 n.3o (Powell, J.,concurring). Justice Powell relied upon a study conducted in 1970,
which stated that "in 1971, the State of Kansas spent $570,ooo defending indigents in felony cases-up
from $376,ooo in 1969. Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,ooo, the legislature has appropriated only $40o,0oo." Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Prior to serving on the Supreme Court, Justice
Powell served as president of the ABA. During his tenure, Powell chose to make the "availability of
legal counsel to all as one of three top priorities for the Association during his term." EARL JOHNSON,
JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 55 (1974).
35. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 67o-7I (20O2). The Court further explained that states unwilling to appoint counsel could use "pretrial probation" as a means of circumventing the Shelton rule.
"Under such an arrangement, the prosecutor and defendant agree to the defendant's participation in a
pretrial rehabilitation program, which includes conditions typical of post-trial probation. The adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence for the underlying offense then occur only if and when the defendant breaches those conditions." Id. at 671. The first study of a state's compliance with Shelton was
completed by The Spangenberg Group on behalf of the Administrative Office of the Courts of Georgia. The report, which was based upon extensive observations and interviews in nineteen of Georgia's
counties, concluded that failure to comply with Shelton's requirements was widespread. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP ET AL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS OF GEORGIA FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S
COMM'N ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, PART II: ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALABAMA V. SHELTON IN GEORGIA
(2003).

36. 512 U.S. 1256 (994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1257 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000). The Act was approved
on March 22, 1995 and enacted in Pub. L. 104-4, § 2, to9 Stat. 48. Constitutional rights are excluded
from its coverage. State constitutions also guarantee the right of the accused to the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8; MIss. CONST. art. III, § 26; N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. I, § I1;S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
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or local jurisdictions should provide funding and have developed a variety of delivery methods.
A review of the fifty states reveals that about half fund all indigent
defense services at the state level, whereas the rest have predominantly
county-funded systems, although in almost all of these some state funds
are provided." The delivery methods include (i) salaried defenders employed either in a public agency or by a private organization; (2) assigned
counsel appointed either ad hoc or systematically and compensated on
an hourly basis or paid a flat fee per case; and (3) attorneys compensated
pursuant to contracts in which they agree to handle all or some of the
cases in the jurisdiction, sometimes for a flat fee."' Frequently these delivery models operate simultaneously in the same jurisdiction.4' Moreover, when jurisdictions rely primarily on public defenders, private
attorneys invariably participate, especially in order to represent codefendants in multiple defendant cases and in other conflict of interest
situations.4"

39.

THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,

ABA,

STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE

SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 1 (2oo3), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/

sclaid/indigentdefense/indigentdefexpend2oo3.pdf; see also Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PRORS. I (1995).
40. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ABA, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED
COUNSEL

IN
NON-CAPITAL
FELONY
CASES
AT
TRIAL:
A
STATE-BY-STATE
OVERVIEW
1-2 (2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
compensationratesnoncapital2003.pdf [hereinafter NON-CAPITAL RATES OF COMPENSATION]. The ABA

lists various elements to be covered in contracts for defense services. These include the types of cases
in which representation will be provided; attorney workloads and a process for dealing with excessive
caseloads; experience levels of attorneys and their qualifications for handling different types of cases; a
policy on conflicts of interest; and arrangements for support services, supervision, training, and professional development. ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-3.3.
See also THE SPANGENGERG GROUP, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES, A SPECIAL REPORT (2000) [hereinafter CONTRACTING FOR DEFENSE SERVICES] (documenting
judicial and legislative attempts to deal with contracts for indigent defense and discusses national standards that govern these services); Meredith Anne Nelson, Quality Controlfor Indigent Defense Contracts, 17 CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1988) (analyzing contract systems for indigent defense with suggestions
for quality controls); Kelly A. Hardy, Contractingfor Indigent Defense: ProvidingAnother Forum for
Skeptics to Question Attorney's Tactics, 8o MARQ. L. REV. 1053 (1997) (explaining the evolution of the
contract system with special emphasis on Wisconsin's fixed fee contracting system); Low-Bid Criminal
Defense Contracting:Justice in Defeat, CHAMPION, Nov. 1997, at 22 (giving a general discussion of the
contract system); David Paul Cullen, Indigent Defense Comparisonof Ad Hoc and Contract Defense in
Five Semi-Rural Jurisdictions,17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 311 (1992) (comparing contractual based indigent defense in five un-named jurisdictions in Oklahoma).
41.

NON-CAPITAL RATES OF COMPENSATION,

42.

Id.

supra note 40, at

2.
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ADEQUACY OF FUNDING

Despite many differences among states in funding and delivery of
indigent defense services, it is still possible to generalize about the availability and quality of such services nationally. While the country as a
whole has made considerable progress in providing legal representation
since Gideon was decided,43 overall this nation's systems for providing
counsel to the indigent are still very inadequate.
When Janet Reno was U.S. Attorney General, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) held unprecedented national symposia on indigent defense
in 1999 and 2ooo. 4 The invited guests at these Washington, D.C. conferences were from all fifty states and included judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, academics and others. 45 The DOJ's final report on the 2000 conference summarized presentations in which speakers emphasized a lack
of adequate resources for indigent defense, insufficient fee rates for assigned counsel, high caseloads of public defenders, and lack of independence for the defense function, among many other problems. 46
Also, during Attorney General Reno's administration, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA) of the DOJ commissioned two special monographs dealing with problems in indigent defense. The first of these, issued in 20o0, deals with contracts for defense services and recounts
examples in which contract systems posed significant problems because
of insufficient funding. 47 The second report, dealing with defender workloads, was published in 2001." There, the authors observe that "[e]very
day, defenders try to manage too many clients. Too often, the quality of
service suffers.... Individual attorneys who contract to accept an unlimited number of cases in a given period often become overwhelmed
as
'49
well. Excessive workloads even affect court-appointed attorneys.
43. The total spent nationwide on indigent defense today is discussed infra at notes 555-68 and
accompanying text.
44. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE

xiii (2000).
Id. at app. 2.
Id. at 3-5.
See CONTRACTING FOR DEFENSE SERVICES. supra note 40.
48. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE (2ooi) [hereinafter DEFENDER WORKLOADSI. Both this report and the one dealing with contracts
for defense services were prepared by The Spangenberg Group, a national consulting organization
headquartered in West Newton, Massachusetts, which has extensive experience furnishing technical
assistance in the indigent defense area in every state in the nation. The Spangenberg Group is also
responsible for the data displayed on the ABA's website cited in this Article. See, e.g., supra notes 3941 and accompanying text; and infra notes 55 and 556-57 and accompanying text.
49. DEFENDER WORKLOADS, supra note 48, at 2. When defense lawyers either accept or are required by their contract or public defender office to represent an excessive number of clients, they invariably violate their obligations as members of the legal profession. The first duty of a lawyer
2000, at
45.
46.
47.
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The conference report of the national symposia in 2000, as well as
the two monographs dealing with the delivery of indigent defense ser-

vices, is similar to many other efforts to summarize the state of indigent
defense in the United States. In 1988, for example, the ABA's Special
Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society issued a report titled
Criminal Justice in Crisis." The committee concluded that "[i]n the case
of the indigent defendant, the problem is... that the defense representation is ... too often inadequate because of underfunded and overburdened public defender offices."'" Further, the report observed that "as a
society, [we are] depriving the system of the funds necessary to ensure

adequate defense services.""
There also are numerous law review articles in which the deplorable
state of indigent defense has been exposed, emphasizing the connection
between lack of adequate funding and the quality of representation. 3

representing a client is to furnish "competent representation [which] requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003). However, disciplinary authorities almost never pursue deficient representation of indigents, largely because such defendants rarely file complaints. If convicted, indigent
defendants invariably challenge their convictions in the courts, often complaining about the performance of their lawyers.
50. SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS (1988).
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 37.
53. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to Be Realized, CHAMPION, Mar. 1998, at
12 (discussing the deteriorating state of indigent defense with reference to situations in Alabama and
Kentucky); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to
the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783 (1997) (examining the availability
and quality of indigent defense services at each stage of the criminal justice process); Matthew J.
Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial,26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67 (2002) (noting the relationship
between under funding, time constraints, caseload, and adequacy of counsel); John Gibeaut, Halls of
Injustice?, A.B.A. J. 35 (2001) (dealing with public defender caseloads in Venago County, Pennsylvania); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalizationof Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 78 MD. L. REV.
1433 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court's test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has effectively sanctioned inadequate legal representation by failing
to pressure defense systems to reform); Richard Klein, The Eleventh Amendment: Thou Shalt Not Be
Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993) [hereinafter Klein,
The Eleventh Amendment] (stating that inadequate compensation for assigned counsel frequently attracts to defense work the least qualified attorneys who, in order to maximize their compensation, represent more clients than they can competently handle); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (description of under funding of public defender systems and resulting inadequate representation by counsel): Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. I8o8 (2000) (analyzing systemic challenges and defects
of indigent defense representation with special emphasis on contract systems for indigent defense);
Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic,9 CRIM. JUST. 13
(0994)(authors discuss caseloads of public defenders and cost of under funding public defenders and
court-appointed attorneys).
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The grossly inadequate funding for indigent defense in capital cases has
been a special problem, and this story has been documented as well. 4
The fees paid to assigned counsel for representation of defendants in
capital and non-capital felony cases differ from state to state, although in
all states the fees are quite modest, so that attorneys willing to represent
the indigent accused are forced to do the work at a significant discount.5
Standard hourly billing rates for lawyers in private practice nationwide
average $265 per hour for equity or shareholder partners; $247 per hour
for non-equity partners; $179 per hour for associate lawyers; and $178
per hour for staff lawyers. 6 Although fees at these levels are typically
paid to private attorneys who represent the federal government in civil
matters,57 they are not available in either federal or state criminal courts
54. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform. 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 315, 328
(2002) (arguing that any stable system of quality capital-defense representation must include minimum
lawyer qualifications, at least two lawyers per case, adequate compensation for lawyers and ample
funds for experts and investigators, and appointment mechanisms that prevent patronage and costsaving concerns from trumping quality); Kelly Reissmann, "Our System Is Broken ": A Study of the
Crisis Facing the Death-Eligible Defendant, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 43 (2002) (discussing inadequate

funding as one explanation for ineffective assistance of counsel in death penalty cases); Penny J.
White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265 (2001) (enumerating and dis-

cussing inadequate funding as a cause of errors in capital cases); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
1835 (1994) (examining reasons for deficient representation and the likelihood of improvement); Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defendants, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1617 (1996) (urging establishment of capital trial units to provide specialized legal services to all indigent capital defendants); Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County
Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735 (2003) (arguing that the enormous costs of prosecution and defense in capital cases

results in an arbitrary application of the death penalty); Douglas W. Vinck, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995) (discussing resources provided for indigent defense services in death penalty cases): Albert L. Vreeland. II,

The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 626 (I995) (arguing that inadequate compensation places a financial burden on appointed counsel, impairs their ability to provide adequate representation, and creates
a motivational disincentive to vigorous representation).
55- See NON-CAPITAL COMPENSATION RATES, supra note 40, tbl. at 18-29; THE SPANGENBERG
GROUP, ABA, RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES AT TRIAL: A
STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW, app. tbl. at 1-11 (2003) [hereinafter CAPITAL COMPENSATION RATES].

56. 2002 SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1o (Altman Weil, Inc. ed.. 2002).
This survey also shows the billing rates of lawyers in the upper quartile: $305 for equity partners/shareholders; $290 for non-equity partners: $205 for associate lawyers; and $200 for staff lawyers.

Id.
57. During fiscal years 1999-2001, the federal government paid private attorneys an average fee

of $242 per hour for consultation on litigation with the DOJ's Antitrust Division; an average fee of
$256 per hour for private attorneys engaged in intellectual property consultation with NASA and the
Veteran's Administration; and an average fee of $304 per hour for asset-forfeiture related services

with the U.S. Marshals Service. Letter from Paul L. Jones, Director, Justice Issues, U.S. Gen. Acct.
Off., to the Hon. William D. Delahunt, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (July 3, 2001); see also Knight
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when a person's liberty is at stake. In state felony prosecutions-whether
a death penalty case or a non-capital felony-the fees paid are normally
much less than $9o per hour"5 and funds are not provided to cover attorney overhead expenses. 9 Many states, moreover, have caps on the
amount that can be earned in a particular case. 60 Although after a case is
over, most states permit the fee cap to be exceeded with permission of
the trial judge, this places the defense lawyer in the unenviable position
of seeking the court's permission for additional compensation and not
knowing before
S 6, completing the work whether excess compensation will
be authorized.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice recommend that lawyers
6
who provide defense services should receive "a reasonable hourly rate. , ,
Although "reasonable" is not defined, the commentary to the standard
cites the 1967 report of President Lyndon Johnson's crime commission,
which suggested that defense counsel's fee should be "comparable to that
which an average lawyer would receive from a paying client for performing similar services., 6' As the commentary to the ABA standards explain,

v. Alabama, 824 F. Supp. 1022, 1032-33 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (awarding lead attorney hourly fee rate of
$275 and other lawyers awarded rates ranging from $ioo to $200 per hour in case involving discrimination in Alabama public education); R.C. by Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Nachman, 992 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 (M.D. Ala. i997) (stating that reasonable hourly fee rate was $250 for plaintiffs lead
counsel and $175 for plaintiffs secondary counsel in case involving constitutional and federal statutory
violations in the Alabama Department of Human Resources' child welfare system); Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding $275 per hour as reasonable hourly rate for
plaintiffs attorney in case challenging constitutionality of state statute that discriminated on the basis
of gender and race).
58. NON-CAPITAL COMPENSATION RATES, supra note 40, tbl. at 18-19; CAPITAL COMPENSATION
RATES supra note 55, app. tbl. at i-ii. The table dealing with compensation in non-capital felonies
reveals that almost two-thirds of the states still compensate assigned counsel in the range of $30 to $65
per hour. A fee of $6o per hour is paid to appointed counsel in federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act, with a $5200 maximum that can be exceeded with permission of the trial court. i8 U.S.C.
§ 3oo6A(d) (2000). The highest fee rate in the country for assigned counsel representation appears to
be in federal death penalty cases, in which the government pays not more than $125 per hour. 21
U.S.C. § 848(q)(Io)(A) (2000).
59. NON-CAPITAL COMPENSATION RATES, supra note 40, at 2. Although the payments are not espe-

cially meaningful, there are two states in which overhead expenses are paid to assigned counsel. In
Alabama, in-court compensation rates are $90 per hour, but this is only because $30 for overhead costs
is added to the statutory rate of $6o per hour. Moreover, there are per case maximums on the amount
that can be paid in Alabama unless waived by the trial court, i.e., $3500 for class A felonies; $2500 for
class B felonies; and $15oo for class C felonies. Id. table at I8. In Mississippi, the hourly rate varies
from county to county, but $25 for overhead is added to the hourly fee rate. However, $iooo is the
maximum payment for a felony case, and the trial court cannot waive this fee cap. Id. at 2, tbl. at 24.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. Unlike the other 48 states, Mississippi and Virginia do not permit a judge to increase the
maximum fees provided for assigned counsel. Id.
62. ABA. PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-2.4, at 39.
63. Id. Standard 5-2.4 cmt., at 40.
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"where payments for counsel are deficient, it is exceedingly difficult to
attract able lawyers into criminal practice and to enhance the quality of
the defense bar. But most important, the quality of representation often
suffers when adequate compensation for counsel is not available." 64
Symptomatic of the enormous problems confronting indigent
defense systems is the remarkable amount of litigation throughout
the country concerning the delivery of indigent defense services.65
During the past twenty-five years, there have been cases dealing with
the adequacy of compensation paid to lawyers, 6' excessive case64 Id. Standard 5-2.4 cmit., at 42.
65. See generally Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of CriminalDefense Services, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 293 (2oo2).
66. For cases rejecting claims of inadequate compensation, see, e.g., Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d
76, 79-8o (Ala. 1985) (maximum fee of $Iooo for capital case did not make effective assistance impossible because attorneys have ethical obligation to give their best efforts to their clients); Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 530-31 (Ala. 1979) (underpayment of court-appointed attorneys did not violate
right to effective assistance of counsel.); People v. Dist. Court, 761 P.2d 206, 210 (Colo. 1988) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of appointed counsel due to inadequate compensation of the scheduled maximum total fee for the defense of a class 3 felony of $2000 where defendant was unable to
demonstrate any specific errors, but only alleged that counsel's representation might at some future
time prove constitutionally deficient should case go to trial); Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Court, 555 N.W.2d
216, 217-20 (Iowa 1996) (where attorneys challenged fee guidelines that provided compensation at a
rate of $40 to $6o per hour with maximum fees for certain forms of court-appointed client representation, the court held that evidence of inadequate compensation for court-appointed attorneys did not
justify presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing of specific harm to indigent's
constitutional rights); Postma v. Iowa Dist. Court, 439 N.W.2d. 179, 181-82 (Iowa 1989) (fee guidelines
of $45 per hour with a $iooo cap do not create chilling effect on representation of indigent criminal
defendants): Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 14o n.I, 144-45 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (where
defendant challenged Virginia fee schedule for indigent representation that provided "a maximum fee
of $735 for representation of a defendant charged with a felony punishable by confinement for more
than twenty years: for representation in connection with any other felony charge, $265; and for any
misdemeanor punishable by confinement, $132," the court held that the fee schedule was properly
based on the budgetary priorities of the legislature, and was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
governmental interest in providing the indigent defendant effective assistance of counsel). For cases
sustaining challenges to the level of compensation, see, for example, Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770,
I
775 (Ark. i99 ) (holding that mandatory fee caps constituted a "taking" of attorney's property); White
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 138o (Fla. 1989) (holding that statutory fee cap is unconstitutional when applied in such a manner that curtails courts' inherent power to secure effective, experienced counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d IIO9,
1115 (Fla. 1986) (stating that departure from statutory compensation system is possible in extraordinary and unusual cases to ensure that the attorney would be compensated in accordance with his time,
talents, and energy): Hulse v. Wifat, 3o6 N.W.2d 707,712 (Iowa 1981) (stating that attorneys should be
compensated for reasonable and necessary time); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 850
(Kan. 1987) (Kansas fee system violated the Kansas Constitution); In re Recorder's Court Bar Ass'n,
503 N.W.2d 885, 888, 897 (Mich. 1993) (holding that fee schedule based on a fixed fee is unreasonable,
but court elected to leave implementation of any specific system of compensation up to the discretion
of the Chief Judge); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1216 (N.H. 1983) (fee limit must sometimes be
exceeded in order to protect indigent defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Madden v.
Township of Delran, 6ol A.2d 211, 219 (N.J. 1992) ("financial pressures on unpaid counsel can affect
their performance"); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 115o, 1164 (Okla. 199o) (holding that Oklahoma com-

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:835

loads," and challenges to systems of providing counsel.i Other litigation
has dealt with whether it is the state's duty to gay for indigent defense or
whether the cost must be borne by the county. There is even one case in

pensation system is unconstitutional because of substantial probability that its application is defective);
Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (S.C. 1992) (stating that fee setting statutes should not be interpreted as setting maximum amounts of reimbursement since the statutes do not provide compensation
to ensure effective assistance of counsel); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 544 (W. Va. 1989) ("It is
unrealistic to expect all appointed counsel ... to remain insulated from the economic reality of losing
money each hour they work.... Inevitably, economic pressure must adversely affect the manner in
which at least some cases are conducted.") (emphasis in original); State ex. rel. Friedrich v. Circuit
Court, 531 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Wis. 1995) (compensation at a rate exceeding the statutory fee schedule
should be awarded when necessary to secure qualified and effective counsel).
67. See, e.g., Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1496 (ioth Cir. 1991) (public defenders' inability to
file appellate briefs promptly due to excessive caseloads excused the defendant from exhausting his
state remedies); Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 199o) (appointed counsel's failure to
file appellate brief for five years constituted deprivation of due process); Yourdon v. Kelly, 769 F.
Supp. 112, I15 (W.D.N.Y. I99I) (delay of nearly four years attributable to appointed counsel was sufficiently long to constitute ineffective assistance as matter of law); Harris v. Kuhlman, 6oi F. Supp.
987, 992-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (counsel's failure to perfect indigent defendant's appeal for approximately seven years was gross ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 738, 74748 (Cal. i98o) (excessive caseloads may violate defendants' right to speedy trial); Hatten v. State, 561
So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 199o) (failing to file briefs within the mandated time period was ineffective representation); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783 (La. 1993) (excessive caseloads and insufficient support
services for public defenders created presumption that indigent defendants were not provided constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel). But see Williams v. James, 770 F. Supp. 1O3, 107
(W.D.N.Y. i99i) (delay of two and one-half years, even if attributable to counsel, was not sufficient to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as matter of law).
68. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 68I P.2d. 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (contract bidding system created
rebuttable inference of ineffectiveness of counsel because it overworked the contract attorneys,
thereby violating defendants' rights to due process and counsel as guaranteed by Arizona and U.S.
Constitutions); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public
Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1138 (Fla. 199o) (Six county governments requested a review of a court's
order restricting prosecution of criminal appeals by a particular circuit's public defender to appeals
from that particular circuit. The Florida Supreme Court modified the order slightly to make it more
consistent with existing legislative directions by stating that where excessive backlogs existed, the
courts could appoint private counsel.); Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 161 (Ind. 1999) (evidence of
systemic defects insufficient to trigger a presumption of ineffective assistance); Coleman v. State, 703
N.E.2d 1022, 1039 (Ind. 1998) (evidence of systemic defects did not justify a presumption of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 481 (Ind. 1997) (evidence of systemic defects
did not constitute a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel since defendant failed to establish
that individualized errors due to systemic errors undermined the reliability of his conviction); Kennedy
v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d i, 8 (Minn. 1996) (indigent defendants failed to establish sufficient substandard
assistance of counsel).
69. See, e.g., State v. Crittenden County, 896 S.W.2d 881 (Ark. 1995) (under Arkansas law the
state is responsible for indigent defense fees); In re Order on Prosecutionof CriminalAppeals, 561 So.
2d at 1138 (court has duty to appoint other counsel where public defender has excessive case backlog,
with the county bearing the cost of appointed private counsel); In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. i98o)
("when counsel is constitutionally required, the county, rather than the state, must compensate appointed counsel"); Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 241 N.W.2d 55, 66 (Mich. 1976) (cost of appointed counsel allocated to the county); State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2ooi)
(county has standing to challenge statute requiring it to fund representation of indigent defendants).
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which a court's regularly appointed lawyers went on strike in an effort to
obtain higher compensation rates, which they believed would lead to
better representation and make it possible for them to accept fewer
appointed cases. However, their action ultimately was held by the U.S.
Supreme Court to be a violation of antitrust laws.7'
During 2002-2003, developments in a number of states reflected the
constant problems that confront the delivery of indigent defense services.
As you review the following potpourri, notice that these examples are
from all parts of the country and are of recent origin; these are not events
that occurred years ago, just after Gideon or Argersingerwere decided.
In each instance, moreover, the problems cited are due either in whole or
in part to inadequate funding.7'
In May 2002, The Spangenberg Group, well known for its expertise
in the study of indigent defense services, completed a lengthy, first-ever
report about defender services in Pennsylvania.72 Extensive data were
70. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (199o). This litigation is discussed in
Klein, supra note 53, at 375-80.
71. The problems discussed below are from ten different states, but more states could have been
included in this summary of recent difficulties in the indigent defense area. For example, the Gideon
Project of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants funded a study that covered the Calcasieu Parish Public Defender's Office in Louisiana. The report concluded "that there is a
lack of client contact, little investigative and/or legal work performed on cases prior to trial, no use of
experts, and minimal assertion of clients' legal rights." MICHAEL M. KURTH & DARYL V. BURCKEL, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA I (2003). Additionally, the report noted that felony
caseloads of attorneys were "three times greater than state caseload guidelines recommend" and that

the defender's office "needs additional funding." Id. Similarly, a report of the National Legal Aid &
Defender Association about the public defender's office in Clark County, Nevada, found that "attorney caseloads are in serious breach of national workload standards. The office has been historically
understaffed and there is a serious crisis in adult felony and misdemeanor representation. Juvenile
representation is beyond the crisis point and requires immediate attention to avert constitutional challenges of ineffective assistance of counsel." NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE: CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, at ii (2oo3). Moreover, just as this
Article was being readied for publication, The Spangenberg Group, on behalf of the ABA, issued a
devastating report about Virginia, which catalogued the many ways in which the state's system of indigent defense fails to protect the rights of the poor. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004). available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2oo4.pdf. In an editorial about the Virginia study, the
Washington Post commented that:
[t]he central finding of the report.., is that the commonwealth's system for providing lawyers for poor people accused of crimes "is deeply flawed and fails to provide indigent defendants the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel required by federal and state
law." ... The rash of exonerations nationwide, including in Virginia, has proven that the defense of indigent people cannot be ignored.
Justice Denied in Virginia, WASH. POST, Feb. so, 2004, at A22. For additional examples of states with
indigent defense systems in crisis, see No ExCEPTIONS: A CAMPAIGN TO GUARANTEE A FAIR JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR ALL, VOL. 2: THE CASELOAD CRISIS (2003).
72. THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, A STATEWIDE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES IN PENNSYLVANIA (2002) (on file with Author). The Spangenberg Group is also discussed supra note 48.
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gathered on-site in twelve of the state's sixty-seven counties, including

four of the state's most populous.73 The study concluded that "underfunding of indigent defense has resulted in inadequate attorney perform'74

ance and poor morale among public defenders and conflict attorneys.
The report further observed that "Pennsylvania suffers from a lack of

any centralized authority to provide coordinated
planning, oversight or
75

management of the defense function.
In December 2002, the Chief Justice's Commission on Indigent De-

fense in Georgia issued its final report. 76 The Commission, after two
years of extensive study, concluded that Georgia was "not providing
adequate funding to fulfill the constitutional mandate that all citizens
have effective assistance of counsel available when charged with a

crime.

'77

Further, the Commission noted that there was a lack of state-

wide oversight of indigent defense;78 a failure "to impose minimum eligibility requirements" for attorneys who defend indigents;79 a lack of funds
for expert witnesses and investigators; 8' and a lack of "an effective ap-

proach to providing counsel for juvenile defendants., 8 ' The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution's headline about the report was succinct: "Indigent
Defense Rates F.""S2 The article pointed out that the overhaul recommended by the commission will "cost the state tens of millions of dollars
at a time
when the government is cutting back because of falling reve'83
nues."

73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 81.
75. Id. at 78.
76. See

REPORT

OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S

COMM'N

ON INDIGENT

DEFENSE

(2002),

available at

http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idcreport.doc.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Rates F, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 12, 2002, at IA.
83. Id.; see also Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook, Indigent Defense to Cost Millions, ATLANTA J.CONST., Dec. 13, 2002, at iE. For more information on indigent defense services in Georgia, see Bill
Rankin, Three Systems: Is One Superior?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 25, 2002, at 2IA; bill, Rankin, Justice Delayed, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 2, 2002, at IA.
On May 22, 2003, the Georgia Legislature passed the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003. See
2003 Ga. Laws 32 (H.B. 770). The new legislation creates public defender offices in each of the state's
judicial districts and also establishes a public defender standards council to set guidelines for public
defenders throughout the state. The new public defender system is scheduled to begin operations in
2005. Funding to implement the new legislation has not yet been approved. Under the current Georgia
program, pursuant to which counties receive grants from the state for indigent defense, the state expects to spend approximately $6.3 million in 2003 and $8.3 million in 2004. In contrast, Governor
Perdue of Georgia estimated that the new system will cost $50-$70 million per year. Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Gets Force But Needs Funds, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 2003, at IF.
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In November 2002, a lawsuit was filed by associations of criminal defense lawyers in Detroit's Wayne Circuit Court, challenging the fees paid
to assigned counsel. 84 The fee schedule, one of the lowest in the nation,
allocates only $250 for the investigation and preparation of felony cases,
including even the most serious cases such as first-degree murder. 5 The
lawsuit alleges that lawyers who accept appointments at this fee rate are
discouraged from doing all that is required to adequately represent their
clients, tend to take more cases than they should, and that some lawyers
will simply not accept cases for these modest fees. 6 In fact, the number of
defense lawyers available to accept court-appointed cases in Wayne
County has fallen from 465 in 1999 to 317 in 2002.87 The court's chief
judge expressed sympathy for the defense lawyers, but said that the requested fee increase to $90 per hour would cost an additional
$ii mil88
lion, and the court's finances are not sufficient to cover this.
At a hearing on indigent defense conducted during the ABA Midyear Meeting in February 2003, the Chief Appellate Defender of Montana told of deficiencies in that state's system, noting a lack of uniformity
in quality and oversight of the work performed by defense counsel. 8 He
referred to two recent convictions overturned in Montana due to DNA
evidence, explaining that in both cases the defense attorneys did little to
challenge bogus expert testimony presented by the state.' In February
2002, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against
Montana and seven counties, alleging that due to a "failure to supervise
and fund indigent defense [programs] adequately... [attorneys for indigent defendants] cannot confer with clients in a meaningful manner,....
conduct necessary pre-trial investigations, secure necessary expert assis84. Compl. for Writ of Superintending Control at 2, In re Wayne County Criminal Defense Bar
Ass'n. 663 N.W.2d 471 (Mich. 2003) (No. 122709), available at http://www.nadcl.org/public.nsf/Defense
Updates/WayneCo/$FILElWaynoeCoComplaint.pdf. See also Shawn D. Lewis, Lawyers Sue Courtfor
Raise, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2002, at IA: Suzette Hackney, Lawyers Sue Circuit Court, DETROr
FREE PRESS, Nov. 12, 2002: Defense Lawyers, Low Pay Buys Only Injustice for Poor Defendants, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 12, 2002. "The problem is national in scope. Around the country, counties and
states are unwilling to spend more for defending those who are least able to defend themselves. Some
counties actually contract with the lowest-bidding attorney for all their indigent cases." Id. See also
Frank D. Eaman, Michigan- 4 8th in the Country in Assigned Counsel Fees, CHAMPION, Dec. 2001, at
43.
85. See Lewis, supra note 84.
86. Compl. for Writ of Superintending Control at 12-13, In re Wayne County Crim. Def. Bar
Ass'n 663 N.W.2d 471 (Mich. 2003) (No. 122709).
87. See Lewis, supra note 84.
88. Id. Subsequently, the case was appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied all
relief. See Wayne County Criminal Def. Bar Ass'n v. Chief Judges of Wayne Circuit Court, 663
N.W.2d 471 (Mich. 2003).
89. See Chad Wright, Address at the ABA Midyear Meeting (Feb. 7, 2003).
o
9 . See id.
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tance, or prepare adequately for hearings or trials."9 ' The lawsuit asks
that an indigent defense system be put in place that complies with the
U.S. and Montana Constitutions. 9
At this same hearing during the 2003 ABA Midyear Meeting, the
chief criminal judge of the King County Superior Court in Seattle testified that there is much that his county must do "before the promise of
' He explained
Gideon v. Wainwright has been fulfilled."93
that "[t]he perennial problem for all public defenders and legal aid services is funding
and caseload levels, and Washington state is no exception in this regard."94 For example, he noted that the Washington legislature had
adopted caseload standards, which also are endorsed by the state bar association, but that "the caseloads in many jurisdictions far exceed this
standard."95 In addition, the chief judge noted that in misdemeanor cases
assigned counsel are not appointed until well after the defendant's first
court appearance, with some defendants pleading guilty without ever
speaking to a lawyer, and that there is not an effective system for monitoring assigned counsel and defender agencies to determine if their clients are being effectively represented. 9
Also, in February 2003, a trial court judge in New York City held
that the assigned counsel fee rates in Family Court, Criminal Court, and*
the Criminal Term of Supreme Court-$40 per hour for in-court work
and $25 per hour for out-of-court work-were unconstitutional.' Based
upon the evidence of forty-one witnesses and 435 exhibits, he concluded
that
i) assigned counsel are necessary; 2) there are an insufficient number
of them; 3) the insufficient number results in denial of counsel, delay in

proceedings, excessive caseloads, and inordinate intake and arraignment shifts; further resulting in rendering less than meaningful and effective assistance of counsel, and impairment of the judiciary's ability
to function; and 4) the current assigned counsel compensation8
scheme ... is the cause of the insufficient number of assigned counsel.

91. Amended Compl. at 4, White v. Martz (filed Feb. 14,2002) (No. C DV-2002-I 3 3 ), available at

http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=i I35I&c=48 (last visited Aug. 14, 2003);
see also Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files Class-Action Lawsuit Against
Montana's Indigent Defense Program (Feb. 14, 2002).
92. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 91.

93. Chief Judge Michael S. Spearman, Remarks, Are We Keeping the Promise? The Right to
Counsel 40 Years After Gideon v. Wainwright (Feb. 7, 2003).

9495.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397,399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
Id. at 44o.
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The judge was especially critical of the "pusillanimous posturing and
procrastination of the executive and legislative branches" of New York's
state government, which had failed for years to increase assigned counsel
fee rates.9 To remedy the situation, the court ordered that fee rates be
increased to $90 per hour.0 °
On December 3, 2002, the Capital News Service in Maryland reported that the Office of Public Defender in Maryland was "so bogged
down in cases that it would have to hire more than 300 attorneys just to
meet the American Bar Association's minimum standard."'' According
to the head of the office, "[tihe average Maryland public defender can
only dedicate eight minutes a day per case . .... Despite significant
caseload increases, the size of the public defender's office has not increased during the past five years.' 3 The article also noted that lawyers
employed by the Attorney General's Office are better compensated than
public defenders, prompting some defenders to leave the office in order
99. Id. at 399.
ioo. Id. at 415. Although the trial judge ordered the State of New York to pay assigned counsel an
"interim rate" of $9o per hour, the opinion indicates that the permanent injunction is only effective
"until modification of County Law § 722-b by the Legislature." Id. at 415. On May 15, 2003, both the
Senate and the Assembly voted to override the Governor's veto (A.B. 21o6, 226TH Leg., Annual Sess.
(N.Y. 2003)) of the bill that compensates assigned counsel at a rate of $6o per hour for in-court and
out-of-court work in matters dealing with misdemeanors or lesser offenses; and a rate of $75 per hour
for in-court and out-of-court work in matters dealing with felonies and appellate proceedings. See N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 2003). The new rates become effective on January 1, 2004, and will
be funded by the Indigent Legal Services Fund administered by the Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance and the Comptroller. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 98-b (McKinney 2003). It is unclear what
effect the legislature's action will have on the pending appeal of this case. However, the New York
County Lawyers' Association "believes that the new law does not go far enough" and "remains committed to [the appeal] of its case." John Caher, County Lawyers' Group Sits Out Celebration Of Assigned-CounselRate Hike Legislation, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 2003, at I.
ioi. See Tamara El-Khoury, Maryland Public Defenders Overburdened with Cases, CAPITAL NEWS
SERVICE, NOV. 27, 2002 (on file with Author). "The situation has gotten so desperate, as of spring, Baltimore's public defender's office has refused to take any more cases. Maryland's Public Defender,
Stephen Harris, capped open cases per attorney at 6o." Id. The ABA standard dealing with attorney
workloads cites with approval recommendations on caseloads first developed in 1973 by the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which provided:
that an attorney handle no more than the following number of cases in each category each
year: 150 felonies per attorney per year; or 400 misdemeanors per attorney per year; or 200
juvenile cases per attorney per year; or 2oo mental commitment cases per attorney per year;
or 25 appeals per attorney per year.
ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, standard 5-5.3, cmt. at 72 (citing NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS 13.12 (1973)). The number of "open" or "pending" cases that a public defender has at a given time, which is what
is referred to in the above news article, is different from the number of cases that a lawyer
can handle during a twelve month period. The latter is the focus of the ABA's commentary
to Standard 5-5.3.
102. EI-Khoury, supra note oi.
lO3. Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:835

to join the Attorney's General's. 4 Moreover, assigned counsel fee rates
in Maryland are $35 per hour for in-court work and $30 per hour for
work performed out-of-court. 05
In January 2003, the ABA Journal reported that due to a state
budget shortfall, the Oregon judicial department was required to reduce
its expenditures by $13.6 million.' ° Because indigent defense is a line
item in the budget of the state's judicial department, this "will drastically
reduce the indigent defense fund."'" An official of the Oregon state bar
acknowledged that "legal and constitutional issues were likely to be
raised."' °8 In February, the ACLU in Oregon filed an original mandamus
action in the Oregon Supreme Court challenging cuts in funding necessary to compensate attorneys to represent indigent defendants from
March i through June 30, 20037 °" The lawsuit also sought restoration of
$io.i million previously cut from the Judicial Department's Indigent Defense Account."' In March 2003, the Oregon Supreme Court denied the
ACLU petition."'
Also, in March 2003, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. issued a report summarizing the terrible plight of criminal and
juvenile representation for the poor in Mississippi.1 2 As the report notes,
it is not the first time an organization has attempted to point out the
state's shortcomings: "Reports commissioned by the Mississippi Bar Association in 1995, 1997, and 1998 found that 'funding for indigent defense
in Mississippi is totally inadequate,' and 'results in poor quality service
and representation.""' I'3 Among other problems, the report cites lengthy
delays before lawyers are appointed and consult with their clients, high
caseloads for court-appointed lawyers who operate with no standards or
supervision, and a lack of investigations and other kinds of basic support

1o4. Id. In response to the current caseload crisis, the Maryland legislature appropriated an additional $1,087,631 to the Office of the Public Defender. Budget Bill, H.B. 40, H.B. 40 , 417th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003) (making 2003 deficiency appropriations in the amounts of $803,598 and
$284,033 for hiring new staff).
io5.
IO6.
107.
io8.

EI-Khoury, supra note rot.
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Courts' Cash Crunch, ABA J. REP., Jan. 24, 2003.

Id.
Id.

to9. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of OR Sues to Force Lawmakers to Fund Criminal
Courts, at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/CrimnalJustice.cfm (last visited Feb. so, 2003).
IIo. Id.
I I I. State ex rel Metro. Pub. Defender Servs, Inc. v. Courtney, 64 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Or. 2003).
112. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI'S

INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 2 (2003) [hereinafter NAACP REPORT, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE].
113. Id. at 7.
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for the defense function."' The report calls for a number of reforms, including "adequate state funding" for indigent defense," 5 a "statewide indigent defense oversight entity"' 6 to "monitor performance" of
counsel," 7 and "[m]aximum caseload guidelines.' 1.
In January 2003, former Governor George Ryan of Illinois announced his now famous decision to commute the death sentences of all
persons on that state's death row." 9 His action was prompted by his conviction that the capital punishment system in Illinois did not effectively
sort out the innocent from the guilty and by the fact that at least seventeen innocent persons had been sentenced to die by Illinois courts.'2 ° In
announcing his decision, the former governor stated that in addition to
the seventeen defendants who were freed during his tenure, "there were
at least thirty-three other people wrongly convicted on murder charges
and exonerated.... How many more cases of wrongful conviction have
to occur before we can all agree that the system is broken?"' The former governor also noted that there were thirty-three persons on death
row in Illinois who were "represented ... at trial by an attorney who had
later been disbarred or at some point suspended from practicing law .... .

114. Id. at 6; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., FORTY YEARS AFTER GIDEON

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND REPORT FINDS AN INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS IN MISSISSIPPI (2oo3).
115. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., supra note 112, at 22. "With the exception of death penalty cases, the State of Mississippi does not contribute one dollar towards the representation of poor defendants. Instead, it requires counties to shoulder the full obligation of
providing lawyers for the poor. It is an obligation that many counties cannot or will not honor." Id.
at 6.
116.Id.

at 22.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Jan. 12,
2003).

i2o. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Since Governor Ryan's decision to commute the sentences of all death row inmates, the
Illinois legislature has passed legislation to reform capital punishment in Illinois. See S.B. 472, 93rd
Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003) (creating capital punishment reform study committee (§ 2(a)), decertifying police officers who knowingly and willingly make false statements during homicide proceedings (§ 6.1(h)), and providing for post-conviction DNA testing); see also § 116-3(a), S.R. 17, 93rd Gen.
Assem. Reg. Sess. (Il1. 2003) (urging Illinois Supreme Court to appoint a standing committee of judges
familiar with capital case management to provide resources to trial judges who are responsible for trying capital cases); S.R. 18, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2003) (urging Illinois Supreme Court to develop a
digest of applicable law so that information regarding relevant case law and other resources can be
widely disseminated to those trying capital cases); S.R. 19, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2003) (urging Illinois
Supreme Court to implement a process to certify judges qualified to hear capital cases either by virtue
of experience or training); S.R. 20, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2003) (urging Illinois Supreme Court to
amend Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to extend prosecutor's obligation to disclose evidence
that tends to negate guilt of defendant even after conviction).
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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Since Gideon was decided in 1963, it has become clear beyond any
doubt that innocent persons are regularly convicted in the nation's criminal courts and are sometimes even sentenced to death. When Powell v.
Alabama'23 was decided in 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke about the
difficulty of innocent persons proving their innocence in the absence of
counsel,' 4 but until recent years I suspect that most persons believed that
innocent persons rarely were convicted. Now, however, we know that
wrongful convictions occur with some frequency, which ought to make
government officials especially interested in making certain that adequate defense services are provided to the indigent. Not only is this important to assure that innocent persons are not imprisoned, but also
because every wrongful conviction means that the crime's real perpetrator remains at large and able to commit new offenses.
The evidence of wrongful convictions can be found in a variety of
sources, including law review articles,'25 books, ' and websites. 7 There is
also a notable report issued in 1996 by the National Institute of Justice of
the DOJ, which covers twenty-eight cases of convicted defendants who
were cleared due to DNA evidence."" In twenty-three of the cases, vic-

287 U.S. 45, 45 (1932).
Id. at 68-69.
125. See, e.g. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI.
123.

124.

L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 75-80, 90-92 (1999) (discussing how innocent persons can be convicted and

the difficult burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel); Penny J. White, Errorsand Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265, 1287-95, 1296-98 (2001) (investigating Illinois rules
to eliminate causes of errors in capital cases and recommending additional remedies to provide a reliable system in capital defense cases); James S.Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: ErrorRates in Capital
Cases 1973-i995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, i844 (2000) (studying 4578 capital sentences reviewed in state
appellate courts and 599 capital sentences reviewed in the federal courts and concluding that capital
sentences spend much time under judicial review precisely because they are persistently prone to error).
126. See generally BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); C. Ronald HUFF & ARYE RATTNER,
CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1996);

MICHAEL L. RADELET ET

AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991).

127. See, e.g., Staff of the House Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rts., Comm. on the Judiciary,
I03rd Cong., Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html; Dr. Edmund Higgings, New Database Reveals Wrongful
Convictions Epidemic, at http://www.dredmundhiggings.com; How the System Works, at http://www
.truthinjustice.org/systemworks.htm; The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org.;
Wrongful Conviction Reading Room, at http://www.law-forensic.com/wrongful-conviction-reading
_room.htm.
128. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF

DNA

EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNO-
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tims of crimes had positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator,
clearly demonstrating the fallibility of eyewitness identification.'29
At the time this Article was completed, the website of the Innocence
Project recounted the stories of 142 persons, convicted of both capital
and non-capital crimes, who had been exonerated due to DNA evidence. 3 ' Another website contains a list of more than 300 persons wrongfully convicted, a list of the thirty-eight states in which the wrongful
convictions occurred, and the basis for classifying a case as one of wrongful conviction.'3 ' The painstaking research of Radelet and Bedau documents the cases of nearly 400 innocent persons who were convicted,
some of whom were sentenced to death.' 32 Another study estimates that
even if the error rate in serious felony cases was only one-half of one
percent, the number of wrongful convictions annually is as high as ten
thousand nationwide.'33
The studies of wrongful convictions cite a number of reasons why
mistakes occur. In addition to eyewitness errors, there are informants
who give false information, police-induced false confessions, and various
other kinds of police and prosecutorial misconduct.'" Of course, another

CENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) [hereinafter NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE REPORT]. See also Higgings, supra note
127.

129. Bernhard, supra note 125, at 75. The stories on establishing the innocence of these twentythree individuals are collected in the Nat'l Inst. of Justice Report, supra note 128, at 34-76.
130. Innocence Project, supra note 127.
131. See Higgings, supra note 127.
132. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 126, at 19.
133. See id. at 54-62. It has been suggested that these estimates are too low since they are solely
based on convictions of innocent people following trial, and there undoubtedly are persons innocent of
the offenses to which they plead guilty. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RTrrGERs L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1997). Although ten
thousand wrongful convictions may seem like a very high number, it is a mere one-half of one percent
of the nearly two million persons incarcerated in the United States. See infra note 567, at is.
134. See HuFF ET AL., supra note 126, at 53-83 (listing the following reasons for wrongful convictions: eyewitness error, prosecutorial and police misconduct and errors, mistakes made during plea
bargaining, community pressure, inadequacy of counsel, accusations by the guilty, criminal records,
and race); George Castelle & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Misinformation and Wrongful Convictions, in
WRONGLY CONVICrED, supra note 126, at 31-32 (discussing effect of DNA testing on the conviction
rate); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONvIcTED, supra note 126, at 42-44 (explores cases where innocent individuals were induced by police to
give false confessions); Clifford S. Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED, supra note 126, at 61-72 (analyzing the role of informants in wrongful convictions); Dianne L. Martin, The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative Study, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra note 126, at 77-8o.
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major factor that contributes to wrongful convictions is the inadequacy of
legal representation.'35
The case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard, who was released in the fall of
2002 after serving fifteen years in a Montana prison, provides a vivid illustration of what can happen when defense representation is inadequate.' 36 In 1987, a brutal rape of an eight-year-old girl occurred in
Billings, Montana. Bromgard, who was then eighteen years old, was arrested because a policeman believed that he resembled a composite
sketch of the girl's assailant.'3 7 The victim was never certain that
Bromgard was her attacker; prior to trial she said she was "6o or 65 percent sure.' ' .. At trial, she was asked to rate her confidence in her identification of Bromgard, and she replied, "I am not too sure."'39 Bromgard's
lawyer, who was under contract with the county to provide defense services for a flat fee regardless of the number of hours that he worked on a
case, failed to challenge the girl's courtroom identification of Bromgard,
undertook no investigation, gave no opening statement, did not prepare
a closing argument, and failed to file an appeal in the case.'40 The lawyer
also failed to object when the state's expert witness testified, without scientific basis, that the chances were only one in one hundred thousand
that scalp and pubic hairs found at the crime scene were not
Bromgard's."' But for DNA evidence, Bromgard would still be in a Montana prison today.
Neither the number of mistakes attributable to defense counsel errors nor the exact number of wrongful convictions can ever be known.
For policymakers, however, it ought to be sufficient that there are many
wrongful convictions and that one of the most important ways to avoid
mistakes is to have skillful, well-trained defense lawyers. Former Attorney General Janet Reno stated it well: "[i]n the end, a good lawyer is the
best defense against wrongful conviction

....

'

But in order to have

good lawyers, the country must be willing to pay for them.
135. See, e.g., SCHECK ET AL., supra note 126, at 231-33 (illustrating the importance of a capable
lawyer); HUFF ET AL., supra note 126, at 76-77 (discusses impact of counsel's adequacy on conviction of
the innocent).
136. Innocence Project, Poor Defense Lawyering, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
badlawyering.php; Innocence Project, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/
display-profile; Barry C. Scheck & Sarah L. Tofte, Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant,
CHAMPION, Feb. 2003, at 39-40.
137. Scheck & Tofte, supra note 136, at 39-40.
138. Id. at 40.
139. Id.
140. State v. Bromgard, 948 P.2d 182, 183 (Mont. 1997). Bromgard was sentenced on three counts
of felony sexual intercourse to three concurrent terms of forty years imprisonment. Id.
141. See id.
142. NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE,

supra note 44, at vii.
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II. CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN ENGLAND
Since the legal system in the United States is derived from England,
it might be expected that our systems of public defense would resemble
each other. Yet, as an English scholar who has studied both the English
and U.S. systems has said, "[A]merican readers may note with wonderment how it is that two cultures, which share so much in their common
in the practilaw origins and procedures, should have diverged so widely
143
cal application of broadly similar principles of justice."'
My own study of criminal defense in the United States and England
confirms that there are numerous and significant ways in which our systems differ and that the comparisons are unflattering to the United
States. An examination of the historical development of public defense
in England is useful in understanding the country's current system and
how it achieved, in the words of one of England's experts on legal aid,
"what is probably the most comprehensive system of state-funded legal
assistance to criminal suspects and defendants in the world.'"
A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LEGAL AID

In England, unlike the United States, furnishing legal counsel to the
poor in both criminal and civil cases has long been regarded as the duty
of the central government, much the way the English government provides health care for its citizens through the National Health Service.'45
Moreover, while the right to counsel in the United States has developed
through court decisions, 46 legislation has been the vehicle in England.'47
The first legislation to fund legal services in Britain-the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act-was enacted in 19o3.'4s However, the law "was limited to those of insufficient means who were on trial on indictment for
serious offences, and then only in cases where it appeared to the court
'desirable in the interest of justice' that they should be legally represented."' 49 Although the scope of defendants covered was somewhat ex-

143.

LORD DAVID WINDLESHAM, DISPENSING JUSTICE

166 (2OOI).

144. Lee Bridges, Recent Developments in Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales-

Contracting, Quality and the Public Defender Experiment., Report to International Legal Aid Conference. Melbourne, Australia (June 2001) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Recent Developments
in Criminal Legal Aid]. Professor Bridges is the Director of the Legal Research Institute, University of
Warwick School of Law, England.
145. GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 518 (5th ed. 2001); see also Lee
Bridges, The Right to Representationand Legal Aid, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 138-42 (Mike
McConville & Geoffrey Wilson eds., 2002) [hereinafter Bridges, The Right to Representation).
146. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
147. See Bridges, Recent Developments in Criminal Legal Aid, supra note 144, at 2-5.
148. Bridges, The Right to Representation, supranote 145, at 139.
149. Id.
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panded in 1930, payments
to lawyers under that act have been character5 °
ized as inadequate.'
Then, in 1949, well before most of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark right to counsel decisions, 5 ' the Legal Advice and Assistance Act
was passed."' This law called for legal representation at public expense
for all persons of insufficient financial means in Magistrates' Courts,
where the vast majority of criminal cases originate and are prosecuted.' 3
The law also provided for counsel whenever the court deemed it to be
"in the interests of justice," as well as "reasonable" payments to lawyers
who would be paid from government funds. 5 4 In addition, the act extended legal services to civil cases and was regarded by the Labor government, which backed the legislation, as "the 'second arm of the
Welfare State' (the first one being the National Health Insurance)."' 55
During the i96os, partly because of differences in the ways courts
applied the "interests of justice" test for providing counsel, the Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (known as the
Widgery Committee, after the name of its chairman) was formed.' s6
Among the Widgery Committee's recommendations was a series of criteria for determining when legal aid should be granted in Magistrates'
Courts."'

Thus, legal aid would be made available only where the defendant was
in "real danger" of imprisonment or loss of employment or reputation
if convicted; where the defence involved substantial questions of law or
tracing and interviewing witnesses; or because representation of the
defendant was necessary to conduct cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses or in the interest of someone other than the defendant. I"8
The Widgery Committee also rejected "an American-style public defender service" in favor of continuing to have lawyers bill the government for their legal services on a case-by-case basis. 9 Although these
recommendations were adhered to for many years, the compensation
scheme for lawyers has now been changed and a few public defender of150. Id.
151. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
152. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 139.
153. Id. For a discussion of Magistrates' Courts, including their criminal jurisdiction, see CATHERINE ELLiorr & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 183-201 (4th ed. 2002).
154. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 139.
155. SLAPPER & KELLY,supra note 145, at 518.
156. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 139-40.
157. Id. at i4o.
158. Id. The current basis for granting the right to representation, which is similar to the quoted
material, is codified in the Access to Justice Act of 1999. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, sched. 3
(Eng.).
159. Bridges, The Right to Representation, supra note 145, at i4o.

March 2004]

LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

fices recently were established, as explained later.' 6° On the other hand,
another of the committee's recommendations has endured, namely, that
courts should not assign solicitors to represent defendants,
but instead
6
should permit defendants to select their own counsel.' '
During the 197os and I98os, the number of criminal cases increased,
as well as the volume of cases in which counsel was authorized by the
courts to provide representation under what became known as the
"Widgery criteria.'16,In addition, during the i98os, two "duty solicitor"
programs were introduced in which solicitors were made available to assist defendants wanting representation in police stations and Magistrates'
Courts.
In 1982, in Magistrates' Courts, a duty solicitor scheme, originally
organized by local law societies,'6 became a national program. 6' Thus,
steps were taken to assure that in all Magistrates' Courts eligible defendants would have prompt access to the legal services of a duty solicitor,
although defendants remained free to select their own counsel if they
preferred. 6' Then, in 1984, pursuant to the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act (PACE), which dealt with a number of police procedures, a national
duty solicitor scheme was introduced to ensure that lawyers would be
present in police stations before and during police interrogations.' 66 Like
duty solicitors in Magistrates' Courts, duty solicitors in police stations
were to be paid by the government from legal aid funds.i67 In addition, at
government expense, since 1959 persons who qualify under a means test
have been able to obtain legal "advice and assistance" from solicitors

16o. See infra notes 285-306, 332-53 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 344-46, 522-23 and accompanying text. The British legal profession is comprised of two separate branches: barristers and solicitors. ELLior & QUINN, supra note 153, at 122.
Both groups can act as advocates in courts and also render other legal services; however, barristers
generally spend a higher proportion of their time in courts. In addition, some types of legal services
have been reserved to a particular branch. For example, conveyancing work has traditionally been the
domain of solicitors, while advocacy in higher courts is handled by barristers. Id. The focus of this Article is on solicitors who provide the initial representation of defendants in criminal cases, represent
their clients in courts except at trials, and arrange to bring barristers into cases in the event of trials.
The "rights of audience" of solicitors in courts is discussed infra note 336.
162. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at I4O-4I.
I63. "[The Law Society] is the profession's governing body controlled by a council of elected
members and an annually elected President. Its powers and duties are derived from the Solicitors Act
1974." SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 145, at 485. "There are 127 local law societies in England and
Wales offering a range of services and support to solicitors within their region." The Law Society of
England and Wales, Local Law Societies at http://www.lawsoc.org.uk (last visited June 29, 2003).
164. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 142.

165. Id.
166. See id. at I43.
167. Id.
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concerning criminal law matters even though the persons, have neither
been arrested nor charged with a crime. '68
Although government funds were used to pay solicitors and barristers who provided defense services, the country's legal aid program was
administered for many years by The Law Society,' 69 which is "the professional body for solicitors in England and Wales"... [that seeks] to improve access to the law."'7 In 1988, however, the government created the
Legal Aid Board (LAB), which became responsible for the administration of legal aid under the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor's Department. 7 '
Under the LAB during the 199os, significant changes were introduced, which have shaped England's current system of legal aid. First, in
lieu of reimbursing lawyers for their time based upon their hourly billing
rates, the LAB adopted standard fees for some legal work. "' In addition,
the LAB introduced quality standards for solicitors,'73 Transaction Criteria for use in auditing law firms,' 74 and, on a voluntary basis, began to
"franchise" firms of solicitors based on "their adopting improved procedures for case management and information-recording on cases."'7 5 A
system for accrediting police station representatives also was begun, although the actual accreditation testing continues to be conducted under
the supervision of the Law Society by independent assessment organizations., 6 Finally, much of the bureaucracy responsible for administering

168. Tamara Goriely, The Development of CriminalLegal Aid in England and Wales, in ACCESS TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL AID, LAWYERS AND THE DEFENCE OF LIBERTY 50 (Young and Walls eds.,

1996); ELLIOTr & QUINN, supra note 153, at 211, 222. The Lord Chancellor's Department has proposed
to abolish "post-charge advice and assistance," which is available to a defendant who "has been
charged but before the first hearing when either a Representation Order is granted or early hearing
advocacy assistance provided." However, there are no plans to eliminate "pre-charge assistance,"
which is what is referred to here. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, DELIVERING VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICE §§ 3.1.1-3.1.3 (2003).
169. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 144.
17o. The Law Society, The Premier Legal Website, at http://www.lawsoc.org.uk (last visited June
29, 2003).

171. Bridges, The Right to Representation, supra note 145, at 144. For a discussion of the role of the
responsibilities and role of the Lord Chancellor's Department, see ELLIOTr & QUINN, supra note 153,
at 451-54.
172. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 144. See discussion of standard fees
infra at note 291 and accompanying text.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 220-70.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 437-41.
175. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145. at 144.
176. E-mail from Tim Collieu. Criminal Defence Service, Legal Services Commission, to Norman
Lefstein (Sept. 18, 2003, 08:30:00 a.m., CST) (on file with Author); see also infra text accompanying
notes 381-86.
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the current legal aid program was organized under the LAB since by
1991-1992 the board already had a staff of 1,300 persons.'77
However, the government became increasingly alarmed about the
amount of public funds being spent on legal aid.' 75 Thus, on several occasions government ministers and reports discussed the growth in the cost
of legal aid and the need to do something about the expenditures. This is
likely surprising to American readers since in the United States state
governments almost never spend sufficient funds on public defense and
government officials rarely, if ever, complain that too much money is being spent to defend the poor.
In 1992, in an address to the Law Society, the then Lord Chancellor
expressed concern about civil and criminal legal aid costs:
Expenditure on legal aid is now over £i.i billion gross.... The net cost
to the taxpayer in 1991-92, after allowing for legal aid contributions
and costs recovered, was more than £90 m. The net figure... will exceed Li billion during [1992-93], more than double what it was a mere
four years ago.... This rate growth, and that's what I'm speaking of,
cannot be allowed to continue. Every extra pound for legal aid means a
pound less for the NHS [National Health Service], for schools, for social security, or for the infrastructure of the economy. 7 9
Although in the 199os eligibility for legal services in civil cases was
restricted and fees for solicitors in criminal cases effectively reduced, legal aid expenditures continued to climb.' s In 1996, therefore, the Lord
Chancellor's Department presented a White Paper to Parliament recommending a significant overhaul of legal aid. In this report, Striking the
Balance: The Future of Legal Aid in England and Wales,' 8' the government again commented on the cost of legal aid and sketched the general
direction of future changes:
In 1995-96, legal aid cost the taxpayer £1.4 billion, twice as much as
five years ago. It is forecast to rise by more than £ioo million in each of
the next three years. More cases, inflation and the development of new
services account for part of that steep increase. However, the average
cost of legal bills continues to rise faster than inflation.... The future
of legal aid must be seen in the context of the wider pressures on public
spending. The Government is committed to maintaining and improving
the competitiveness of the national economy. We are therefore determined to contain overall public spending.... The Government cannot

177. Erhard Blankenburg, The Lawyers' Lobby and the Welfare State: The PoliticalEconomy of
Legal Aid, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID 123 (Francis Regan et al. eds., 1999).
178. SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 145, at 518-19.

179. Id. at 519. The sums listed in the quotation are for the cost of criminal and civil legal aid.
18o. See WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 136.
I8i. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, STRIKING THE BALANCE: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL AID IN ENGLAND
AND WALES (I996).
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be expected to increase legal aid's share of taxpayer's money.... This
means that the rapid expansion of legal aid in the past cannot be allowed to continue, and any improvements in the scheme that call for
resources will in the future have to depend to a very considerable extent on getting more for the money available than we do now; and/or
being able to redirect existing resources. It also follows, more bleakly,
that if the cost of legal aid continues to rise, it might well become necessary to take steps that would reduce the level and perhaps quality of
services."'

According to the White Paper, the changes to legal aid would be
"radical... [because] [n]othing less will do."' ' To counter ever-rising legal aid costs, the report proposed the extensive use of contracts with solicitors while simultaneously promoting "quality" in criminal legal aid.'8
The Conservative Government issued Striking the Balance in 1996,
but it was left to the new Labor Government, elected in 1997, to make
further changes in England's system of legal aid. Legislation to do so was
accompanied by a second White Paper, which dealt with numerous
criminal justice issues, including legal aid. Like its predecessor, Modernising Justice'5 addressed the cost of legal aid and the objectives in changing the system.
Thus, the report compared amounts spent on civil and criminal legal
aid between 1992-1993 and 1997-1998, noting that there had been a

forty-four percent increase in legal aid costs compared to a thirteen percent increase in inflation.' 86 The report's greatest concern was reserved
for fees paid for defense representation in Crown Court, in which the
most serious and complex criminal cases are prosecuted. 8, In these
courts, the cost increase was 58% over the same five-year period, although the number of new cases each year remained unchanged.' 8 The
report also pointed out that "[i]n 1996-97, 42% of legal aid spending in
the Crown Court (almost fII6 million was on just I,OOO (i %) of the
cases; an average of Li15,627 per case."'
Nevertheless, the report declared that, in changing the criminal legal
aid system, defendants must "receive a fair hearing" and the defense

182. Id. at 7-8.
183. Id. at5.
184 Id. at Io-ii.

185.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, MODERNISING JUSTICE: THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR REFORMING

LEGAL SERVICES AND THE COURTS 2-3 (1998) [hereinafter MODERNISING JUSTICE].

i86. Id. at 60.
187. For a discussion of the Crown Court and its jurisdiction, see SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 145,
at 139-47.
188. MODERNISING JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 6o.
189. Id. at 61.
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must be "on an equal footing with the prosecution."'" Moreover, the report expressed support for the independence of the defense function, observing that the "the defence must be free from influence by the
prosecution or the courts.'' At the same time, the report proclaimed the
government's commitment to achieving its objectives "at an affordable
cost to the taxpayer, and in a way that secures
services of the right qual92
ity, for the best possible value for money."'
B.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AND THE LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION

The bill to revamp the legal aid scheme in England was introduced
in Parliament in 1998 on the same day that Modernising Justice was published by the government.'93 The Access to Justice Act,"9 enacted by Parliament in 1999, established the Legal Services Commission (LSC) under
the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, who is authorized to appoint the
commission's members. The commission consists of two parts: the
Community Legal Service to oversee the provision of civil legal aid and
the Criminal Defence Service (CDS) for the purpose of "securing that
individuals involved in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings
have access to such advice, assistance and representation as the interests
of justice require."' 6 In April 2001, the LSC replaced the LAB and as19o. Id. at 59.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 6o.
193. WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 143.
194. Access to Justice Act, 1999, C. 22 (Eng.).
195. The statute provides that the Legal Services Commission shall consist of seven to twelve
members; however, the Lord Chancellor has discretion to change the number of members specified by
the statute. Access to Justice Act, 1999, C.22, § 1.3 (Eng.). The Legal Services Commission currently
consists of a chairman and six members. Legal Services Commission, The Commission: Corporate Information, at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/about-us/how.htm (last visited June 29, 2003). In addition, the statute seeks to ensure that the Legal Services Commission is an independent authority in a
manner substantially in accord with ABA Criminal Justice Standards regarding the provision of defense services. Compare Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, §§ 2, 6, sched. I (Eng.) ("The [Legal Services] Commission shall not be regarded.., as the servant or agent of the Crown.... Before
appointing a person to be a member of the Commission, the Lord Chancellor shall satisfy himself that
that person will have no such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially the exercise
or performance by him of his functions as a member of the Commission."), with ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-1.3 ("[An effective means of securing professional independence for defender organizations is to place responsibility for governance in a board of
trustees ....Provisions for size and manner of selection of boards of trustees should assure their independence ....Boards of trustees should be precluded from interfering in the conduct of particular
cases."). In contrast to the discretion afforded to the Lord Chancellor in selecting members of the Legal Services Commission, the Legal Services Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(b) (2000), requires that the
President appoint eleven voting members to the corporation's board of directors; that the appointees
meet Senate approval; and that no more than six of the Presidential appointees may be of the same
political party. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(c)(a).
196. Access to Justice Act, 1999, C. 22, § 12.1 (Eng.).
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sumed responsibility for England's programs for criminal and civil legal
aid.'97

The Access to Justice Act also eliminated a means test in order to
qualify for criminal legal aid in both Magistrate and Crown Courts."8
During 1997-1998, when a means test was used and defendants sometimes ordered to pay for their representation, the amount collected was
£6.2 million, whereas the cost of assessing and collecting these monies
was about £5 million. 99 In the Crown Court, however, pursuant to the
new law, at the end of a case a special CDS unit may investigate a convicted defendant's financial capability and a judge may order the defendant to contribute to the cost of his or her defense.2" The government's
goal in eliminating a means test was do away with a system regarded as
"ineffective" and "wasteful," while assuring that a wealthy person convicted of an offense would still be required to pay something towards
their defense.2"' Prior to the new law, less than one percent of defendants
were refused legal aid for financial reasons. 2
As a result of these changes, there is little retained criminal defense
work in England. Several solicitors told me that the only persons who retain private counsel now are celebrities, who do not want to be seen relying upon legal aid, and defendants charged with corporate misconduct.0 3
In fact, the Head of Public Legal Services for the Lord Chancellor's Department commented that more persons retain private physicians in lieu
of the National Health Service than defendants in criminal cases retain
private lawyers. 4
Given its responsibilities for civil and criminal legal aid throughout
England, the LSC's administrative staff is now approximately I500 persons, located in the commission's principal office in London and in

197.

LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, SPECIALIST QUALITY MARK STANDARD

SQM STANDARD];

12 (ist ed., 2002) [hereinafter

ELLIOTr & QUINN, supra note 153, at 221.

198. Access to Justice Act,

1999, c. 22, § 17.1 (Eng.).
199. WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 142.
200. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 17.2 (Eng.); SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 145, at 538-39.
201. Id. at 539.

202. WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 142; ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 142.
203. Interview with Greg Powell, Powell Spencer & Partners, in London, England (Oct. i8, 2002);
Interview with Richard Miller, Staff Head, Legal Aid Practitioners Group, in London, England (Oct.
15, 2002).

204. Interview with Derek Hill, Head of Public Legal Services, Lord Chancellor's Department, in
London. England (May 2, 2003).
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twelve regional offices."' The LSC budget for administration in
2002 was £71.4 million.2
C.

2001-

CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE

The CDS is authorized to enter into contracts with persons to provide representation and to employ persons to provide representation.2
The latter provision is the authority for the CDS to establish England's
first ever public defender offices, which are discussed later."
The CDS is also authorized to "accredit" those providing its services,
to monitor their performance, and to withdraw accreditation because of
"unsatisfactory quality."" ° At the same time, both the CDS and Lord
Chancellor are admonished to "aim to obtain the best possible value for
money ....
.In addition, the statute guarantees individuals the right to select their own legal representatives, "' but as a practical matter the representatives selected must be persons approved by the CDS to provide
services and thus eligible to receive payments for doing so.
i.

Funds for the CDS

From an American perspective, since government monies for public
defense in the United States sometimes run out, surely one of the most
intriguing aspects of the Access to Justice Act is the following provision:
"The Lord Chancellor shall pay to the Commission such sums as are required to meet the costs of any advice, assistance and representation

205. Interview with Tim Collieu, Criminal Defence Service, Legal Services Commission, in London, England (Oct. I8,2002); E-mail from Tim Collieu, supra note 176. As noted earlier, during the
early 199os the administrative staff of the Legal Aid Board was about I3OO. See supra text at note 177.
206. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, 2001/02 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2002), at http://www.legalservices.gov
.uk/about-us/plans.htm.
At an exchange rate of $I to £i.6i, this is about $1 15,276,ooo. To put this sum in perspective, consider that the federal appropriation for the Legal Service Corporation is $338,848,ooo for fiscal year
2003. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. Io8-7, III Stat. II(2003). The Legal Service Commission's annual expenditure for criminal legal aid is discussed infra at notes 551-52 and accompanying text.
During my visit to England in the spring of 2003 (April 6-June I),the exchange rate varied from
a low of $1.55 per pound, Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL ST.J., Apr. 8, 2003, at Cis, to a high of
$i.65 per pound, Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL ST. J., May 30. 2003. at B8. As of July 25. 2003, the
exchange rate was $L.62 per pound, Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL ST. J.,July 25. 2003, at C14.
207. Access to Justice Act, 1999. c. 22, §§ 13.2(a)-(g), 14.2(a)-(g) (Eng.).
208. See infra notes 329-71 and accompanying text.
209. Access to Justice Act. 1999, c. 22, § 12.4 (Eng.).
210. Id. § 18(4). This section of the Act applies to the Legal Services Commission's funding of the
Criminal Defence Service. The language regarding the Lord Chancellor is slightly different, but surely
means the same thing. See id. § 25(3)(c) ("When making any remuneration order the Lord Chancellor
shall have regard to ...the need to secure value for money.").
211. Id. § I(I)
("An individual who has been granted a right to representation in accordance with
Schedule 3 may select any representative or representatives willing to act for him.").
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funded by the Commission as part of the Criminal Defence Service .....
Does this mean that in any given fiscal year adequate funds for criminal
defense representation in England and Wales will be available?
Historically, criminal legal aid in England has been a "demand-led"
program, in which the government was duty bound to find the requisite
funds to cover its cost." 3 The above-quoted provision is intended to continue the government's promise to appropriate sufficient funds for criminal defense. In his treatise on the justice system, Lord Windlesham
reprints a lengthy letter that he received from the then Lord Chancellor
when the Access to Justice Act was passed by Parliament."4 The Lord
Chancellor's letter discusses this provision of the Act, explaining that if
"demand rises ahead of supply" he either would seek to find additional
resources from within his own budget or ask for more monies from the
Exchequer."5 As the Lord Chancellor elaborated, "[o]ur international
obligations require that legal representation is available to all those
charged with a criminal offence. This means that the CDS will have a
prior claim on the available funding. ' ' ,I 6 The reference to "international
obligations" refers to the European Convention on Human Rights, which
provides that a person has a right to "legal assistance" to defend himself
and "to be given it free when the interests of justice so require. 2. 7 Although this European Convention was signed by the United Kingdom in
1951, it was incorporated into "the Human Rights Act 1998" and thus
"converted into an enforceable Convention right in the British
courts... .""'
The overall level of funds required by the CDS is dependent to a
considerable degree on the level of fees paid to lawyers pursuant to contracts. The more lawyers are paid for their legal services, the more the
Lord Chancellor's allocation for criminal legal aid must increase. On the
other hand, if the numbers of magistrate representation orders increase
beyond expectations-a matter beyond the Lord Chancellor's control-

212. Id. § 18(1). For an example of a situation where government monies for indigent defense did,
in effect, run out, see supra notes io6-i i and accompanying text, discussing Oregon's budget shortfalls.
213. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 139; SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 145,

at 518.
214. WINDLESHAM,

215.

Id. at 162-63.

216. Id. at 563.
217. Id. at 134.
218. Id. at 149.

supra note 143, at 16o-63.
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this provision assures that sufficient funds to compensate lawyers will be
available." 9
2. Specialist Quality Mark
As noted earlier, the LAB introduced franchising of criminal legal
aid providers on a voluntary basis.22 ° In Striking the Balance, as well as in
Modernising Justice, the government promised that contracts with solicitors would be used extensively as a means of controlling the cost of legal
aid. 21 The Access to Justice Act, moreover, authorized the new LSC to
enter into contracts for the provision of legal services. 2 Now, solicitors
can perform criminal defense work and be compensated by the government only if they are first awarded a "general criminal contract." ' 3 But in
order to execute a contract with the LSC, solicitors must first satisfy the
"specialist quality mark" (SOM), which applies both to criminal law and
civil law practitioners. 24
To explain the SQM to American readers is a difficult task simply
because its requirements are totally different from those that have been
devised in the field of public criminal defense in the United States. 25 To
be sure, there are a wide variety of standards related to indigent defense
in the United States dealing with a myriad of subjects.26 But the vast majority of U.S. standards are not binding on the lawyers who provide representation227 and few of them contain requirements similar to those
necessary to qualify for the SQM designation.
In April 2002, the LSC published two lengthy, explanatory books
about the SQM, one of which is titled "Specialist Quality Mark Standard ' ' ,,8 and the other titled "Specialist Quality Mark Guidance."2 9 The
219. An increase in magistrate orders and its budgetary impact is discussed later. See infra note 458
and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
223. SQM STANDARD, supra note 197, at 6.
224. Id. at 7;Legal Services Commission website, at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/contract/lafgas
.htm (last visited July 17, 2003).
225. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS

FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2000)[hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEMS]. This compilation contains standards and rules issued by national organizations, state agencies, bar associations, public defender associations, state appellate and local courts. The various standards and rules are organized in five volumes under the headings administration of defense systems,
attorney performance, capital case representation, appellate representation, and juvenile justice defense.
226. Id.
227. Id. See also ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22.
228. SQM STANDARD, supra note 197. This book has 278 pages.
229. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, SPECIALIST QUALITY MARK GUIDANCE (2002). This book has 118

pages.
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material in the "Standard" volume is described as "mandatory" in order
for solicitors to obtain the SQM designation and contract, whereas the
material in the "Guidance" volume is "provided to assist you in complying with the requirements" and "to provide
background detail about
230
some of the requirements or definitions.
According to the "Standard" volume, the "prime purpose [of the
SQM is] ensuring [that] services are well organised and managed, giving
quality advice and client care. 2' 3' Further, the volume explains that the
SQM uses "a well-run organisation as a proxy for the quality of advice."
While the LSC claims that it has developed the SOM "with regard to the
need to reduce bureaucracy wherever possible and to focus more directly
on the quality of advice, competence of advisers and client care,"'32 many
solicitors are extremely critical of the LSC and its regulations. 33
To obtain the SOM designation, solicitors must satisfy requirements
related to the following
seven "key quality areas, known as the Quality
2 34
Mark Framework":
Access to Service: Planning the service, making others aware of the
service and non-discrimination;
Seamless Service: Signposting and referral to other agencies, and
awareness of any appropriate CLS 35 partnership arrangements;
Running the Organisation:The roles and responsibilities of key staff,
and financial management;
People Management: Equal opportunities for staff, training and development, supervision and supervisors' standards;

230. SQM STANDARD, supra note 197, at 19.
231. Id. at 5.
232. Id. at 9.
233. See, e.g., Julian Gibbons, The Death of a Profession, i5o NEw L.J. 1366, 1366 (200o) ("The
[LSC] has managed to produce a document [referring to the General Criminal Contract] calculated to
undermine the good will and professionalism of those who do criminal defence work in England and
Wales. In its place they seek to put a body of automatons, a system whose members can fill out forms,
tick boxes and supervise and administer themselves to death. The [LSC] will in turn supervise them
and analyse and monitor everything and anything to do with the mechanical process of administering
criminal files, meeting targets and generating paper-work."); Paula Rohan, A Dying Breed, ioo LAW
Soc'Y GAZETrE 20, 23 (Jan. 30, 2003) (responding to a recent survey concerning the future of legal aid,
one solicitor stated "I am fed up with the massive form-filling, low pay and very poor return on all the
effort put into getting franchised. If I could get out of this toxic job, I would."); Paula Rohan, No Gain,
Much Pain, 99 LAW Soc'y GAZEFrrE 16, 17 (2002) ("The LSC requires a standard of service from [solicitors] but fails to comply itself. It requires more and more records to be kept of this, that and the
other, but is never going to use the information contained in those records.").
234. SQM STANDARD, supra note 197, at 16.
235. CLS refers to the "Community Legal Service," which is the arm of the LSC that deals with
legal representation in civil cases. See Access to Justice Act, t999, c. 22, § 1.4 (Eng.).
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Running the Service: Case management, independent review of files
and feedback to caseworkers;
Meeting the Clients' Needs: Providing information to clients, confidentiality, privacy and fair treatment, and maintaining quality where
someone else delivers part of the service; and
Commitment to Quality: Complaints, other user feedback and maintaining quality procedures."'
Grouped under the above seven areas are eighty-two separate requirements that firms of solicitors must fulfill in order to quality for the
SQM designation.237 But since virtually each of the requirements contains
multiple sub-parts, in reality there are literally hundreds of requirements
that must be satisfied."" The following examples illustrate SQM requirements.
Under "Access to the Service," solicitors must disclose their business
plan, including information about how their services will be promoted
and the quality mark logo of the CDS displayed." 9 Solicitors must also
adopt a policy which makes it clear that the firm does not discriminate in
providing services "on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or national origins, 4sex,
marital status or sexual orientation, disability, age or relig0
ion.'

2

To comply with the requirement of a "Seamless Service," there must
be a "process ...to ensure that records for all referrals identify, as a
minimum, the client or case, who made the referral, the matter type, to
whom the client was referred (justifying the selection of any service
without a Quality Mark), and the reason for the referral... ." This provision recognizes that sometimes clients require the services of other lawyers, including civil practitioners or government and private agencies.
To satisfy requirements related to "Running the Organisation,"
there must be documents that show current jobs in the organization and
lines of responsibility, and the names and titles of those responsible for
the organization's management and financial control.2 4' This section also
requires disclosure to the CDS "of any adverse findings made or formal
investigations undertaken by the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors
(OSS) . . ." and "all professional indemnity claims paid out (in the last six
years) .. ,"4 The law firm is also called upon to demonstrate that it is
236. SQM STANDARD, supra note 197, at 16-17.
237. Id. at 20-137.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 23-29.
240. Id. at 30-31.
241. Id. at 43-45.
242. Id. at 47.
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capable
of rendering independent legal advice "in the client's best inter,,43
e sts . "
"People Management" requires a written non-discrimination policy
governing "the selection, treatment and behaviour of staff";2" documents
containing the duties of staff and their requisite skills and experience;245 a
policy covering the behavior of staff towards one another;246 the organization's process for recruiting new staff;' 47 an orientation program for new
staff,"2 and staff training of at least six hours in each twelve-month period. 49 In addition, there are extensive rules covering supervisors, including their prior experience and training in the area of law in which they
are providing supervision,"' and each staff member must be reviewed
annually and made the subject of a written appraisal.25 ' The regulations
also require that the organization document "that time is designated for
supervision and.., justify the number of caseworkers supervised by each
supervisor.''. The size of a solicitor's caseload is dealt with as a matter of
supervision, as the rules require that "[s]upervisors must be able to demonstrate that staff are allocated only work that is appropriate for their
role ... and that it falls
within their limits, in terms of skills, experience
53
and available time.'
Under "Running the Service," there are regulations concerning file
management (e.g., "identifying potential conflicts of interest; maintaining
a backup record of key dates; monitoring files for inactivity at predetermined intervals");'54 and procedures for the review of files (e.g,, solicitors must be able to document and justify the number and frequency
of files to be reviewed).'55
To comply with requirements for Meeting the Clients' Needs, solicitors must record and confirm information offered to clients ' 6 (e.g., "[t]he
243. Id. at 49.
244. Id. at 56.
245. Id. at 57.

246. Id.
247. Id. at 58-59.
248. Id. at 6o-6i.

249. Id. at 61, 78. The standards also require that individual training and development plans be
implemented; and that records be kept detailing the "dates of external and in-house training courses
attended (or given), the course titles, the names of course providers, and where qualifying for Continuing Professional Development (CPD) hours, the hours must also be recorded." Id. at 63.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 64-77.
Id. at 6o-6i.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 86. See generally id. at 84-87.
Id. at 88-93.

256. Id. at 96-98.
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requirements or instructions of the client; [t]he advice given and/or action to be takeirby the organisation");'57 demonstrate how they will deal
with complex cases (e.g., solicitors must prepare a case plan, give it to the
client, and periodically review and update it);25s and they must have written procedures related to confidentiality.259
To satisfy the "Commitment to Quality," there must be procedures
for dealing with complaints, including giving information to clients about
what they should do if they have a problem with the services provided. 6°
There must also be a "client satisfaction feedback procedure,"261 a quality
manual that documents all procedures and policies of the organization, '
and a person designated "for overseeing all quality procedures. '2 63 Finally, there must be a risk management strategy and a person in the organization responsible for its oversight.264
Once a firm of solicitors submits its application, the LSC determines
whether the firm is entitled to the SOM designation. 65 Initially, a "desktop audit" is performed and, if the firm passes this review, "[a] temporary
CDS contract may be granted ... to allow sufficient work to be performed in the area of criminal law to enable LSC auditors to ascertain
that the Specialist Quality Mark will be operationally effective at subsequent audits."'266 The next step is a "preliminary audit" held on the firm's
premises at which documents are examined and one or more staff interviews conducted. 67 Subsequent audits include a "pre quality mark" audit,
usually conducted between four and six months after the preliminary audit, and a "post Specialist Quality Mark audit" normally conducted nine
to twelve months later and annually thereafter. At the end of these audits, "the auditor will report on the evidence they have found to demon'6 9
strate that the Specialist Quality Mark requirements have been met.
When auditors identify a matter requiring corrective action, organizations are afforded twenty-eight days to remedy the deficiency. 7

Id. at 96.
258. Id. at IO4-ii.
259. Id. at 112-13.
260. Id. at 122-25.
261. Id. at 126.
.
262. Id. at 132-33
257.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 134-37.
See generally id. at 142-164 (dealing with the "auditing process").
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
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3. Contractsand Fees
Ultimately, the SQM designation enables a firm of solicitors to receive a "general criminal contract" to provide criminal defense representation." ' While contracts to provide public defense services have become
common in the United States during the past twenty years,"7' I am reasonably confident that there is not a defense services contract anywhere
in this country that even remotely resembles the standard contract used
by the LSC. It is nearly 200 pages in length and seemingly covers every
administrative subject imaginable. It even provides that "[y]ou [the contractor] must not try to bribe any of our personnel, or any person who
may perform services for,
or is associated (in any way) with, the Legal
73
Services Commission.

Like the requirements for the SQM designation, few of the terms of
the contract relate to substantive matters of the kind contained in the
Defense Function Standards74 of the ABA or in the Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation 75 of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association (NLADA). These documents spell out in considerable detail the numerous actions defense lawyers are expected to
take in representing a defendant in a criminal case. 76 In contrast, the
271.

LEGAL SERVICES

COMM'N, GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, CONTRACT DOCUMENTATION

1O

(2003)

[hereinafter GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT]. A three-year contract is awarded when the audit process is
complete. If the audit process is ongoing, a one-year contract may be awarded. In addition to the general criminal contract, specialist contracts for prison law work and representation before the Criminal
Cases Review Commission (CCRC) can be awarded. The CCRC is an independent, executive body
created by the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995, whose primary purpose is to review the convictions of
those who believe they have been wrongly convicted or sentenced; and if warranted, to refer those
cases back to an appropriate court of appeal. Criminal Cases Review Commission website, at
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/aboutus/aboutus.htm (last visited July 20, 2003); see also Criminal Appeal Act
1995, ch. 35, § 8 (Eng.); Lissa Griffin, The Correctionof Wrongftl Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1307-o8 (2o0) ("[The United States could enhance protections for persons who are wrongly convicted... [by creating] a meaningful forum for the receipt and
investigation of new evidence.... This forum could be modeled after the English CCRC, or it could be
provided for within the present judicial structure by broadening rules for newly discovered evidence,
lengthening state time limits for its introduction, or amending the federal habeas corpus statute specifically to allow review based on a claim of innocence."); Annabelle James, Miscarriagesof Justice in
the 21st Century, 66 J. CRIM. L. 326 (2002) (noting that while the CCRC has improved how the English
criminal justice process deals with miscarriages of justice, there is still much room for improvement);
see also David Horan, The Innocence Commission:An Independent Review Boardfor Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91 (2000).
272. See ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-3.1 and cmt.
273. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at77.
274- See ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22.
275. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION,

NAT'L LEGAL AID AND

[hereinafter NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES].
276. See, e.g., ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, Standard 4-4.1 (Duty to Investigate), Standard 4-6.1 (Duty to Explore Disposition Without Trial), Standard 4-7.2 (Selection of Jurors), Standard 4-7.9 (Posttrial Motions); NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 275,
DEFENDER ASS'N (1994)
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general criminal contract simply states that the contractor must "perform
all Contract Work ...in a timely fashion and with all reasonable skill,

care and diligence.2 77 One of the few specific substantive provisions relates to police station advice cases: solicitors are required as a condition
of the contract to respond to calls for police station representation within
forty-five minutes.27 8

The following items suggest the broad range of administrative provisions covered in the contract, as well as the authority of the CDS over
the solicitors who provide the representation. Thus, the contract provides
' contractors (i.e., solicithat in the event of an "official investigation,"279
tors) must make available all documents related to the representation of
current and former clients as requested by the CDS and give access to
their premises to CDS staff.2 8 The CDS also retains authority "to carry
out surveys of Clients and [contractors] must provide us [i.e., the CDS]
with such information as we may require for such purposes. ' 2s' In addition, the CDS "may commission research on the operation of our contracts'212 and contractors are required to cooperate fully with the
researchers, including sharing information concerning current and former clients."3 For its part, the CDS promises that "we and any Researchers shall keep all information of a confidential nature concerning you and
your Clients' and Former Clients' affairs or business strictly confidential . .. ,,284

Guideline 3.1 ("The attorney should preserve the client's rights at the initial appearance on the
charges by entering a plea of not guilty.., requesting a trial by jury... seeking determination of
whether there is probable cause ...[and] requesting a timely preliminary hearing ..."),Guideline
7.6(d) ("Whenever the prosecutor exceeds the scope of permissible argument, counsel should consider
objecting, requesting a mistrial, or seeking cautionary instructions unless tactical considerations suggest otherwise.").
277. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at 47.

278. Id. at 215. When a client is arrested and requests telephone advice, an attorney is expected to
meet the forty-five minute contact target in at least eighty percent of his/her cases; however, if an attorney is requested to attend to a client at the police station, the attorney is expected to meet the fortyfive minute contact target in at least ninety percent of his/her cases. Id.
279. Id. at 39.
"Official Investigation" means any investigation ...(a) into suspected serious professional
misconduct, breaches of the Act... or regulations, or dishonesty by you or your personnel.., by (i) any organisation.. . which is responsible for regulating or disciplining you or
your personnel, or (ii) the [LSC's] Investigation Section; or (b) any investigation.., by the
police into suspected criminal offences relevant to your operations.
Id.
28o. Id. at 47.
281. Id. at 49.
282. Id. at 73.
283. Id. at 48.
284. Id. at 65. I inquired during interviews of several solicitors whether there was any concern that
employees of the CDS might breach their duty of confidentiality. Invariably, I was told that this has
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As noted earlier, a major concern with contracts for defense services
in the United States has been the tendency to require lawyers to represent a fixed number of defendants for a predetermined price."' Contracts
for defense services in the United States, therefore, are sometimes simple
arrangements that do not involve hourly fees.'s6 However, the fee structure spelled out in the general criminal contract is unlike fee arrangements in most U.S. contracts. Not only does the fee structure make
extensive use of hourly rates,"7 but there also are provisions for exceeding the hourly rates due to special circumstances2 and a method for
dealing with very high cost cases.2s9 As required by the Access to Justice
Act, the goal of the fee structure must be "to secure the provision of services ...by a sufficient number of competent persons" while being mindful of "the cost to public funds, and.., the need to secure value for
money."29

Thus, for representation in the Magistrates' Courts, the contract
specifies a number of hourly fees that solicitors cumulate for a variety of
defense activities, although the final amount charged is determined by
what is known as the "standard fee" formula, which enables solicitors to
receive greater compensation if a case is tried or prepared for trial rather

than resolved through a guilty plea or dismissal.'

In addition, fees may

not been a matter of concern among the legal profession and no one was aware of any instance where
confidentiality had been breached.
285. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz.
1984).
286. See Hardy, supra note 40, at 13 ("The most seriously criticized contract systems ...[p]lace
cost containment before quality; [c]reate incentives to plead cases out early rather than go to trial;
[and] ...[r]eward low bids rather than realistic bids."). In order to counter these kinds of problems,
consider ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-3.3(a) ("Contracts should include provisions which ensure quality legal representation and fully describe the rights and duties of
the parties, including the compensation of the contractor."); and Standard 5 -5 .3(b) ("Contracts for
services should include ... reasonable compensation levels and a designated method of payment.").
287. See infra notes 291, 296, 299-301, 304,306 and accompanying text.
288. See infra
note 292 and accompanying text.
289. See infra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
290. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 25.3(a)-(c) (Eng.).
291. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at 2o8-29. "Standard fees" are different from any
fee system devised in the United States to compensate lawyers for indigent defense representation.
Initially, lawyers add up the amount to which they would be entitled based upon the number of hours
worked and the allowable fees for the particular activity in which they engaged. Then, pursuant to the
contract, they consult a schedule containing "lower standard fees" and "higher standard fees" and
"lower limits" and "higher limits." To illustrate, in London, in a category Icase involving a guilty plea,
there is a "lower limit" of £382.9 o and a "lower standard fee" of £223.25. If the "lower limit" is not
exceeded, the "lower standard fee" is paid. But if the amount to which the lawyer would be entitled
exceeds the "lower limit" but does not exceed the "higher limit" of £646.85, a "higher standard fee" of
£529.25 is paid. If the "higher limit" is exceeded, payment is based on the number of hours worked on
the case. Under this "standard fee" system, solicitors sometimes receive less than they would other-
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be enhanced if "(a) the work was done with exceptional competence,
skill, or expertise; or (b) the work was done with exceptional dispatch; or
29 Solici(c) the case involved exceptional circumstances or complexity.""
293
tors also may be reimbursed for numerous types of expenses.
To illustrate the fee structure, set out below are the hourly fees applicable to what is known as "Police Station Advice and Assistance. '94
The reference to "unsocial hours" refers to "the hours between... 5:30
p.m. and 9:30 a.m. on any business day and any time on a day which is
not a business day." 95 As suggested by the table, hourly fees that solicitors can bill are sometimes higher for London than for the rest of England.
TABLE I
POLICE STATION ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE2 96
National

London

4.20 (to a max of

4.24 (to a max of

100.80)

102.00)

Duty solicitor"9 (unsocial hours)

69.05

69.05

Duty solicitor (other hours)

52.00

56.20

52.00

52.00

Duty solicitor (unsocial hours)

69.o 5

69.05

Duty solicitor (other hours)

52.00

52.00

Own solicitor

28.8o

28.8o

30.25 per Claim

31.45 per Claim

Availability during Duty Period
Police Station Advice and Assistance
other than by telephone

98

Own solicitor2

Traveling and waiting

Police Station Telephone Advice fixed
fee (including all telephone calls
whether "routine" or "advice")

wise be entitled based upon the number of hours worked on the case, but on other occasions they will
receive more compensation than their cumulative hours would allow. Id.
292. Id. at 231.
293. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
294. For discussion of police station legal advice, see infra note 299 and accompanying text.
295. GEN. CRIMINAL CoNTRAcT, supra note 271, at 218.
296. Id. at 219. All amounts listed are in British pounds.
297. Id. at 37 ("'Duty Solicitor' means a Solicitor or employed barrister who is admitted to a Local
Scheme under Arrangements.").
298. Id. at 39 ("'Own Solicitor' means a Solicitor who provides Advice and Assistance to a Client
other than as a Duty Solicitor.").
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Additionally, there are tables containing hourly fee rates for other
activities, such as "advice and assistance, '' "9 as well as representation in
Magistrate and Crown Courts.3 ' The highest standard hourly rate is
£81.9o per hour,"' which at exchange rates during the summer of 2003
was approximately $130 per hour.3"2 The lowest fee rate is for routine letters and phone calls at £3.70 per item (national rate) and £3.85 (London
rate).313 Compared to the United States, one of the more unusual tasks
for which fees may be claimed is for reviews of files.3"4 As noted earlier,
there must be procedures for file reviews as part of a supervision program" and compensation is allowed for in-person reviews of files and for
"paper file reviews. ' 3 6
Solicitors may also seek reimbursement for a number of expenses.
These include compensation for barristers who are "instructed" to provide legal assistance in Magistrate and Crown Court cases,3" 7 as well as
fees for experts, travel expenses, and various other out-of-pocket costs. 3 8
Although permission from the CDS for some expenditures can be ob-

299. As noted earlier, "advice and assistance" refers to providing representation to a person who is
neither in police custody nor charged with an offense in court, but believes that it is necessary to confer with a solicitor. See text accompanying supra note 168. While there is no means test for police station representation or for representation in court, the "advice and assistance" category of
representation is means tested. See LEGAL SERVICES COMM N, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICES 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/leaflets/lsc/prac-guide-cds
-apro3.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
300. See LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, CLAIM CODES available at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/
cds/claim-codes.pdf (last visited July 20, 2003). There are forty-five different "claim codes" set out by
the LSC, each corresponding to discrete acts of representation and having their own specific charges.
301. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT. supra note 271, at 234.
302. For information on exchange rates, see supra note 206.
303. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at 219, 222.
304- Id. at 236.
305. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
306. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at 236. The contract specifies compensation of
£31.18 per file for face-to-face file reviews, and £18.71 per file for paper file reviews. Id.
307. Id. at 134. In the context of the English legal system, the term "instruct" means to "authorize
one to act as advocate." FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1273 (I8th ed. 1963). As indicated above, the English legal system is composed of solicitors and barristers, see supra note 16i, with barristers essentially acting as "self-employed, referral professionals."
THE BAR COUNCIL, INSTRUCTING A BARRISTER, at http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/document.asp (last updated June 19, 2003). Although the main function of barristers is to act as an advocate for clients in a
courtroom, barristers usually cannot be hired directly by the client. ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153,
at 122, 129. Instead, for "any matter for all types of work" barristers may only be hired by "solicitors;
other authorised litigators; Parliamentary agents, patent agents, trade mark agents and notaries: employed barristers and[/]or European lawyers registered with the Bar Council; or legal advice centers
designated by the Bar Council." THE BAR COUNCIL, supra. In certain specialized matters, barristers
may also be hired by other individuals or groups. See id.
308. GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT, supra note 271, at 148-49, 198-201.
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tained in advance, prior approval is not required.3" As the contract

states, "[a]pplying for authority is not mandatory. If permission is not
sought or refused, the costs may still be allowed on Assessment if the ex-

penditure was reasonably incurred.. 3. ° Legal research may be reimbursed
if "the case involves a novel, developing, unusual or complex point of
law. . . ."" On the other hand, there is no explicit authority under the
contract to retain persons to conduct fact investigations and to be reim-

bursed for such expenditures.3"'
In the event of a trial in Magistrate or Crown Courts, solicitors in
London normally arrange for a barrister to handle the case, although
outside of London solicitors usually try the case themselves." 3 The

amount paid to the barrister in Magistrate's Court is a matter of contract
between the solicitor and barrister, with barristers often agreeing to handle cases for minimal sums in order to encourage solicitors to select them

or their chambers for trial work in the Crown Court.3" 4 Barristers are better compensated in the higher court, with almost all payments made as
part of a "graduated fee" program." '
Payments to solicitors by the CDS are made monthly, which assures
law firms of a consistent cash flow to operate their practices. 3'6 Based

upon the prior year's payments, each contract specifies the monthly

amount to be paid to the contractor 37 and, at the end of each year, the
CDS performs a reconciliation to determine whether subsequent payments need to be adjusted either to recoup overpayments or to compensate for underpayments.' 8 However, the CDS reserves "the right to
309. Id. at 147-49.
310. Id. at 148.
311. Id. at 198 ("We are entitled to assume that the work has been undertaken by a competent and
experienced adviser and that work which is not appropriate for you to do will be referred by you.").
312. Whether a solicitor who retains an investigator to interview prosecution witnesses can be reimbursed for the expenditure is a matter of some uncertainty. See infra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
313. E-mail from Tim Collieu, supra note 176. Interview with Judy Khan, Barrister, Two Garden
Court Chambers, in London, England (May I, 2003). Although the Access to Justice Act granted solicitors the same rights as barristers to conduct litigation in all courts, Access to Justice Act I999, ch.
22, § 36 (Eng.). the vast majority of solicitors still prefer to arrange for barristers to do the trial work.
Interview with Greg Powell, supra note 203.
314. Interview with Judy Khan, supra note 313. Solicitors are able to bill for the time that a barrister spends on a case in Magistrate's Court in accordance with the "standard fee" schedule, but the
amount paid to the barrister is controlled by the contract between the parties. Id.
315. See ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 271-314 (Supp. 2003)

316.

GEN. CRIMINAL CONTRACT,

supra note 271, at 61-62.

317. Id. at 12-13.

318. Id. at 61-62
We may amend your monthly payments at any time if we redetermine the average monthly
amount payable in respect of your Claims. We will not reduce your monthly payments
unless the amount payable in respect of your Claims is at least lo% less than the amount of
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Assess a Claim at any time within the two years following its submission .... 5 319
While the vast majority of criminal cases are handled by the CDS
under the general criminal contract, those entailing "very high costs" can
be dealt with through specially negotiated contracts and monitored by
the Criminal High Cost Cases Unit (CHCCU).32 ° A "very high cost case"
is defined as one "that is likely to last for twenty-five days or more at
trial and/or is likely to incur total defence costs (per defence team) of
£150,000 or more. 32 Additional factors bearing on whether a case involves "very high costs" may include whether "(a) the case raises complex issues of law, fact or procedure; (b) detailed consideration of
extensive documentary evidence... ; [and] the defendant is charged with
a large number of offences. '32
All firms are required to notify the CDS of cases within the above
definition and, after reviewing the situation, the CHCCU "can insist"
that the case be handled pursuant to a special contract." 3 There is also a
"specialist fraud panel" of solicitors to handle Very High Cost Fraud
cases, and these, too, are overseen by the CHCCU.3 "4 However, as of
2003, not all Very High Cost cases have been brought under the jurisdiction of the CHCCU. Some of these cases, for the time being, are still be-

your monthly payments paid in respect of Claims .... If, following a reconciliation ... there
has been an overpayment, we may adjust subsequent monthly payments to recover it within
no fewer than three of them. If there has been an underpayment, we will make good the
underpayment within one month.
Id.

319. Id. at 62.
320. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, CRIMINAL HIGH COST CASES UNIT AND VERY HIGH COST CASES, at

http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/cds/vhcc.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
321. Id. ("A defence team is made up of the solicitors' firm, counsel and any experts instructed.").
322. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, VERY HIGH COST CASES ARRANGEMENTS 6 (2002), availableat http://

www.legalservices.gov.uk/cds/high-cost cases/vhcc.arrangements_2002.pdf (last visited July 21, 2003).
323. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 320.
The first stage of the contracting process is for the solicitor to compile and return to us a
case plan .... The case plan should give an overview of the work which is likely to be conducted for the client and details of the proposed defence team. This should also include information regarding the seriousness and complexity of the case, which will help the Unit to
assess the category of the case and hourly rate at which the case will be remunerated ....
The stage plan should give an overview of the nature of the work which both solicitors and
counsel expect to undertake during that stage.
LEGAL

SERVICES

COMM'N,

VHCC

CONTRACTING

PROCESS,

at

http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/cds/

contracting._process.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
324. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N,

SPECIALIST FRAUD PANEL, at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/cds/

sfp.htm (last visited July 21, 2003); see also LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 322 at 6 (providing
guidance on Very High Cost Fraud Cases).
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ing dealt with under the former system, in which bills are submitted,
post-trial, to what is known as the National Taxing Team.325
I interviewed a solicitor from a large London law firm in charge of a
unit of twenty-two persons (consisting of eleven solicitors and an equal
number of paralegals) who represent defendants in very high cost cases
pursuant to contracts with the CDS.326 The law firm also has handled
cases under the former system, in which its fees for services were submitted to the National Taxing Team. In addition, the firm does retained
work in complex fraud and other high cost cases.
I inquired of the solicitor whether he regarded the new system of
special contracts with the CDS to be an improvement over prior practice.
Without directly answering the question, he noted that firms are now
compensated promptly in accordance with their contracts, which is very
beneficial from a cash flow standpoint. Under the National Taxing Team,
there were often long delays before payments were received, and reimbursement claims were sometimes arbitrarily reduced. However, the fees
received under the new special contracts are less than the amounts allowed by the National Taxing Team and less than the £200 to £350 per
hour, depending upon the experience of the solicitor, charged by the firm
for similar retained work. In contrast, the CDS has developed an elaborate fee rate structure, in which the amount of the reimbursement depends upon the experience of the solicitor and barrister and whether the
case is rated as a level one, two, three, or four. For example, in level one
cases (which are serious and complex fraud prosecutions), hourly rates
for preparation are from £I8o per hour for a "level A" solicitor to £ioo
per hour for a "level C" solicitor. Also, in the event of a trial in which a
solicitor engages a barrister, daily rates are stipulated for the barrister's
advocacy.3"7

325. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 320. In an effort to reduce costs, the Lord Chancellor's
Department (LCD) has announced its intention to handle all Very High Cost Cases under individual
case contracts, effective April 1, 2004. In making this announcement, the LCD noted that very high
cost cases "consume a disproportionate amount of Crown Court legal aid expenditure: it is estimated
that the top I% of Crown Court cases by volume account for 49% of that expenditure." LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T., DELIVERING VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE: A CONSULTATION
ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE (2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
consult/leg-aid/cdserv.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
326. Interview with John Harding, Kingsley Napley Solicitors, in London, Eng. (Oct. 1 4 , 2002).
The law firm employs about I6o persons, approximately half of whom are solicitors. Virtually all of the
time of the twenty-two persons in the criminal defense unit is spent on complex and high cost crime
cases.
327. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, VERY HIGH COST CASES CONTRACT SPECIFICATION 16, available at

http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/cds/high-cost-cases/contract-specification.pdf (last visited July
2003). The highest barristers' daily fee is £6oo for a Queen's Counsel. Id. at 16.

21,
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4. Public Defender Service
As noted earlier, the Access to Justice Act authorizes the LSC to
employ persons to provide legal representation.32 Although the statute
does not require public defenders, the government made clear in Modernising Justice319 that it intended to have the CDS set up the first public
defender offices in England's history.33 The report claimed that
"[e]vidence from other countries suggests that properly funded salaried
defenders can be more cost effective and provide a better service than
lawyers in private practice. '
To date, a total of eight "Public Defender Service" offices have been
opened.33 ' The first four were begun in 2001 (Birmingham, Liverpool,
Middlesbrough, and Swansea).333 Two more were opened in 2002 (Cheltenham and Pontypridd) and two additional offices in 2003 (Chester and
Darlington).334 Except for Birmingham (England's second largest city
with more than one million persons) and Liverpool (about 460,000 population), the offices are primarily in smaller, more rural areas.333
328. Access to Justice Act,
accompanying text.

1999, C. 22,

§§ 13.2(a)-(g), 14.2(a)-(g) (Eng.); see supra note 207 and

329. MODERNISING JUSTICE, supra note 185.
330. Id. at 63. As previously noted, MODERNISING JUSTICE was released the same day that the Access to Justice Act was introduced into Parliament in 1989. WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 143.

331. MODERNISING JUSTICE, supra note I85, at 63. It has always seemed self evident to me that
whether, in fact, public defenders are less expensive than private attorneys depends on numerous factors, such as the fees paid to private lawyers, the overhead and salaries of the public defenders, and the
respective caseloads of each group. Although public defenders are sometimes efficient due to specialization, this does not necessarily assure that they will be less expensive. Oftentimes when public defenders are deemed less costly than private lawyers, it is because defender caseloads are too high
and/or the private lawyers are not sufficiently compensated for their representation.
332. Initially, the program was referred to as the "Salaried Defence Service." See LORD CHANCELLOR's DEP'T, CONSULTATION RESPONSE, CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE: ESTABLISHING A SALARIED DEFENCE

SERVICE (2001) [hereinafter LCD, ESTABLISHING A SALARIED DEFENCE SERVICE]. This awkward name

for the new program was later discarded in favor of "Public Defender Service." See LEGAL SERVICES
COMM'N, PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE INTRODUCTION, at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/pds/intro.htm

(last visited July 21, 2003).
333. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 332.
334. Id.
335. The estimated populations of Birmingham and Liverpool are 977,087 and 439,473, respectively. UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF NAT'L STATISTICS CENSUS 2OOI, available at http://www.statistics
.gov.uk/census200l/default.asp (last visited July s, 2003). In contrast, Middlesbrough has a population
of 134,855; Cheltenham 110,013; Chester I18,21o; and Darlington 97,838. Id. Swansea and Pontypridd
are located in Wales, which is comprised of twenty-two unitary councils or counties. See Councils
within Wales, available at http://www.oultwood.com/localgov/wales.htm (last visited July I, 2003). The
City and County Council of Swansea has a total population of 223,293 and covers an area of 378
square kilometers. City and County of Swansea Website, at http://www.swansea.gov.uk/aboutswansea/
(last visited July I, 2003). The population of Pontypridd Town was 2919, UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF
NAT'L STATISTICS CENSUS 2001, supra, and is located in the county of Rhondda Cynon Taff, which has a
total population of 231,946. Id.
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Each of the public defender programs, directed by a head solicitor
and staffed by solicitors, paralegals and administrative assistants,336 is
situated in a ground floor store-front office.337 They are authorized to

provide representation in all of the same kinds of cases that private solicitors handle, and thus they defend persons in police stations, Magistrate, and Crown Courts. Eventually the programs will hire lawyers with
higher rights of audience"' s and also be given a budget to retain "special'
ist advocates, whether solicitors or barristers."339
Prior to beginning op-

erations, each of the offices was required to achieve the SQM
designation,34 thus complying with the same requirements
imposed upon
34 I
private solicitors under contract with the LSC.

According to the LSC website, these new public defender offices are
intended, inter alia, to furnish "independent, high quality and value for
money criminal defence services to the public"; enable the LSC and Lord
Chancellor's Department to better understand "the issues facing criminal
defence lawyers"; provide "an additional option to ensure the provision
of quality criminal defence services in geographic areas where existing
provision is low or of a poor standard"; and "share with private practice
suppliers best practice, in terms of forms, systems, etc., developed within
the PDS to assist in the overall improvement" of criminal defense representation.342 These purposes are consistent with the government's initial
promise in Modernising Justice, i.e., to have a "mixed system" of legal
services in which public defenders are an alternative means of delivering
effective defense representation. 3

336.

PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, 2001/02 REVIEW OF THE FIRST YEAR OF

7 (2002).
337. Id.
338. The term "rights of audience" refers to "the right of a certain type of lawyer to appear in a
certain type of court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (7th ed. 1999). Although the Access to Justice
Act automatically granted solicitors a "right of audience before every court in relation to all proceedings," Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 36 (Eng.), solicitors still have to undergo training in order to
exercise these rights. ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 144. Moreover, "[slome solicitors who have
gained rights of audience have said they are unwilling to use them, particularly in the High Court, for
fear that judges' bias against solicitor advocates may prejudice the chances of the clients they represent." Id.
339. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 336, at 3.
340. Id. at 8.
341. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
342. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 333.
343. Bridges, The Right to Representation,supra note 145, at 147
The Government's stated intention is not to replace the present system of contracting with
private solicitors for such services with a monopoly public defender service consisting of
lawyers and other legal advisers directly employed by the LSC. Rather, the aim is to create
a "mixed system" under which private solicitors with contracts will work in competition
with the public defenders.
OPERATION
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The new public defender offices differ from those in the United
States in the way in which they acquire their cases. As noted earlier, the
Access to Justice Act grants individuals the right to select their own lawyers.3" Accordingly, when a court enters a representation order because
the defendant satisfies the "interests of justice" test,345 public defender
offices must compete with local private attorneys to provide legal services."46 The new public defenders have obtained their cases by serving on
duty solicitor rotations in police stations and in Magistrates' Courts,347 by
accepting the cases of walk-in clients who were attracted by the storefront offices of the public defenders, and from repeat business of clients
formerly represented by the public defender solicitors when they were in
private practice."'5 Given this system for selection of counsel, it has taken
a while for public defender offices to develop sufficient caseloads.349
These new public defender offices also differ from their counterparts
in the United States because they are regarded as a "pilot" program and
are being subjected to an extensive, university-based four-year research

Id. This approach is consistent with the standards for providing defense services promulgated by the
ABA.
The primary component in every jurisdiction should be a public defender office, where conditions permit. The secondary component is an administered assigned counsel panel, which
assures an appropriate level of participation by the private bar. Bar participation also may
occur through a contract for services .... [A] "mixed" system of representation consisting
of both private attorneys and full-time defenders offers a "safety valve," so that the
caseload pressures on each group are less likely to be burdensome.
See supra, note 22, Standard 5-1.2, cmt. 1

344. See ABA,

4, 6

DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra

note

211

and accompanying text. "An indi-

vidual who has been granted a right to representation ... may select any representative or representatives willing to act for him; and, where he does so, the Commission is to comply with the duty imposed
by section 14(I) by funding representation by the selected representative or representatives." Access
to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 15.1 (Eng.).
345. See supra notes 157-58, 196 and accompanying text.
346. See PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 336, at 2
[W]e believe it is right that clients should have a choice of quality assured suppliers and that
the PDS in England and Wales should compete for clients on the basis of the quality of service provided. Nevertheless, it was recognised that this would have an impact on the speed
with which the PDS offices would be able to establish a client base from scratch.
Id.
347. At the Birmingham Public Defender Service, most of the new cases acquired by the office
have been received through the duty day solicitor system. A client who receives assistance from a duty
solicitor may elect to have that solicitor continue to provide representation throughout the defendant's
case. Alternatively, after the initial court appearance the client can decide to replace the duty solicitor
with a solicitor of his choice. Interview with Lee Preston, Solicitor Head of the Birmingham Public
Defender Service Office, in Birmingham, Eng. (Oct. 25, 2002).

348. Interview with Lee Preston, supra note 347. See also PUBLIC

DEFENDER SERVICE,

supra note

336, at 16-i8. The PDS annual report also points out that in several cities the solicitors for those offices came from outside the area and did not have any clients who were obtained while they were in
private practice. Id. at I7.

349.

PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE,

supra note 336, at 16-18.
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study commissioned by the LSC.35 ° The government has promised, when
the research is completed, to "review the Service and make decisions
about future development."35 ' The professors conducting the study have
stated that their objectives include analyzing the cost effectiveness and
quality of representation of public defender offices compared to private
solicitors who have contracts with the LSC.35 2 Ultimately, the researchers
will address
"whether the PDS should form part of future service provi353
sion.
Since there has been a long tradition of private lawyers providing all
criminal legal aid in England, it is not surprising that the private bar has
complained vociferously about the introduction of public defenders. 54
For example, private solicitors have worried that public defenders will
take cases from private lawyers;3 5 that public defenders are "grossly expensive" and a "waste of valuable resources";"56 that there is not a "level
playing field" between private solicitors and public defenders since all of
the latter's overhead expenses are furnished; 37 and that the research

350. See LCD, ESTABLISHING A SALARIED DEFENCE SERVICE, supra note 332, at 3-5; LEE BRIDGES ET
AL., METHODS FOR RESEARCHING AND EVALUATING THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE (2002).
351. LCD, ESTABLISHING A SALARIED DEFENCE SERVICE, supra note 332, at 3.
o
352. BRIDGES ET AL., supra note 35 , at 6.

353. Id.
354. ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 223 ("There has been strong opposition to the introduction of public defenders."). The interviews that I conducted of solicitors revealed substantial concerns
about the new public defender programs. The consistent refrain was that everything was being provided to the public defenders (e.g., office space, staff salaries, etc.) so that there was not a "level playing field" between the defenders and private solicitors. See, e.g., Interview with Rodney Warren,
Administrative Head, Criminal Law Solicitors Association, in London, Eng. (Oct. 29, 2002). See also
Christopher Frazer, The CriminalDefence Service: Lessons from Abroad, 151 NEW L.J. 670 (2001)
The truth is that research from foreign jurisdictions simply does not justify the Government's claims about salaried defender schemes. No research has been carried out into the
availability of, or access to, criminal defence services in the UK; the quality of advice, assistance and representation by criminal practitioners; or the reasons for the burgeoning legal
aid bill.
Id. at 671.
355. Gibbons, supra note 233, at 1367.
This service [referring to public defenders] is supposed to develop its own client base. How
is it to do this, other than by taking clients from a shrinking private sector? For more private
firms to drop out of the market would undoubtedly suit the government agenda. We might
have a little more respect for them if they were to come out and admit that this is their position.
Id.
356. Jon Robins, The Salaried Defence Service: Pilot Error; Clash of the Clans, 97 L. Soc'y GAZETrE 28 (Nov. 19, 2000) ("Many are dead against the SDS [Salaried Defense Service] in principle and
echo the damning view of the Criminal Law Solicitors Association (CLSA) that it is 'unnecessary and
grossly over expensive' and a 'waste of... valuable resources."').
357. Id. ("A chief concern for the CLSA is that there is a level playing field between public and
private sector work to make a true comparison.").
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numbers
comparing private solicitors and public defenders might be
"rigged." 358
When plans for the new public defenders were first announced, concerns were expressed that the defenders would not be sufficiently independent of the government. During parliamentary debates on the Access
to Justice Act, a former defense counsel chastised the government's proposal with typical British eloquence:
As the independence of the prosecutor is swept away, there emergesten days ago-predictably undiscussed, without warning to the public
or [the] profession, what I would call the sinister figure of the state
salaried defender, paid, selected and controlled by the state. That fine
warrior is to be sent out to do battle on the field of liberty and human
rights, with his opposite number, his local colleague at arms, the salaried state prosecutor-an all-state contest. As many others have long
predicted, introduce a state prosecutor and the state defender follows
as night follows day-the dark night of dependence and control, the
other side of the coin.
What next? Instead of the interests of justice being paramount, the culture of negotiated justice will prevail.... Plea bargaining already exists[,] but not behind closed doors. However, there will be plea
bargaining behind closed doors, pressures to abort trials, cosy relationships between prosecution and defence to maintain the conviction
count and the volume of cases and to minimize the cost. The cosiness
will soon extend to the court itself, which will be anxious to rid itself of
the stubborn and determined advocate who wastes the judge's time."'
Several national organizations in England concerned with criminal
legal aid also have voiced concerns about the independence of the new
public defender offices. 36° For example, England's Legal Action Group
(LAG) has argued that while it favors the public defender experiment, it
believes that the offices should not be managed by the LSC. 6 , Instead,
LAG would like there to be "an arm's-length body" to oversee the public
358. Paula Rohan, Hero to Zero, 98 L. Soc'y GAZETrE 16 (Nov. 21, 2001).
359. WINDLESHAM, supra note 143, at 143 (quoting 595 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998) 1I49).
360. Robins, supra note 356.
[T]here are objections in principle to the public defender scheme. "The state arrests, prosecutes and sentences individuals involved in the criminal justice system," the CLSA [Criminal Law Solicitors Association] argued ....
For the state to purport to defend that
individual will allow a breeding ground for miscarriages of justice." Certainly Mr. Fowler
[former chairman of the CLSA] is anxious about the development of a "canteen culture"
where deals are struck between crown prosecutors and public defenders over a coffee in the
morning. Both lawyers would be on a salary and a pension, he argues, and neither would
want to rock the boat.

Id.
361. See Rohan, supra note 358. The Legal Action Group is an organization whose purpose is "to
promote equal access to justice for all members of society who are socially, economically or otherwise
disadvantaged. To this end, it seeks to improve law and practice, the administration of justice and legal
services," LEGAL ACTION (Legal Action Group, London, Eng.), Aug. 2002, at 2.
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defender offices.362 The approach is reminiscent of the position of the
ABA, which suggests that an effective way to secure the independence of
a public defender program is to have a private board of trustees."3
Because the LSC understands the concerns respecting independence
of its public defenders, it has provided for a "Professional Head of Service" and appointed a well-respected London solicitor, who is also a
Commission member, to serve in this capacity. 6 4 According to the first
annual report of the Public Defender Service, the Head of Service chairs
a Public Defender Service (PDS) Management Committee, whose members include the heads of the PDS offices and the head of the CDS. 6 5
During an interview with the Head of Service, I learned that he routinely
visits each of the public defender offices, attends orientation programs
66
for new solicitors, and asks to be advised of all complaints from clients.
The Annual Report also states that the Head of Service "has specific
responsibilities for the professional standards and independence of the
' 67
service in the way it, and the staff within the offices, represent clients."
One of his principal duties is to ensure staff compliance with the Code of
Conduct for Public Defenders, which the Access to Justice Act required
to be prepared. 368 Several of the code's provisions relate directly to the
issue of public defender independence and the quality of work. Thus, the
code provides that "a professional employee shall do his or her utmost to
promote and work for the best interests of the client and.., provide the
"'69
client with fearless, vigorous and effective defence. ...
The code's section dealing with "excessive caseload" provides that if
a professional employee believes that the acceptance of additional cases
is "reasonably likely to lead to inadequate representation of existing clients," the matter should be brought to the attention of the head of the
office "who shall notify the professional head of service. ''

,37

During my

interview with the Head of Service, I asked how the rule dealing with excessive caseloads operates in practice. He advised me that the rule had
not yet been invoked by any public defender, probably because the offices are still involved in developing adequate caseloads. He also told me
362. Rohan, supra note 358.
363. ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5 -i.3(b).
364. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 336, at i8.
365. Id. at 13.
366. Interview with Anthony Edwards, TV Edwards Solicitors and Head of Service, in London,
Eng. (Oct. 28, 2002).
367. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 336, at s8.
368. Access to Justice Act, 1999, C. 22, § 16 (Eng.).
369. CODE OF CONDUCr FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, LEGAL SERVICE COMM'N
§ 2.1 (200I).

370. Id. § 13.1.
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that he would not be sympathetic to complaints about caseload unless
the defender had devoted at least 1200 "billable hours" during the year
on his or her cases and none of them had yet done so.'
5. Police Station Representation
No facet of defense services in England is more unlike the United
States than the routine practice of providing legal representation for suspects in police custody. Following the wrongful conviction of three young
persons for murder and a Royal Commission to consider criminal procedure reforms, Parliament enacted in 1984 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), which guarantees suspects in police custody the right
to legal advice.37 ' Section 58 of PACE provides as follows: "A person arrested and held in custody in a police station or other premises shall be
'
entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time."373
The implementation of this right to counsel is dealt with in an addendum to PACE titled, "Code C: Code of Practice for the Detention,
Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers," which sets
forth in detail exactly what the police can and cannot do in dealing with
persons in custody. Respecting legal representation, Code C requires
that suspects in police custody be "informed that they may at any time
consult and communicate privately with a solicitor, whether in person, in
writing or by telephone, and that free independent legal advice is avail-

371. Interview with Anthony Edwards, supra note 366. A public defender could still have an excessive caseload even if he or she had not yet billed 12oo hours for the year. For example, a public defender who received fifty new felony cases in January would be overwhelmed with work by the end of
the month, but obviously would not yet have billed i2oo hours for the year. Public defenders, like private attorneys, are required to record the time that they spend representing their clients. In 2002, average billable hours for partners and associates in U.S. firms were 1751 and t827, respectively.
ALTMAN WEIL, INC., THE 2002 SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 (Altman Weil
Publications, Inc.) (20o2).
372. Ed Cape, Assisting and Advising Defendants Before Trial, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS,
supra note 145, at 99, 99-1Ol.

373. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 6o, § 58.1 (Eng.). In contrast to the expansive right
to counsel guaranteed to persons in England, the right to counsel in the United States is more limited.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual a right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. However, the right to counsel only arises if "adversary judicial proceedings have
commenced.., and ... the encounter is a 'critical stage' of the criminal proceeding .... [T]he right to
counsel does not come into play simply because a person is or becomes the 'prime suspect' or 'focal
point,' or even when he is arrested (absent 'interrogation' or its equivalent)." YALE KAMISAR ET AL.,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 73 (ioth ed. 2002). "[O]ur cases have long recognized that the right to
counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant ... " United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 18o, 187 (1984).
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able from the duty solicitor. 37 4 Thus, the statute contains neither a
means test nor a merits test.375
Additionally, Code C requires that if the suspect declines to speak
with a solicitor, the police must ask the reason for not wanting legal advice, and must record the suspect's response."76 There also is a requirement that the police "prominently" display "[a] poster advertising the
'
right to legal advice.. . in the charging area of every police station."377
At
the start of police interviews or the re-commencement of any interview,
the police must usually re-advise suspects of their right to speak to a solicitor and that the interview will be delayed until legal advice can be obtained .3 Moreover, subject to certain exceptions, interviews of suspects
must be tape-recorded379 and solicitors are entitled to attend while police
interview suspects. On the latter point, Code C provides that "[a] detainee who has been permitted to contact a solicitor shall be entitled to
have the solicitor present when they are interviewed unless... awaiting
[the solicitor's arrival] would cause unreasonable delay to the process of
investigation. "'8'
In response to PACE, as noted earlier, 8" a national duty solicitor
program was established so that legal assistance would be available
twenty-four hours a day to persons in police custody."2 Initially, the Law
Society operated the duty solicitor system, but the Legal Services Commission runs it now. 3"' Persons may request that their own solicitor be
called instead of the duty solicitor.' Although section 58 of PACE refers
to a person's right to consult with a "solicitor," sometimes the person
374. U.K. HOME OFFICE, PACE CODES OF PRACTICE, CODE C 1 6.1, at 63 (rev. ed. 2003), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crimpol/police/system/pacecodes.html (last visited July 31, 2003) [hereinafter PACE CODES OF PRACTICE]. Pursuant to Code C, some delay in advising of the right to a solicitor is possible but does not often occur. See Cape, supra note 372, at tot.
375. ELLIOTr & QUINN, supra note 153, at 211.
376. PACE CODES OF PRACTICE, supra note 374, at Code C 6.5, at 65.

377. Id. Code C 9 6.3, at 64.
378. Id. Code C 6.6, at 64-65, 11.2, at 81.
379. Id. Code E: Tape Recording Interviews with Suspects 3.1, at 178. An interview is not required to be tape recorded where it is "clear from the outset there will not be a prosecution," id. Code
E I 3 .3 (b), at 179; or where it is "not reasonably practical because of equipment failure or the unavailability of a suitable interview room or recorder" and the custody officer reasonably believes that "the
interview should not be delayed," id. Code E I 3.3(a), at 178. In addition, an interview is not required
to be tape recorded if a suspect "refuses to go into or remain in a suitable interview room" and the
custody officer reasonably believes the interview should not be delayed. Id. Code E 3.4, at 179.
380. Id. Code C I 6.6(b)(ii), at 65, 16.8, at 66.
381. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
382. ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 211.

383. Ed Cape, Assisting and Advising Defendants Before Trial, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS,
supra note 145, at 102.

384. Id.
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who responds to the call for representation is a non-solicitor who has
been trained through an accreditation program. 35 About 40% of the persons in police custody avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain legal
assistance. 3s

The availability of solicitors in police stations to advise suspects during interviews took on even greater importance in 1994 when Parliament
enacted the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act ("CJPOA"), which
altered traditional rules regarding the right to remain silent."'7 Historically, the rule in England was the same as in the United States, i.e., a person did not have to say anything to the police and a person's silence
could not be used against him or her in court.3" Now, under the CJPOA,

adverse inferences may be drawn by courts or juries from the silence of
suspects if, during questioning, suspects "fail to mention facts which they
later rely on as part of their defence and which it is reasonable to expect
them to have mentioned."""8 Because of this rule, solicitors are faced with
the enormously important and difficult decision whether to advise suspects to answer police questions.3"
385. Id. at sii. The accreditation scheme was implemented following the discovery that a large
percentage of suspects were being advised by unqualified, non-solicitor representatives. It was designed to ensure that all non-solicitors who give legal advice at police stations meet some "minimum
level of competence." Id. Jointly administered by the Law Society and the LSC, the accreditation
scheme has improved the quality of police station advice from both solicitors and non-solicitors. Id.
See also LEE BRIDGES & SATNAM CHOONGH, IMPROVING POLICE STATION LEGAL ADVICE: RESEARCH STUDY
31, SUMMARY at viii (1998)

The research has produced mixed findings regarding the quality of police station advice following the introduction of the accreditation scheme. On the one hand, there have been
measurable and significant improvements in quality across a large number of elements of
police station advice provision and different types of adviser. ...On the other hand, there
are still significant areas in which there is a low rate of compliance with the standards of
performance laid down under the accreditation scheme across all types of adviser.
Id.
386. Cape, Assisting and Advising Defendants Before Trial, supra note 145, at 102. In contrast,
shortly after the introduction of PACE, the proportion of suspects requesting legal advice was only
twenty-five percent. This increase in the percentage of suspects requesting legal advice is partially explained by the fact that revisions of Code C have strengthened the right to advice. Id.
387. Id. at 105.
388. ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 262.

389. Id. at 263; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34 (Eng.).
390. ED CAPE & JAWAID LUQMANI, DEFENDING

SUSPECTS AT POLICE STATIONS: THE PRACTITIONERS'

GUIDE TO ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION 192 (3d ed. 1999).

Whether to answer police questions ...is usually the most important, and the most difficult,
area of advice. Anything said by a suspect in the context of a police interview at which
his/her lawyer was present will almost certainly be admitted at trial. On the other hand,
things that are not said in the interview may, as a result of CJPOA ...have a critical impact
on both the decision whether to initiate criminal proceedings and on the outcome of any
trial. Furthermore, the lawyer has to give advice in circumstances where s/he will usually
have limited and uncertain information, both about the possible prosecution evidence and
about the position of the client.
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ENGLAND'S DEFENSE SYSTEM

In General
As discussed earlier, England used to provide criminal legal aid under a system in which an eligible defendant could "retain" any solicitor
he wanted; and the solicitor would send a bill for services to the government upon completion of the case.39 ' Now, in order to be paid by the
government for criminal legal aid, a solicitor must be "licensed," i.e., the
solicitor must meet quality standards, sign a contract with the LSC, and
agree to various audits. Although there are some new experimental public defender programs, these offices, too, must satisfy the same practice
requirements imposed on private solicitors. Defendants continue to be
able to select the solicitors they prefer, assuming the solicitor is licensed,
and thus even public defenders must compete for client business.
England's system of criminal legal aid provides more extensive coverage than do indigent defense programs in the United States. Since in
England a means test to qualify for legal aid has been eliminated, everyone is eligible initially to receive a lawyer without charge.39 In England,
even if a person has financial capacity, he is not required to contribute
towards his defense except in serious cases prosecuted in Crown
Courts.393 Also, in contrast to the United States, England routinely provides lawyers for defendants in police custody39 and, subject to a means
test, lawyers are compensated when they provide "advice and assistance"
to persons under police investigation who have not been charged with an
offense.395 As discussed later, the per capita cost of criminal legal aid in
England is substantially higher than indigent defense services in the
United States, but36this is due only partially to the greater coverage of
England's system. 9
2.
Quality of Representation
During my research of England's defense program, I was intrigued
about the quality of the legal representation provided by solicitors and
whether the Specialist Quality Mark (SQM) and the auditing of case files
required by the CDS has affected defense services.3 9 My interest in these
i.

391. See supra text accompanying note 172.
392. See supra text accompanying note 189. In the United States, counsel is provided to persons
who are unable to afford a reasonable attorney's fee. See generally ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-7.1 and cmt.
393. See supra note 2oo and accompanying text. See generally ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES,
supra note 22, Standard 5-7.2 and cmt.
394- See supra notes 372-9o and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
396. See infra notes 551--66 and accompanying text.
397. See supranotes 228-7o and accompanying text and infra notes 436-41 and accompanying text.
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issues was largely due to a scholarly study published in 1994, which contained a harsh indictment of the practices of solicitors who provide
criminal legal aid.
The study, conducted by the Legal Research Institute of the University of Warwick School of Law, is contained in a full-length bookStanding Accused: The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence
Lawyers in Britain.398 The defense practitioners I interviewed in England
were familiar with the study even though it was published almost a decade earlier. This is probably due to the study's findings, the reputations
of the scholars who conducted it, and because it was based upon extensive empirical data collected over several years, beginning in 1988. Altogether, "forty-eight firms of solicitors and three independent agencies in
various parts of the country were observed in detail ....
Some of the most serious charges in the study included widespread
impersonal interviewing and abrupt treatment of clients,4" a failure to
prepare cases adequately and to conduct appropriate investigations,4"'
and a lack of sufficient in-service training." 2 The researchers also found
"that many solicitors do not check whether there is a factual basis for a
4 3 Referring to solicitors serving apprenticeships, the
plea of guilty.""
study contains this statement:
Almost all our respondents came to see criminal defence practices as
geared... towards the routine production of guilty pleas. A minority
of them found this to be a source of injustice for clients and of disillusionment for themselves, given their earlier expectations of the defence
lawyer's role in an adversarial system." 4

Later the study elaborated on the attitude of solicitors towards guilty
pleas:
The idea that the prosecution should be "put to the proof"-required

to establish a case against the defendant-is not accepted as "valid" or
"realistic" by defence solicitors.... [S]o strong is their presumption of
guilt and their faith in the prosecution's case, that they fail to see their
own role in the production of [guilty] pleas .... 40'

398. MIKE MCCONVILLE ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION AND PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN (1994). A 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice also disclosed "a number of problems with criminal legal aid." ELLIOrT & QUINN, supra note 153, at 214.
399. MCCONVILLE ET AL., supra note 398, at 15.

400. Id. at 67, 189.
401. Id. at 67, 237.
402. Id. at 71.
403. Id. at 189.
404. Id. at 71.
405.

Id. at 210.

March 20041

LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

During interviews, I inquired whether the findings in Standing Accused were still appropriate characterizations of defense practice. Invariably, I was told that the profession had changed and that the study's
findings are out of date. One of the principal authors of the study explained to me that a new generation of defense lawyers had grown up
who are better trained and have a more professional and adversarial approach to their work."' He attributed improvements to a variety of factors, including Legal Aid Board quality standards that were forerunners
of the SQM4' and the accreditation program for non-solicitor police station legal advisers, which he described as having had a positive "ripple
effect" among solicitors.4"' Because defense practices have changed, he
worried that persons reading Standing Accused today might erroneously
conclude that it continues to reflect the ways in which defense lawyers in
England practice."
The administrative head of England's Criminal Law Solicitors Association also claimed that the defense bar was performing more effectively, and he attributed changes that had occurred partly to Standing
Accused."' Moreover, while lamenting the bureaucracy and the administrative burden of the SQM and other requirements imposed by the CDS,
he conceded that they were part of a "necessary evil." He explained that
the SQM produced a "consistency of operation" and "practice habits"
that were quite positive for the profession. Similarly, the Head of Service
for public defenders in England told me that because of SQM standards,
solicitors are delivering a "better service" to their clients than previously.4" ' He also pointed to the "review and supervision" requirements of
the SQM,which he characterized as a "remarkable success." Now, he
said, because solicitors have to record everything that they do, they are
better organized and supervisors can review a file and discern "whether
the representation was done right."4 2'
406. Interviews with Lee Bridges, Chair, Warwick Law School, Professor of Law and Director.
Legal Research Institute of Warwick Law School, in Warwick, Eng. (Oct. 29,2002), and London, Eng.
(Apr. 30, 2003).
407. See supra text accompanying note 173.

408. Interview with Lee Bridges on Apr. 30, 2003, supra note 406. For a discussion of the accreditation program, see BRIDGES & CHOONGH, supra note 385.
409. The concern expressed by Professor Bridges appears to be well founded. There are several
relatively recent sources that cite STANDING ACCUSED, supra note 398, without questioning whether its
findings are still accurate. See, e.g., ANDREW W. BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF
LAWYERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

317-18 (1999).

Interview with Rodney Warren, supra note 354.
411. Interview with Anthony Edwards, supra note 366.
412. Id. The Head of Office for the Public Defender Service in Birmingham also said that he believed defense representation of solicitors had improved substantially since STANDING ACCUSED, supra
note 398, was published. Interview with Lee Preston, supra note 348.
410.
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Yet several interviewees conceded that it was possible for a solicitor
to satisfy the SQM requirements and obtain a contract from the LSC
when he ought to be found ineligible for legal aid work. For example, the
head of the London Criminal Courts Solicitors Association told me of a
lawyer whom they would not admit to the association because he was not
paying the fees of barristers, as required, but still managed to sign a contract with the LSC." 3 Even the Executive Director of the LSC acknowledged that there were solicitors who qualified for contracts who should
not be furnishing criminal legal aid because they were "not doing what
that they should" in representing their clients or were overcharging for
their time."'
The caseloads of solicitors were another matter about which I inquired because I wondered whether in order to maximize income, it was
possible for a solicitor to take on an excessive number of cases, resulting
in inadequate client representation. The CDS does not impose any limits
on the numbers of cases that a solicitor may handle,415 but solicitors of
whom I inquired claimed that excessive caseloads were not a problem
since solicitors depend heavily on their reputations and repeat business
of clients. If an excessive caseload were to prevent a solicitor from being
attentive to clients, the solicitor would in the end lose business and the
problem would thus correct itself.4' 6 In other words, according to practitioners, the market forces that operate in private practice are at work in
legal aid, and they effectively discourage lawyers from accepting too
many clients. Also, as one solicitor explained, the mandatory supervision
of lawyers required by the SQM protects against solicitors developing
excessive caseloads. A solicitor-supervisor who saw that one of his or her
lawyers had too many cases would insist that some of the cases be transferred to others in the firm." 7

One of the issues not dealt with in the SQM requirements relates to
continuous representation by the same solicitor.' While solicitors with
whom I spoke agreed that continuous representation by the same solici413. Interview with Robert Brown, Corker Benning Solicitors, in London, Eng. (Oct. 22, 2002).
414. Interview with Steven Orchard, Chief Executive, Legal Services Commission, in London,
Eng. (Apr. 14, 2003).
415. Interview with Greg Powell, supra note 203.
416. Id.
417. Interview with Stephen Hewitt, Managing Partner, Fisher Meredith Solicitors, in London,
Eng. (Oct. 19, 2002). 1 made no independent investigation of solicitor caseloads and thus have no information on actual caseloads of solicitors who provide criminal legal aid representation.
418. The standards of the ABA provide as follows: "Counsel initially provided should continue to
ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERrepresent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings ....
VICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-6.2. The commentary to this provision argues that when a defendant
has a series of lawyers the cost in "human terms" is significant since a "close and confidential relationship with the client" is jeopardized.
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tor was desirable and practiced to the extent possible, they maintained
that in busy law practices it often was necessary for one solicitor to substitute for another at court proceedings and on other occasions.4"9 One
solicitor explained that his firm's practice was to confirm in writing to the
client the name of the solicitor with primary responsibility for the case
but inform the client that other lawyers from the same office "team" may
occasionally have to substitute for the lead lawyer.42
Fact investigations are another critical component in furnishing
quality legal representation to defendants. In the United States, ABA
standards long have recognized that defense lawyers "should conduct a
prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty
in the event of conviction. 4 ..' The duty to investigate "is not discharged
by the accused's admission of guilt to the lawyer or by the accused's
stated desire to enter a guilty plea."4 2 It is well accepted in the United
States, moreover, that the duty to conduct an investigation extends to the
interviewing of prosecution witnesses whenever necessary.4"3 Because of
the importance attached to investigations, public defender offices in the
United States often employ full-time investigators and ordinarily at least
some government funds are available for private attorneys who incur investigative expenses."

In England, there are no national standards for defense practice of
the kind developed in the United States, although there are general admonitions related to advocacy contained in a code developed by The

419. Interview with Lee Preston, supra note 348; interview with Anthony Edwards, supranote 366.
420.

Interview with Anthony Edwards, supra note 366.

421. ABA. DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 22, Standard 4-4.5(a). The U.S. Supreme Court recently

emphasized the importance of investigations, noting that the decision not to investigate circumstances
in mitigation of the death penalty may itself be unreasonable and grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
422. ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 22, Standard 4-4.I(a) cmt. 913. The recommendations of
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association are quite similar. See NLADA PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 275, Guideline 4. 1(a).
423. The commentary to the ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.3, supra note 22, offers the

following guidance:
Because witnesses do not "belong" to either party, it is improper for a prosecutor, defense
counsel, or anyone acting for either to suggest to a witness that the witness not submit to an
interview by opposing counsel. It is not only proper but it may be the duty of the prosecutor
and defense counsel to interview any person who may be called as a witness in the case ....
Similarly, NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 275, Guideline 4.1 (b)(3) contains the following advice: "Counsel should consider whether to interview the potential witnesses, including any
complaining witnesses and others adverse to the accused."
424. Standards in the United States recognize the importance of investigative assistance: "The legal representation plan should provide for investigatory, expert, and other services necessary to quality legal representation." ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-I.4.
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Law Society.42 5 Although the CDS expects that solicitors will talk to witnesses who are "in support of the client," neither the SQM standards nor
the "Transaction Criteria" form used in the auditing of case files42 mentions interviews of prosecution witnesses.427 Nor is it entirely clear
whether the CDS is willing to reimburse solicitors if they submit claims
for investigators retained to interview prosecution witnesses.42 Further, a
member of the Commission commented that routine reimbursements for
such investigative expenses "would blow the budget."4 '9
Several solicitors acknowledged that there is "no tradition" in England of defense lawyers or investigators interviewing witnesses for the
prosecution, probably because the defense receives in advance of court
proceedings all witness statements furnished to the police. 3 If prosecution witnesses were sought for interviews, solicitors said, the witnesses
probably would feel obliged to inform the prosecutor and either "permission would be denied" or the prosecutor would insist upon being present
during the interview.43'
But the practice of not interviewing prosecution witnesses is inconsistent with settled principles of ethics and professionalism in England. In
The Law Society's Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors, the
following statement appears: "It is permissible for a solicitor acting for
any party to interview and take statements from any witness at any stage
in the proceedings...."43 2 Moreover, a book on criminal defence in England published in 2002 cites the foregoing authority but concedes that
"English and Welsh defence solicitors have had a distinct disinclination
'
to interview prosecution witnesses."433
While noting that there may be

425. See THE LAW SOCIETY,GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS (8th ed. 1999).
426. See infra text accompanying notes 437-41.
427. The Transaction Criteria form reads as follows: "Where there are witnesses in support of the
client: Has the adviser taken proof/s of evidence?" LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, CRIME TRANSACTION CRITERIA 12, QUESTION 52 ( 4 th ed. 2002) [hereinafter TRANSACTION CRITERIA]. This form is further discussed
at infra notes 437-4 and accompanying text.

428. A senior staff member of the Criminal Defence Service told me that the commission would
consider reimbursements for investigators to interview prosecution witnesses if the interviews were

deemed reasonably necessary, but she also expressed doubts about the ethical propriety of such interviews. Interview with Katherine Pears, Senior Legal Advisor to the Criminal Defence Service and Tim
Collieu, Criminal Defence Service, Legal Services Commission in London, Eng. (Apr. 14, 2003)
(comments by Katherine Pears). On the other hand, an experienced defense solicitor told me that he
didn't believe such reimbursements were possible. Interview with Rodney Warren, supra note 354.
429. Interview with Anthony Edwards, supra note 366.
430. Id.; Interview with Lee Preston, supra note 348.
431. Id.
432. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS, supra note 425, § 21.10.
433. ROGER EDE & ANTHONY EDWARDS, CRIMINAL DEFENCE: GOOD PRACTICE IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 9 (3d ed. 2002).
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are persuasive arguments for inrisks, the authors suggest that "[t]here
434
witnesses.
prosecution
terviewing
Absent a far more searching inquiry, I cannot offer categorical judgments about the overall quality of defense representation among England's solicitors. From an American perspective, the failure of solicitors
or investigators to interview regularly witnesses for the prosecution suggests that the adversary system is not functioning as it should. On the
other hand, it seems likely that the SQM requirements have made a difference in the approach of solicitors to their work. Not only do the SQM
standards assure annual training, in-office supervision, and a host of progressive business practices, 435 but also there are audits that deal directly
with the performance of counsel.
Each year twenty closed files of solicitors are selected at random and
reviewed by CDS staff to assess the accuracy of billing. In addition, in the
case of new law firms and when there are questions concerning the quality of a firm's work, the files are analyzed in order to assess counsel's performance. 4, 6 This is achieved through the use of a detailed, twenty-page
"Transaction Criteria" form, first developed by the Legal Aid Board in
the 199os, which enables the reviewer, inter alia, to discern the extent of
the solicitor's preparation and the advice given to the client.437 For example, under the heading "Advice on Proceedings," a reviewer is prompted
to consider what the client was told when a guilty plea was discussed.
Question fifty-four reads, in part, as follows: "Does the file show that the
client was advised as to:
What the prosecution will have to prove?
434- Id.
435. See supra notes 228-70 and accompanying text.
436. Interview with Katherine Pears and Tim Collieu (comments by Katherine Pears), supra note
428; Telephone interviews with Katherine Pears (Apr. 15 and 25, 2003). Ms. Pears explained that the
CDS selects files randomly by computer and a greater number of files than are actually reviewed are
sent to the CDS. Questions about a law firm's performance can arise, for example, when the CDS receives complaints about a lawyer from a judge or the police.
437. See TRANSACTION CRITERIA, supra note 427. The Transaction Criteria does not contain any
questions concerning whether or not the defense has interviewed prosecution witnesses. However, the
form does contain questions about whether or not the defense has "requested or obtained... prosecution disclosure," which presumably includes statements of witnesses for the prosecution. There have been several major changes in the criteria form since it was first devised, as well as
some minor adjustments. Interview with Avrom Sherr, Woolf Professor of Legal Education, Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, in London, Eng. (May 13, 2003).
The transaction criteria were compiled by the researchers ... from a study of client files,
textbooks and practice manuals. The draft criteria were then sent to expert practitioners
and other interested groups for comment and revision. The resulting "check-lists" were
therefore an amalgam of empirical work and expert knowledge and opinion.
Alan Patterson & Avrom Sherr, Quality Legal Services: The Dog That Did Not Bark, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID 244 (1999).
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The strength of the prosecution's evidence?
Reasons for advice as to plea?
The likely sentencing options in the client's particular case?
The implications of an early plea?" '...
While a reviewer probably cannot determine from a file whether a
case was fully and carefully investigated and whether a solicitor's judgment about pleading guilty was appropriate, the fact that files are subjected to this sort of inquiry should cause conscientious solicitors to
consider the important issues in a case before recommending that a client
plead guilty. A reviewer who is concerned about the content of a file may
refer the case for further review within the CDS, and occasionally experienced defense solicitors will conduct peer reviews of files.439
The Transaction Criteria are not without their detractors. For example, one researcher has suggested that they were intended to make solicitors more efficient and cost effective, with the risk that the practice of
law would become more "a matter of form rather than substance."' The
researchers who developed the Transaction Criteria have responded as
follows:
These process measures have attracted.., criticism.... From the outset practitioners and other interest groups objected to the notion that
quality could be gauged from an audit of files, which measured compliance with a check-list rather than the adequacy of the advice given or
the action taken.... Indeed, the accusation was made that the criteria
encouraged routinisation and standardisation of practice.... It was
felt, however, that in most cases it would lead to a levelling up rather
than a levelling down in standards .... In the eyes of the researchers,
transaction criteria, properly applied and audited, constituted a robust
yet affordable approach to establishing a quality floor, as opposed to
the highly expensive option of peer review, much favoured by critics
such as the Law Society and the Legal Action Group."
3. Future of CriminalLegal Aid
In February 2003, The Law Society issued a report titled, The Future
of Publicly Funded Legal Services, which states that the legal profession

438.

TRANSACTION CRITERIA, supra note 427.
439. This approach is consistent with recommendations in death penalty cases in the United States.
See text infra accompanying notes 5o6-07.
44o. Tamara Goriely, Debating the Quality of Legal Services: Differing Models of the Good Lawyer, I INT'L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 159, 167 (1994).
44i. Patterson & Sherr, supra note 437, at 244. The Legal Services Commission plans increasingly
to use panels of experienced solicitors as peer reviewers who are paid a daily stipend for their services.
Telephone interview with Katherine Pears, supra note 436 (Apr. 25, 2003); and interview with Steven
Orchard, supra note 414.

March

2004]

LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

has grown "disillusioned with [civil and criminal] legal aid."" 2 This is because "[1]egal aid is at best marginally profitable" since "[d]uring the last
ten years ... the costs of running a solicitors' practice rose by 67.52%
whilst legal aid rates increased by 26.35%."4' In addition, the report
notes that the "administrative burden" of operating under contracts of
the Legal Services Commission has further eroded the profitability of legal aid practice." According to a Law Society telephone survey conducted during 2002 and included as an appendix to the report, more than
a fourth of the law firms questioned said that they were likely to give up
their criminal legal aid practices during the next five years."5 Graduates
of law schools, who often have considerable debt upon completing their
legal education, are also described as
6 "reluctant to take poorly paid training contracts with legal aid firms."",
However, the report does not argue for a significant increase in the
government's budget for legal aid," 7 noting that it has argued for in-

442. THE LAW SOCIETY, THE FUTURE OF PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES 6 (2003) [hereinafter
THE FUTURE OF PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES].

443. Id.
444. Id. at 1o.
445. Id. at 46.
Larger firms were the most likely to state that they would give up crime work for legally
aided clients. Almost half (48%) of respondents from firms with is-25 partners said that
they did not think that their firms would be undertaking crime work for legally aided clients
in five years time. Only a quarter of smaller firms (sole practitioners (27%) and 2-4 partners (25%)) said that they will have stopped crime work for legally aided clients in five
years time.
Id.
446. Id. Upon graduating from law schools, solicitors are required to complete a nine-month "Legal Practice Course" as well as a two-year training period with a solicitors' law firm during which they
are paid. In order to encourage law graduates with educational debts to accept legal aid positions. the
LSC announced in 2002 that it would provide "a three-year, £30,000 sponsorship for oo LPC [Legal
Practice Course] places and funding for i00 trainee places.., in smaller urban and rural areas, where
the LSC maintains that the shortage of new solicitors opting to work for legal aid firms is most apparent." An interview with an official of the LSC confirmed that these stipends are intended to encourage
new solicitors to work in both civil and criminal legal aid practices. Interview with Katherine Pears and
Tim Collieu (comments by Tim Collieu). supra note 428. Similar to the recruiting efforts of the LSC,
legislation introduced in both houses of Congress would "encourage qualified individuals to enter and
continue employment as prosecutors and public defenders." Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act,
S. IO9i, io8th Cong. § 2(a)(a) (2003): see also Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act, H.R. 2198,
io8th Cong. (2003). Under this legislation, if an individual agreed to serve as a prosecutor or public
defender for at least three years, they would be eligible to receive up to $6ooo of loan forgiveness per
year, and could receive up to $40,000 in total debt forgiveness. Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive
Act, S. io9I, Io8th Cong. § 2(a). Also, a report of the American Bar Association calls for intervention
by the federal government, state governments, and law schools in creating programs designed to alleviate financial problems that debt-ridden law school graduates face when choosing to enter lowerpaying public service jobs. See ABA, COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE
BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE (2003).

447. THE FUTURE OF PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 442, at 9.
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creases in the past to no avail." Instead, accepting that there are not going to be increases beyond three percent per annum over each of the
next three years, which is the sum projected by the Lord Chancellor's
Department, 449 the report seeks the profession's comments and advice
among four quite distinct options: (I) maintain the status quo, which
means having most criminal defense work performed by private attorneys; (2) continue with private practitioners but with "block funding"; (3)
increase substantially the number of Public Defender Service offices,
thereby providing more choice to clients among legal service providers;
and (4) expand the number of Public Defender Service offices so that
salaried lawyers can provide the bulk of the legal representation.45 °
Whether any of these alternatives would be less expensive than the current system is not addressed in the report.
My interviews with solicitors confirmed that many are, in fact, "disillusioned" with criminal legal aid. As one lawyer told me, "the number of
firms [doing criminal legal aid] is shrinking, life is not fun any more"; he
said that he "bumps into firms all over that are closing out of criminal legal aid. ' 451' Another solicitor said that the "administrative burden" of the
regulations of the CDS has contributed to a decline in the number of
firms willing to do criminal legal aid. 4 ' As this lawyer explained, the
more profitable areas of legal practice in laws firms are not willing to
continue indefinitely to subsidize an area of the practice that is much less
profitable.453 Still another lawyer said that if there are not eventually increases in fee rates, the "best lawyers will be driven out-the best suppliers will be lost. 45 4 All of the solicitors I interviewed told me that fee rates
for criminal legal aid are considerably below what clients are charged in
civil cases and in the occasional retained criminal case.455
448. Id. at 6.
449. Appendix B of the report shows the budget for civil and criminal legal aid as follows: 20022003-11,748 million; 2003-2004-I,8i9 million; 2004-2005-£1,874 million; and 2005-2oo6-i,929
million. Id. at 40.
450. Id. at 30-31.
451. Interview with Robert Brown, supra note 413.
452. Interview with Rodney Warren, supra note 354.
453. Id.
454. Interview with Stephen Hewitt, supra note 417.
455. See supra note 291 for a discussion of "standard fees" paid to solicitors for rendering legal
services. The LSC does not maintain data on average fees paid to solicitors for various types of cases.
However, average fee rates are reported for various stages of case. For 2001-2002, for example, claims
paid to solicitors for police station attendance averaged £246; for police station telephone advice
only-£62; court duty solicitor sessions-£222; lower standard fees in Magistrates' Courts-£326;
higher standard fees in Magistrates' Courts-£821; and for non-standard fees and exempt cases in
Magistrates' Courts-£i632. LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, supra note 206, at 45. Based upon an exchange
rate of $1.61 per pound, see supra note 2o6, these average fees equal $396 for police station attendance; $Ioo for police station telephone advice only; $357 for court duty solicitor sessions; $525 for
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There also have been a number of news articles in English law publications that have recounted the dissatisfaction of criminal legal aid lawyers. In one publication a solicitor wrote that "[m]any firms that I have
been in contact with.., have in fact decided to close their criminal defence department because they have not been able to recruit ....In my
twenty years of practice the current recruitment crisis in criminal defence
work is the worst that I can recall.""46 The author claims that the current
state of affairs is a "crisis," attributable to the level of remuneration and
the government's failure to give lawyers annual increases.457
As discussed later, even though there have not been significant fee
increases for lawyers in criminal cases in recent years, government expenditures for criminal legal aid have gone up by more than £300 million
just in the last four years. This is due primarily to magistrates approving
more representation orders following the removal of a means test for legal aid and to more arrests by the police. 4" The increase in spending undoubtedly contributes to the unwillingness of the Lord Chancellor's
Department to raise fees for legal aid work.
Despite the comments of solicitors and the Law Society's report on
the future of legal aid, it was unclear to me as of the summer of 2003
whether there was a serious, current crisis involving criminal legal aid.
Although the CDS does not track how many lawyers are engaged in
criminal defense work, the agency maintains an exact count of the number of law firms who have fulfilled SQM requirements and signed contracts to provide criminal representation. As of March 31, 2002, there
were 2909 law firms under contract with the LSC to provide criminal defense services, whereas on March 31, 2003, the number under contract
was only nineteen fewer-2890. 4"9 In addition, the number of duty solicitors for police stations and Magistrates' Courts has remained steady at
about 5500, which is the same number of approved duty solicitors when
the Legal Aid Board administered the program."
The Chief Executive of the LSC was quite firm in stating that there
was not a current crisis, although he conceded that there might be at
some future time. He also acknowledged that there were some problems
respecting the availability of solicitors in rural areas and difficulties in re-

lower standard fees in Magistrates' Courts ;$1322 for higher standard fees in Magistrates' Courts; and
$2628 for non-standard fees and exempt cases in Magistrates' Courts.
456. Ian Kelcey, Going Going Gone, 152 NEw L.J. 1877 (2002).
457. Id.
458. Interview with Katherine Pears and Tim Collieu, supra note 428.
459. Id.
460. Id.
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cruiting recent law graduates to undertake careers in legal aid. 6 ' The
Head of Public Legal Services for the Lord Chancellor's Department
told me that except for some "patchiness in rural areas," there were
really no immediate problems with the supplier base. As he put it, "people are not about to go unrepresented-the system is not about to stop
operating."46'
I expect that during the next several years there will not be major
changes in the delivery of criminal defense services; that the alternatives
to the status quo identified in the Law Society's report on legal aid will
not be pursued because none would likely be any less expensive than the
current program; and that ultimately the government will spend what is
necessary to maintain the program's viability, including raising fees for
lawyers, if necessary. This latter prediction is based on history because
clearly England is prepared to invest in criminal legal aid., 6' As the Head
of Public Legal Services for the Lord Chancellor's Department said,
"you cannot continue to pay the same rates ad infinitum, although it's
impossible to predict the timing" when rates might be raised. 6 '

III.

LEARNING FROM ENGLAND

Much of what England does in the field of criminal legal aid is obviously not suitable for replication in the United States. For example, the
suggestion that U.S. jurisdictions eliminate a means test to qualify for
counsel in criminal cases would surely induce a mixture of jeers and
hearty laughter from legislators of all political persuasions. 465 Nor are
states ever apt to adopt programs in which persons under suspicion of
criminal activity can consult with a lawyer at public expense. Similarly,
461. Interview with Steven Orchard, supra note 414. Similar views were expressed by Lee Bridges,
who believes that there are some difficulties in rural areas, but not in the cities where there is an oversupply of lawyers willing to undertake criminal legal aid work. Thus, he believes that if some firms in
the larger cities cease doing criminal legal aid work, there will be others willing to step up to handle
the work. Like Mr. Orchard, Professor Bridges was aware that there were problems in getting recent
law graduates to accept a "training contract" to do criminal legal aid. Interview with Lee Bridges, Professor of Law and Director Chair Warwick Law School and Director, Legal Research Institute, Warwick Law School, in London, England (May t, 2003).
462. Interview with Derek Hill, supra note 204.
463. See infra notes 549-54 and accompanying text.
464. Interview with Derek Hill, supra note 204.
465. ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-7.1, provides as follows:

"Counsel should be provided to persons who are financially unable to obtain adequate representation
without substantial hardship." State statutes are often quite similar. See, e.g., WASH. REV. COoE
§ Io.IoI.oIo (i)(d) (2004) (providing defense counsel to those "[u]nable to pay the anticipated cost of
counsel for the matter before the court because his or her available funds are insufficient to pay any
amount for the retention of counsel."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-2 (2002) (providing defense counsel
to persons who are "unable, without undue hardship, to provide for all or a part of the expenses of
legal representation from available present income and assets").
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the widespread, routine availability of lawyers in America's police stations is never likely to be accepted, although England's successful deployment of solicitors and accredited representatives in police stations
should at least support efforts in the United States to persuade police
departments to record or videotape interrogations of suspects. 46'
On the other hand, some of England's approaches to criminal legal
aid merit serious consideration in the United States. I refer to England's
emphasis on quality representation, payments to counsel, and the right of
clients to select their own solicitor.

A. ASSURING QUALITY
England's system seeks to assure that quality criminal legal aid is
provided to defendants. The accreditation of duty solicitors for police
stations and Magistrates' Courts, the Specialist Quality Mark (SQM),
audits of case files, and occasional peer reviews of files are all aimed at
increasing the likelihood that solicitors perform effectively. 467 While there
can be debate about whether these measures of quality are appropriate
and how much difference they have made, there cannot be any dispute
that a major effort to assure quality in England's criminal legal aid program has been underway for some years.
In contrast, state and county governments in the United States do
not monitor the quality of the defense services for which they pay. Nor
466. There is considerable support in the United States for videotaping and/or recording interrogations. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.22(3) (Vernon 2003) ("[S]tatements of an accused made
during custodial interrogation are not admissible in criminal proceeding unless an electronic recording
is made of the statement."); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) ("[All custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be
electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of
detention."); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, mI58 (Ala. 1985) ("[A]n unexcused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a suspect's right to due
process, under the Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible."); Act of July i8,2003, Pub. Act 93-206, 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. H.B. 223, §103-2.1 (West) (requiring
police to electronically record all custodial interrogations and confessions in homicide cases in order
for the statement of the accused to be admitted into evidence); Mandy DeFilippo, You Have The Right
To Better Safeguards:Looking Beyond Miranda In The New Millennium, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 637,
705 (2001) ("[V]ideotaping should be made mandatory for all custodial interrogations."); Steven A.
Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of InterrogationsIs the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 337, 341 (2001) ("[V]ideotaping interrogations will save valuable court time by reducing frivolous motions to suppress, will induce guilty
pleas, and will protect honest police officers from false allegations that they abused defendants.");
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-682 (1996)
("[S]ubstantive due process requires that we legally mandate the electronic-recording of custodial interrogations in all felony cases. The use of audio or videotaping inside the interrogation room creates
an objective record of police questioning to which all interested and potentially interested parties may
appeal.., in the determination of truth and in judgments of justice and fairness.").
467. See supra notes 163-66, 226-70, 436-41 and accompanying text.
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are the vast majority of defenders, assigned counsel, and contract programs monitored by independent quasi-governmental or private organizations to assure the quality of the legal services they provide. 468 This
absence of external oversight to assure quality ought to be a source of
major concern, especially since there is overwhelming evidence that defense representation
in the United States often is egregiously inade4
quate. 6
Since the late I96os, the ABA and the NLADA have adopted a
number of well-accepted standards related to indigent defense representation. In particular, provisions of the ABA's chapters on ProvidingDefense Services,47 the Defense Function,47"' and NLADA's Performance
47 spell out critical eleGuidelines for Criminal Defense Representation
ments of sound indigent defense systems and steps that defense lawyers
should take in representing their clients. These publications are designed
not only to guide attorneys but also to assist state criminal justice policymakers improve defense services and, if deemed appropriate, adopt
their own standards for indigent defense.473 And during the past fifteen
years, by virtue of legislation, rules of supreme courts, and state commissions or other entities, a wide variety of standards and guidelines dealing
468. By "independent quasi-governmental or private organizations," I am referring to entities that
have oversight responsibility for indigent defense in the jurisdiction but do not employ or directly supervise the lawyers who provide the legal representation. The Legal Services Commission in England
meets this definition, much like a number of state public defender commissions in the United States.
See supra note 195 and infra notes 484-87, 500-02 and accompanying text.

One scholar has aptly noted the problem in achieving quality in this country:
The conventional political maneuver has been for government funding authorities to distill
the duty to provide assistance to the indigent accused into an obligation to conduct volume
business at rock-bottom prices. With their eyes fixed on ever-shrinking funds available to
finance the growing obligations of government, these funders carefully and consistently
evade the question of quality. Instead, as a matter of routine, they demand that indigent defense service providers set and then meet specific requirements to justify their budget allotments, measuring performance according to the defenders' ability to handle at
discounted prices a set number of cases during a fiscal year.
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2003).

469. See supranotes 43-122 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standards 5-1.2, 5-1.3, 5-1.5,

5-i.6.
471. See, e.g., ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 22, Standards 4-1.2, 4-1.3, 4-1.5, 4-1.6, 4-2.1,

4-3.1, 4-4.1, 4-5.1.
472. See, e.g., NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 275, Guidelines t.i-1.3.
473. See ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, at xii ("These new changes should

serve as a useful tool to both the policy-maker and the litigator who seeks legal and ethical guidance
on the provision of defense services in state and federal courts."). In 2002, the ABA adopted ten principles for providing effective defense services based substantially on earlier standards that the association had approved. The purpose of these ten principles was to distill the most important ingredients of
providing effective defense services, and to disseminate this information to policy-makers. See ABA,
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYS. i

3-12 (2002), available at http://www.abanet

.org/legalservices/sclaid/defenderpolicy.html (last updated Apr. 18,

2004).
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with defense representation have been adopted in many states. 74 Unfortunately, most of the standards and guidelines are no more binding on
the lawyers to whom they are intended to apply than are the ABA and
NLADA models on which they are based.475 There are a number of
states, moreover, where there are no standards or guidelines at all.
To illustrate just how useless standards are in the absence of effective monitoring and enforcement, consider the ABA standard dealing
with attorney workloads, which admonishes defense counsel to avoid accepting too many cases if doing so will lead to representation "lacking in
quality or to the breach of professional obligations. '' ,, 6 If lawyers have
too many cases, the standard recommends that they "take such steps as
may be appropriate to reduce their pending ...caseloads, including the

refusal of further appointments., 47 Courts also are advised not to "require" lawyers or defender programs "to accept caseloads that will lead
to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of
professional obligations." ' The commentary to this black-letter provision cites the caseload standards first suggested more than twenty-five
years ago by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, which set forth maximum numbers of different
kinds of cases that an attorney should undertake to represent during a
twelve-month period.479
474. See COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYS., supra note 225.

475. In the death penalty area, a number of states have adopted binding rules related to capital
cases, and these clearly have been influenced by the American Bar Association's recommended guidelines for defense counsel in death penalty cases. See ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 913-1090 (Rev. ed., Feb. 2003) available at
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/DPGuidelines420o3.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
ABA GUIDELINES IN DEATH PENALTY CASES]. See also, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.117 (West 1996
& Supp. 2003) (requires court to review "attorney's background, experience, and training to determine
whether the attorney has demonstrated the skill, knowledge, and proficiency to diligently and competently represent the defendant"); IND. R. CRIM. P. 24 (requires two attorneys and establishes experiential requirements for those appointed and imposes some caseload limitations); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS
LAW § 35-B (McKINNEY 2003) (establishes a "capital defender office" that provides the court with a list
of qualified lead and associate counsel from which the court will choose two attorneys); OHIO SuP. R.
20 (West 2002) (requires at least two attorneys be appointed to represent indigent defendant in a
death penalty case and establishes qualifications for appointed counsel).
476. ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5 -5 . 3 (b) at 68.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. See id. cmt. at 69-74; NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS, STANDARD 13.12

(1973)

The caseload of a public defender office should not exceed the following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than 15o; misdemeanors (excluding traffic) per attorney per year:
not more than 400; juvenile court cases per attorney per year: not more than 2o0; Mental
Health Act cases per attorney per year: not more than 200; and appeals per attorney per
year: not more than 25.
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Despite the ABA's standard, lawyers providing public defense often
have overwhelming caseloads far in excess of the standards. In fact, the
problem is so pervasive that the DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance
(BJA) commissioned a monograph to address excessive defense workloads and strategies to keep workloads manageable. 4"' Obviously, if lawyers and judges were dealing effectively with the problem of excessive
defender workloads, there would have been no need for BJA's publication. Among the report's recommendations is that jurisdictions
"[d]evelop a way to enforce or encourage compliance with workload
standards." ' 8' Similarly, a BJA publication dealing with contracts for defense services notes that "few systems have managed to implement a coherent and independent review process that examines compliance with
standards as well as individual attorney performance."4s2
However, at least two states-Massachusetts and Indiana-have developed mandatory standards, including rules covering workloads, in
which compliance is monitored and sought to be enforced by withholding
funds in the event of violations. The activities in these states are especially noteworthy because they represent serious efforts by independent,
quasi-governmental bodies to assure that effective defense services are
provided. These efforts, therefore, are reminiscent of what the CDS does
to assure quality legal representation in England. The Massachusetts
program, moreover, has developed extensive procedures to monitor the
performance of assigned counsel and provide peer evaluation of their
483
representation.
480. KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE, supra note 48. For an example of a jurisdiction
where the defenders have excessive workloads, see supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
481. Id. at 26.
482. CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 40, at 20.
483. Massachusetts law requires the Committee on Public Counsel Services to "monitor and
evaluate" attorney performance. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211 D, § so (West 2003). In order to carry
out this responsibility, the agency contracts with independent, private not-for-profit corporations
(usually known as "County Bar Advocates") in twelve of the states' fourteen counties. Telephone In-

terview with William J. Leahy, Chief Counsel; Andrew Silverman, Deputy Chief Counsel, Public Defender Division; and Patricia A. Wynn, Deputy Chief Counsel, Private Counsel Division, Committee
on Public Counsel Services (Sept. i8, 2003); Telephone Interview with Patricia A. Wynn, Deputy
Chief Counsel, Private Counsel Division, Committee on Public Counsel Services (Oct. 2, 2003). These
organizations retain "staff counsel" to monitor the work of assigned counsel, provide training, and
deal with complaints about counsel. Telephone Interview with Patricia A. Wynn, supra. Statewide, the
number of staff counsel is twenty-three, as several of the most populous counties have more than one.
Id. The staff counsel also arrange for "resource attorneys," who are paid an hourly fee, to mentor less
experienced defense attorneys and conduct performance reviews in which the work and files of assigned counsel are evaluated in face-to-face meetings. Id. Annually, the Committee on Public Counsel
Services contracts to have 6oo performance reviews conducted statewide. Telephone Interview with
William J. Leahy, Andrew Silverman, and Patricia A. Wynn, supra. For discussion of similar procedures for the review of defense services provided in England, see supra notes 436-41 and accompanying text.
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In its structure, overall design, and policies, the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) in Massachusetts is probably more like the
LSC and its CDS than is the program for indigent defense of any other
state. CPCS is created by statute and governed by fifteen persons appointed for three-year terms by the justices of the state's Supreme
Court. 4 Its purpose is to "plan, oversee, and coordinate the delivery of
criminal and certain noncriminal legal services by all salaried public
counsel, bar advocate and other assigned counsel programs, and private
attorneys serving on a per case basis." '5 A majority of the criminal de-

fense representation in Massachusetts is provided by 2000 assigned counsel certified to do so by the CPCS, with the balance of defense services
4 s6
delivered by the 112 "public counsel" lawyers employed by the CPCS.
The agency is headquartered in Boston and has thirteen regional offices,
with an administrative staff of about twenty persons, directed by a chief
counsel. 487

Attorneys seeking certification in District Courts to provide representation in misdemeanors, felony arraignments, and bail hearings must
attend a five-day training seminar run by the CPCS. 488 There also are
special certification requirements for other classes of cases, including Superior Court felonies, juvenile delinquency and youthful offender cases,
Besides Indiana and Massachusetts, there are other states that have developed statewide standards, but enforcement of their provisions has been lacking. For example, Nebraska created a system
that enables counties to be reimbursed for a portion of their indigent defense expenditures if they
comply with standards of the state's Commission on Public Advocacy. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3933
(2002). However, $I million earmarked for indigent defense standards reimbursement was eliminated
during 2002 and has not been restored. Telephone Interview with Dennis Keefe, Lancaster County
Public Defender, Lincoln, Nebraska (July 7. 2003). Also, the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance
Board, which provides some financial assistance to district indigent defender boards, has developed
extensive standards for the performance of counsel in providing representation. LOUISIANA INDIGENT
DEFENSE ASSISTANCE BOARD, STANDARDS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, PURPOSE

available at http://www.lidab.com/standards.htm (last visited July 7. 2003).
The standards, by their terms, are "not a mandatory requirement for participation in the financial assistance programs of the Louisiana Indigent Defender Board." Id.
484. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21iD, § I (West 2003). In making their appointments, the justices
are directed by the statute to "request and give appropriate consideration to nominees ...[of] the
Massachusetts Bar Association, county bar associations, the Boston Bar Association, and other appropriate bar groups including, but not limited to, the Massachusetts Black Lawyers' Association.
Women's Bar Association, and the Massachusetts Association of Women Lawyers." Id.
485. Id.
486. COMM. FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES, availableat http://www.state.ma.us/cpcs/ (last modified
Oct. 20, 2003). The number 2000 for assigned counsel and 112 for "public counsel" were provided to
me during a telephone interview with the chief staff of the Committee on Public Counsel Services. See
Telephone Interview with William J. Leahy et al., supra note 483.
487. Telephone Interview with William J.Leahy, Chief Counsel, Committee for Public Counsel
Services (July 9, 2003).
AND SCOPE OF STANDARDS,

488.
DURES

COMM.

3-2 (1999)

FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES,

[hereinafter CPCS,

ASSIGNED COUNSEL

ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL].

MANUAL,

POLICIES AND

PROCE-
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criminal appeals, and other post-conviction matters. 4"9 Moreover, for
first- and second-degree murder cases, the procedures stipulate specific
experiential requirements and individual approval by the chief counsel,
who "may consider any and all additional information that s/he deems
relevant ....
In reaching this decision, the Chief Counsel receives a recommendation on each application from a Certification Advisory Board
consisting of senior private practitioners from around the state.''49°
The CPCS also has adopted the most extensive "performance standards" of any state, modeled on those of the NLADA,49' and "intended
for use by the Committee on Public Counsel Services in evaluating, supervising and training" assigned counsel.492 The standards also state that
assigned counsel "must comply" with the standards, as well as the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.493 In addition, there are procedures for dealing with complaints against lawyers and with audit issues
arising from their claims for compensation. 41 If there are adverse findings against lawyers arising from either client complaints or claim submissions, an attorney's certification to provide representation can be
canceled.495
The performance standards of the CPCS include strict caseload limits, in which the number of new cases that an attorney may accept during
the course of a twelve-month period is specified. 496 Thus, an attorney may
not provide representation in more than 200 Superior Court criminal
cases, more than 400 District Court criminal cases, or more than 300 juvenile delinquency cases.497 If an attorney exceeds the caseload limits, the
CPCS will not pay for the additional work that the attorney undertakes,
although the lawyer still will be expected to perform all of the necessary
work. 4 8 The CPCS also limits attorneys to I8oo billable hours of assigned
counsel service during a year.499 In these ways, the CPCS enforces
caseload limits and seeks to assure that lawyers do not assume representation in excessive numbers of cases.

489. See id. ch. 3.
490. Id. at 3 -3 .
491. See NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 275.
492. CPCS ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL, supra note 488, at 4-I.
493. MASS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT AND COMMENTS, MASS. RULES OF SUP. JUD. CT., RULE 3:07

(West 2003).
494. CPCS, ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL, supra note 488, at 4-104-4-io6.

495. Id.
496. Id. at 5-8, 5-9.
497. Id. at 5-9.
498. Id.
499. Id. The Massachusetts rules do not prohibit assigned counsel from devoting time in excess of
i,8oo hours to other legal work. Id.
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In Indiana, there is also a system to enforce caseload standards, but
the program is very different from the one in Massachusetts. Enforcement is achieved in Indiana through the Indiana Public Defender Commission (IPDC), which can either grant or withhold payments to counties
who participate in a reimbursement program that the commission administers."° Like the CPCS, the IPDC is an independent, quasi-governmental
entity established by statute, consistifig of eleven persons appointed by
government officials to serve three-year terms."' Unlike the CPCS, it
provides no direct representation and has only one staff member." 2
The duties of the IPDC include the authority to reimburse Indiana
counties 40% of their defense expenditures in felony and juvenile cases if
the defense program of the county complies with IPDC standards, which
(like the caseload standards adopted by the CPCS) impose limits on the
number of cases that a lawyer may handle during a year."° When counties file periodic claims for reimbursement, they must submit documentation on the caseloads of the defense attorneys furnishing representation.
If the caseload limits are exceeded, the county will not be reimbursed for
its indigent defense expenditures. Through this monitoring function, the
IPDC, like the CPCS in Massachusetts, seeks to assure the quality of legal representation provided in the state. (The Massachusetts and Indiana
programs have something else in common-both are experiencing serious financial difficulties.)0 4
500. IND. CODE § 33-9-14-5(a) (2003).

[Ulpon certification by a county auditor and a determination by the public defender commission that the request is in compliance with the guidelines and standards set by the commission, the commission shall... authorize an amount of reimbursement due the county
that is equal to fifty percent (50%) of the county's certified expenditures for indigent defense services provided for a defendant against whom the death [penalty] is sought...
and.., equal to forty percent (40%) of the county's certified expenditures for defense services provided in non-capital cases except misdemeanors.
Id.
5oi. Id. § 33-9-13-2.
502. Id. § 33-9-13-4 ("The division of state court administration of the supreme court of Indiana
shall provide general staff support to the commission."). Since I serve as chairman of the commission,
I am familiar with the staff assistance provided.
503. Id. § 33-9-I3-3(2)(F) (authorizing public defender commission to establish minimum and
maximum caseloads); STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN NON-CAPITAL CASES, INDIANA
PUBLIC DEFENDER COMM'N (effective Jan. I, 1995; amended Oct. 28, 1998 and Sept. 1, 1999). Under the
guidelines established by the Indiana Public Defender Commission, in a twelve-month period a public
defender without adequate support services should not be assigned more than 12o non-capital murder
and all classes of felony cases: more than ioo non-capital murder and class A, B, and C felony cases;
more than 300 misdemeanor cases; or more than 200 juvenile delinquency cases. Id. However, a public
defender with adequate support services may be assigned up to 15o non-capital murder and all classes
of felony cases: up to 12o non-capital murder and class A, B. and C felony cases; up to 400 misdemeanor cases; or up to 250 juvenile delinquency cases. Id.
504. See William J. Leahy, CPCS Chief Counsel, Remarks at the Massachusetts Joint House and
Senate Ways and Means Committee Hearing (Mar. 18, 2003); Letter from Norman Lefstein, Chair-
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That the quality of defense representation in the United States
should be monitored by an external body or group that is separate and
distinct from the lawyers or defender organization providing the services
has been accepted in principle in the death penalty area. In February
2003, the ABA adopted a revised version of its Guidelines for the Appointment and Performanceof Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 5
Guideline 3.1 envisions a "Responsible Agency," independent of the judiciary, to "recruit and certify attorneys as qualified" to handle death
penalty cases; "publish certification standards and procedures" advising
attorneys how to become qualified for death penalty assignments; "monitor the performance of all attorneys providing representation in capital
proceedings"; "withdraw certification from any attorney who fails to
provide high quality legal representation"; "conduct, sponsor, or approve
specialized training programs" for death penalty litigators; and "investigate and maintain records about 'the performance of attorneys providing
representation in death penalty cases and take appropriate' ...
action. ...

""

The commentary to this guideline explains that the re-

sponsible agency should gather information about attorneys from all
"sources" that it "deems appropriate, including in-court observations,
writing samples, and information-gathering from the applicant, from
judges before whom the applicant has appeared, and from attorneys, supervisors, and former clients who are familiar with the applicant's professional abilities."5'
During 2003, an Innocence Protection Act, similar in some respects
to ABA Guideline 3.1, was introduced in Congress.5°8 Although not enacted, this bill would have authorized grants to states with death penalty
laws if they maintained "an effective system for providing competent legal representation."5" Such a system, according to the proposed legislation, would require an independent "entity" to "establish and maintain a
roster of qualified attorneys," "provide for periodic [attorney] training,"
and "monitor the performance of attorneys" and "remove from the roster attorneys who fail to deliver effective representation. ' '"' The legisla-

man, Indiana Public Defender Commission, to the Hon. Lawrence Borst, Chair, Indiana Senate Finance Committee, and Members of the Senate Finance Committee (Feb. 5, 2003) (on file with Author); Letter from Norman Lefstein, Chairman, Indiana Public Defender Commission, to the Hon.
William A. Crawford. Chair, Indiana House Ways and Means Committee, and Members of the House
Ways and Means Committee (Feb. 5, 2003) (on file with Author).
505. ABA GUIDELINES IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, supra note 475.
506. Id. § 3.1.
507. Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 26.
508. Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003, S.22, io8th Cong. § 6201 (2003).
5o9. Id. § 6201(d).
510. Id. § 62o1(d)(2).
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tion also called for the independent entity to determine whether attorneys furnishing death penalty representation have been sanctioned for
unethical conduct or been found "to have rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in a felony case in Federal or State court.. 5 '
This proposed legislation, as well as the ABA's Guidelines in Death
Penalty Cases, are significant because they are among the first national
efforts to recognize the importance of comprehensive monitoring of the
quality of defense services by an independent, external authority. Such
efforts to assure quality are similar to what England has been doing for
nearly a decade, except that in England the means used to measure quality differ from what has been proposed in the death penalty area. Moreover, the LSC is essentially an independent "responsible agency" or
"entity" of the kind envisioned by the ABA's Death Penalty Guidelines
and the proposed Innocence Protection Act."'
While the ABA has not developed standards for monitoring the performance of counsel beyond death penalty cases, the need to assure quality services in other areas of defense representation is vitally important
as well. I doubt that governments would be willing to pay doctors for
their services if their routine surgeries led to frequent medical complications or to the deaths of their patients. The response surely would be to
investigate and to insist that medical societies take essential measures to
assure that quality care is provided.5"3 But in the criminal defense area,
despite serious concerns about lack of quality, this has not happened.
And it is quite unlikely to occur unless, as in the death penalty area, the
legal profession devises systems to oversee attorney performance and
works diligently for their adoption. One of the ways to improve quality is
to link funding to attorney performance, as is done in Massachusetts and
Indiana and as proposed in the Innocence Protection Act.

511. Id. § 62oI(e)(i)(B).
512. For discussion of the organizational structure of the LSC, see supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
513. Following enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in t965, "the federal government became increasingly concerned about cost and quality issues and enacted many laws and regulations that in some way regulated the practice of healthcare professionals." Mark R. Yessian & Joyce
M. Greenleaf, The Ebb and Flow of Federal Initiativesto Regulate HealthcareProfessionals,in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 169, 171 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997). For example, in response
to escalating Medicare costs in the early 1970s, Congress created what is now the Peer Review Organization (PRO) program "to determine whether services paid for by Medicare were medically necessary.
met professional standards, and were provided in appropriate settings." Id. at 172. Although initially
concerned with "cost control," PRO's evolved as a mechanism to assess the "completeness, adequacy,
and quality of care provided" through Medicare. Id. at 173. By the t99os, instead of focusing on individual quality-of-care problems, the PRO program aimed to improve "the mainstream of care for
Medicare beneficiaries." Id. at 174-75.
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PAYMENTS TO LAWYERS

England has developed various ways to compensate solicitors for
their defense services, and the approaches are more varied and innovative than those of any in U.S. jurisdictions. In developing its compensation system, the goals have been to control costs while assuring that
solicitors have adequate incentives to represent their clients effectively." 4
While solicitors must execute contracts with the LSC in order to
provide criminal legal aid, the contracts are unlike those for criminal defense in the United States.515 As noted earlier, the LSC contract uses
lower and higher standard fees and affords an opportunity for solicitors
to be paid more than the higher standard fee if the demands of the case
require additional time.' 6 In addition, the CDS retains authority in all
cases to allow enhanced fees if circumstances warrant.517 Moreover, for
length y or especially costly cases, specially negotiated contracts are
used.5 Since supervision of lawyers who furnish criminal legal aid is required, solicitors who serve as supervisors are compensated.5 19
Some facets of the English compensation system merit serious consideration in the United States. For example, payments to encourage supervision of less experienced criminal defense lawyers in assigned
counsel and contract systems make considerable sense as a means of assuring quality representation. In addition, the use of special contracts for
high cost cases can be a reasonable means to control costs without sacrificing counsel's incentive to serve his or her clients. A similar recommendation was endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the United States
dealing with federal death penalty cases.' Finally, to encourage exceptional services, it makes sense to authorize additional payments, which is
what is done in U.S. civil rights cases when private lawyers provide especially outstanding representation.521
514. The government, however, has not been successful in controlling criminal legal aid expenditures. See infra notes 552-54 and accompanying text.
515. See supra notes 291-322 and accompanying text.

516. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
517. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 3o4-o6 and accompanying text.

520. See

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY

OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION,

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES, COMMIT-

53-56 (1998) (Comm. Print 1998). The recommendations in the report
were adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States on September 15, 5998.
521. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a prevailing party in civil rights litigation may seek to
recover attorney's fees. In calculating attorney's fees, a court must determine a "lodestar" amount,
which is calculated by multiplying the number of attorney hours expended on the case by a reasonable
hourly rate. Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). Once calculated,
TEE

ON DEFENDER SERVICES
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SELECTION OF COUNSEL BY THE CLIENT

The right of indigent defendants in England to select counsel of their
choice was noted earlier. 22 The Access to Justice Act recognizes the
right, which means that even public defender offices must compete with
private solicitors for their clients. 23 In fact, England long has permitted
defendants to select their own solicitors, and their experience is strong
evidence that such a system is workable.
In interviews with solicitors, I was told repeatedly that one of the
great strengths of England's legal aid system is that clients select their
own lawyers." 4 The advantages include an attorney-client relationship of
trust and confidence and a strong incentive for solicitors to provide the
best possible representation since "repeat business" is essential for lawyers practicing criminal legal aid. 5 Not only might the client need a solicitor in the future, but defendants often have relatives and friends who
will someday need a defense lawyer.
Empirical evidence suggests that the attorney-client relationship is
enhanced when clients are permitted to select their lawyers. A study
based upon data collected in Edinburgh, Scotland, comparing private solicitors selected by their clients with public defenders whose clients were
not given a choice of counsel, showed that the latter group of solicitors
enjoyed consistently lower "levels of trust and satisfaction" from their
clients."' Further, while eighty-three percent of the clients of private attorneys said that they would use the same law firm again, only forty-six
percent of the public defender clients said that they wanted to be represented again by the office.527 While other factors may have influenced

the "court may adjust the amount up or down to take into account various factors [such as] ... the
time and labor required;.., time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; the amount
involved and the results obtained; [and] the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys .... "
Id. at 742 n.i; see Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349-51 (6th Cir. 2000) (fact that
attorney representing Title VII plaintiff achieved "exceptional results" highly important in calculating
lodestar amount); Knight v. Alabama, 824 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (N.D. Ala. I993) (in determining lodestar amount, court found that lead attorney for successful Title VII plaintiff had "exhibited significant
skill in his prosecution of [the] case," warranting compensation at higher hourly rate).
522. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
523. Id.
524. Interview with Richard Miller, supra note 203; Interview with Lee Preston, supra note 348;
Interview with Greg Powell. supra note 203; and Interview with Rodney Warren, supra note 354.
525. Interview with Greg Powell, supra note 203.

526. Tamara Goriely, Evaluating the Scottish Public Defense Solicitor's Office, 30 J. L.
84, 97 (2003).
527. Id.
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these results, the study found that "clients resented being directed to use
the [public defender] and this directly affected their views. '
A system of client choice does not mean that defendants should be
required to select their own lawyers or that clients should be permitted to
delay court proceedings while searching for counsel. England's system,
for example, does not require that defendants choose their own lawyers
and a sizeable minority of defendants accept representation from duty
solicitors who confer with them in either the police station or Magistrate
Court.

9'

In the United States, both state and federal courts almost uniformly
have held that the designation of counsel is vested in the court's discretion and that indigent defendants have no legal right to the attorney of
their choice."' This rule has been applied regardless of whether the attorney desired by the defendant is qualified and available to accept representation in the case. 3 ' Moreover, in Morris v. Slappy, the U.S.
528. Id. The public defender office in Edinburgh, Scotland, was established in October 1998 and
clients were assigned to the office until July I, 2000, when the law was amended and the office was required to compete with private solicitors for their clients. Interview with Alistair G. Watson, Director,
Public Defender Solicitor's Office, in Edinburgh, Scotland (May 12, 2003). This change was strongly
supported by the director of the public defender office, who believes that the level of trust and confidence between attorney and client is considerably stronger when clients are able to select their own
solicitor instead of being directed to do so. Id.
529. See supra text at notes 164-65,347-49.
530. See cases cited in Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All
Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1993); and Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (974). In both of these articles, the authors argue that
defendants should be given authority to choose their own attorneys. For cases refusing to permit indigent defendants to select counsel of their choice, see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)
("[T]he essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom
he prefers."); United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 798-99 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[An indigent defendant
has no right to demand of a court that a particular attorney, or particular attorneys, be appointed to
represent him."); United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[An] indigent defendant
has a right to competent counsel but not a right to counsel of his choice."); Hickey v. State, 576 S.E.2d
628, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("An indigent defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of
counsel, not counsel of his own choosing."); State v. Jimenez, 815 A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. 2003)
("[A]ccused is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel, but not the constitutional right to
counsel of his choice."); State v. Feole, 797 A.2d 1059, io67 (R.I. 2002) ("The right to counsel of one's
choice is not unfettered or unlimited but must be balanced with the public's right to the efficient administration of justice.").
531. See, e.g., Drumgo v. Super. Ct., 5o6 P.2d ioo7 OO9 (Cal. 1973) (indigent defendant's constitutional and statutory guarantees not violated by appointment of attorney other than one requested
even though requested counsel had indicated his willingness and availability to act); Katzoff v. Super.
Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (appointment of counsel for juvenile "rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge" and does not require court to appoint particular attorney requested
by a party even if such counsel has indicated willingness and availability to act); Alexander v. Super.
Ct., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("fact that the requested attorney is willing and
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Supreme Court held that a defendant does not enjoy a Sixth Amendment
right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship."53 ' In this case, the
Court sustained the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion for continuance, after defendant's original lawyer became ill on the eve of trial
and was replaced by another public defender.
A variety of arguments have been used by courts to deny defendants
the right to select their own counsel, including the belief that judges
know best whom to appoint and thus are able to protect defendants from
making a poor selection of counsel;533 that defendants lack sufficient information to make informed choices;53 4 that appointments of counsel
should be distributed to the private bar in rotation; 35 that the most popular lawyers will be overwhelmed with cases;,, 6 and that judicial efficiency
requires that defendants be precluded from selecting their own counsel
since counsel's unavailability might lead to delays in court proceedings. 37

available to represent defendant does not compel the appointment of the requested attorney," but is
merely one subjective factor court should take into account in exercising its discretion); Brewer v.
State, 470 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. I97o) (finding no error in trial judge's refusal to appoint
lawyer whom defendant requested, even though requested lawyer expressed willingness to serve as
appointed co-counsel).
532. 461 U.S. I, 13 (1983).

533. See, e.g., People v. Fuller, 7 N.Y.S. 487, 488 (19o0) (independent selection of counsel by
court will permit assignment of counsel who are "eminent, able, and honorable"); People v. Fitzgerald,
105 Cal. Rptr. 458, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (allowing indigent defendant to nominate counsel assigned to them "would be contrary to the best interests of most indigent defendants").
534. See, e.g., Fuller, 71 N.Y.S. at 488 (accused has relatively limited acquaintance of the capability
and suitability of counsel, and is poorly situated to choose or recommend counsel).
535. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. I979) ("Permitting the defendant
to select the lawyer he wishes ... [would] be achieved at the cost of serious disruption to the evenhanded distribution of assignments.").
536. See, e.g., id. at 478 (more experienced criminal defense lawyers would be unavailable for other
defendants); United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[I]ndigent defendants cannot be
allowed to paralyze the system by all flocking to one lawyer."); United States ex rel Mitchell v.
Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683, 688 (S.D.N.Y. I944) ("[Plre-eminence at the bar would be the surest road
to bankruptcy."): accordWilson v. United States. 215 F. Supp. 661, 663 (W.D. Va. 1963).
537. See, e.g.. Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776 F. Supp. 815, 819 (S.D.N.Y. I99I) (failure to guarantee indigent defendant counsel of choice "follows from the government's countervailing interest in the 'fair
and proper administration of justice"); People v. Manchetti, 175 P.2d 533, 537 (Cal. 1946) ("[']Reduced to its lowest terms, [allowing choice of counsel] would allow a popular attorney to have the
courts marking time to serve his convenience."'); Fitzgerald, io5 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66 (allowing indigent defendant to choose assigned counsel could "give hostile or disruptive defendants an incentive to
make impossible demands upon the court," such as requesting "unavailable lawyers or lawyers unqualified to handle a particular matter"). See also Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment
for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to
Counsel of Choicefor the Indigent? 64 BROOK. L. REV. I81, 201 (1998) ("An indigent defendant's claim
of right to be represented by an attorney of his choosing is frequently rejected with little explanation
beyond rote citation to prior cases, which themselves articulate no rationale.").
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None of these arguments is especially compelling, especially if lawyers providing criminal defense are qualified to do so and their representation is monitored. But if clients do need help in identifying lawyers, one
way to assist them would be to provide a list of lawyers who are on an
approved panel. That the courts know whom best to appoint since clients
lack information about lawyers and thus need to be protected from their
mistakes is not only condescending of defendants but ignores, like the
rest of the arguments, that persons of wealth charged with a crime are in
exactly the same position when they need to hire an attorney. Moreover,
if some of the attorneys providing defense services are not qualified, the
solution should be to exclude them from providing representation, not to
deny defendants the right to select counsel of their choice. An English
researcher, undoubtedly influenced by England's system of client choice,
has written an effective response to the notion that courts must protect
defendants from making a poor selection of counsel:
Many customers of criminal legal aid are repeat purchasers. They have
often been through the system. They usually choose lawyers on the basis of past experience or recommendation, so they have information on
which to base their decisions. One should guard against the snobbery
which suggests that because most clients are poor, ill-educated and socially disadvantaged they are incapable of making rational choices. Instead, it is fair to assume that the poor know more about surviving the
system than the rest of us, and tend to be more adept at recognising
condescension or disrespect."'
Distributing appointments in rotation among private lawyers should
surely not rank higher than achieving client satisfaction with the selection
of counsel, and even with a system of client choice there still would be
many cases for which attorneys would need to be appointed. In addition,
appointments should not be "distributed" to lawyers unless clients are
satisfied with their performance, so in a market system of client choice
the less effective lawyers should have fewer clients. Ultimately, lawyers
who are not adequately representing their clients will either have reduced caseloads or be driven from the system entirely. These same principles ought to be applied to public defenders as well, just as they are to
the eight new public defender offices opened in England. 39 If public defenders are serving their clients well, clients will want their services, and

538. Tamara Goriely, Revisiting the Debate over CriminalLegal Aid Delivery Models: Viewing InternationalExperiencefrom a British Perspective,5 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 23 (1998).
539. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
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there is evidence that defendants will not always prefer private counsel.
For example, in Quebec, where clients are allowed to choose either private counsel or a public defender, a study found that a strong majority of
clients preferred representation by the public defender. 4
Rejecting client choice because popular lawyers would receive too

many requests for representation ignores counsel's duty not to accept
more clients than an attorney can competently represent."' Arguments
based upon judicial efficiency, while important, really depend on the degree of leeway given to the defendant to obtain a lawyer. If clients are restricted in the amount of time they have to obtain counsel, the prompt
disposition of cases should not be a problem.
ABA Standards do not address the idea of client selection of counsel.5 Instead, the standards recommend that "[tihe selection of lawyers
for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected officials,
but should be arranged for by the administrators of the defender, as'
signed-counsel and contract-for-service programs."543
The commentary to
this provision explains that "[r]etained lawyers are neither chosen nor
approved by the courts, and there are no compelling reasons for defenders and private assigned counsel to be treated differently." 5" But defendants are treated differently under the ABA's recommendation since

clients who can afford counsel are not required to accept the lawyer "arranged" for them by the "administrators of the defender and assigned-

counsel programs."

54o. Goriely, supra note 536, at 23. "In a Quebec study,... 71% [of clients] expressed a preference
for a staff lawyer while 23% wanted a private lawyer. Their staff offices have never had any problems
in getting enough clients: the numbers they handle are dictated only by their capacity." Id. If defendants refuse to select the public defender, the problem will be with the office, perhaps because of burdensome caseloads, impersonal attention to clients, etc. On the other hand, if clients readily select the
public defender, this can serve as a cost-free way of determining that its services are highly valued by
the client community.
541. Consider, for example, Rule 1.3of the ABA's Rules of Professional Responsibility: "A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.3(2002). The comment to this rule explains: "A lawyer's work load must be controlled
so that each matter can be handled competently." Id. R. 1.3 cmt. at 2.
542. See ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standards 5-1.1-5-8.2. Because of my
personal involvement with the standards, as discussed at supra note 22, I know that the option of client
selection was never considered.
543. Id. Standard 5-i.3(a).
544. Id. Standard 5-1.3(a) cmt. at 17.
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The commentary also explains that if judges do not appoint the lawyer, this "should help to alleviate the fear of clients that the defense
lawyer is working for the judge or court official in charge of appoint'
ments."545
But if this is true when those making the appointments work
for a defender or assigned counsel program, then it should be even more
true when the client selects the lawyer.
Defendants in the United States have considerable autonomy when
they are charged with a crime. Not only do they have a right to counsel,
but they retain a constitutional right to self-representation." 6 They also
are entitled to make numerous critical decisions affecting the outcome of
their case, including whether to plead guilty, whether to waive a jury
trial, and, in the event of trial, whether to testify.4 But the decision
about counsel's selection-arguably the most important decision that an
indigent defendant can make-is vested in others. The United States
would do well to heed England's example and begin to permit defendants to make their own selection of counsel.

IV.
A.

COMPARATIVE COSTS AND FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. EXPENDITURES
During a meeting with the head of public legal services for the Lord
Chancellor's Department, I recounted the complaints that I had heard
from solicitors about the lack of fee rate increases for lawyers doing
criminal defense work. While acknowledging an awareness of solicitor
concerns, he commented that "there is no possible way that you can say
that the government is unwilling to spend funds on criminal defense." 5
Clearly, this is correct, since there is perhaps only one other jurisdiction
in the world that on a per capita basis exceeds England's expenditures
for defense representation.549 England's commitment to criminal legal aid
is underscored by the Access to Justice Act, which provides that the Lord
Chancellor shall pay to the CDS such funds as are necessary.55
COMPARING ENGLAND AND

545. Id.
546. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,807, 836 (1975).
547. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 541, R. 1.2(a); ABA, DEFENSE FUNCTION,
supra note 22, Standard 4-5.2(a).
548. Interview with Derek Hill, supra note 462.
549. It has been suggested that as of 1994 per capita expenditures for criminal legal aid in Scotland,
which has a totally separate system from England's and Wales's, had a higher per capita rate of expenditures. See Blankenburg, supra note 177, at 123. For a comparison of spending on criminal legal aid
among England and Wales and several other countries (but not the United States), see Cyrus Tata,
ComparingLegal Aid Spending: The Promise and Perilsof a Jurisdiction-CenteredApproach to (International) Legal Aid Research, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, supra, at 133 (Francis Regan et
al. eds., 1999).
550. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
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The Lord Chancellor's Department furnished to me expenditures
for all criminal legal aid in England for the last eight years:" '
1995-1996
£616 million
1996-1997
£669 million
1997-1998
£734 million
1998-i999
£779 million
1999-2000
£783 million
2000-2001
£873 million
2001-2002
£982 million
2002-2003
£i.o98 billion (estimated amount)
The data clearly reveal that since 1995-1996 England's expenditures
for criminal legal aid have risen by almost eighty percent despite the absence of significant fee increases for solicitors. 2 Thus, the government
has not successfully limited expenditures for criminal legal aid through
the use of contracts with solicitors.5 3 Given the population of England
and Wales at fifty-two million, the expenditure on criminal legal aid for
2002-2003

was approximately $34 per capita.

"

551. The financial data were given to me during my interview with Derek Hill. See supra note 462.
Subsequent to my meeting with Mr. Hill, the Legal Services Commission reported the exact sum for
criminal legal aid during 2002-2003 at £1095.7 million. See LEGAL SERVICES COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT
47 (2002-2003), available at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk. The data that I received from Mr. Hill
also included amounts spent on civil legal aid during prior years, as well as total legal aid expenditures.
Annual amounts spent by the government on all legal aid (criminal and civil in millions of pounds) are
as follows: 1995-1996: £1391; 1996-1997: £1477; 1997-1998: £1525: 1998-i999: £1623; 1999-2000: fi55I;
2000-2001:
664; and 2001-2O02: £I716. In 2002-2003, expenditures totaled £i908 million. See id. The
growth in CDS expenditures as a proportion of the legal aid budget has been substantial. In 1996, for
example, expenditures for criminal legal aid were about forty-four percent of England's legal aid
budget, but by 2001-2002 it was fifty-seven percent. See DELIVERING VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE,

A

(ANNEX

IN

B-GROWTH

CONSULTATION ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICE

THE

CRIMINAL

DEFENCE

SERVICE

EXPENDITURE)

(2003).

available at

http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/leg-aid/cdserv.htm (last visited July 3, 2003).
552. Some of the reasons for the increase in expenditures were mentioned earlier. See supra text at
note 458.
553. Other researchers have made similar observations. See, e.g., Blankenburg, supra note 549, at
123 ("Recent reform attempts present a remarkable story of failure to cut costs ....
While other countries have effectively curbed legal aid funds, in the UK they have doubled since i99o."); Tamara
Goriely, The English Approach to Access to Justice, Paper Presented to World Bank Workshop Io
(Dec. II, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author), available at http://wwwi.worldbank
.org/publicsector/legal/EnglandWhales.pdf ("[T]he reforms have not controlled costs."). As discussed
earlier, during the 199os, both Conservative and Labor governments declared their intentions to control increases in legal aid expenditures. See supra notes 18o-92 and accompanying text.
554. This per capita figure was determined by using 2002-2003 expenditures of £i,ioo,ooo,ooo and
an exchange rate of $1.61 per British pound, see supra note 206, yielding expenditures of
$I,76o,ooo,ooo in U.S. dollars. This sum was then divided by 52,041,916, the combined population of
England and Wales, see supra note 25, resulting in an exact sum of $33.82.
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England's expenditures for criminal legal aid are in stark contrast to
the amount spent per capita on indigent defense in the United States.
During 2003, The Spangenberg Group completed an updated survey of
defense expenses for the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government's Criminal Justice Act (CJA) program.55 The survey,
which covers fiscal year 2001-2002 and is available on the ABA's web-

site, 556 shows an increase in state indigent defense expenditures since the
last comprehensive defense survey published in 1986. At that time, expenditures for indigent defense among the fifty states and D.C. totaled
nearly $I billion. 57 The more recent survey reveals that this sum has
grown to about $2.8 billion for the fifty states and D.C. When CJA expenditures of $485 million are included, total state and federal indigent
defense expenditures in the United States during 2001-2002 were ap-

proximately $3.3 billion, s8 which for the U.S. population is about $11.72
per capita. 59
For the fifty states, where concerns about the adequacy of indigent
defense spending are greatest, the expenditure was about $io per capita. 6° However, among the states, the amounts spent on defense services
vary considerably, so that the quality of representation that a person receives may depend on the jurisdiction in which the defendant is prosecuted. Of the fifty states and D.C., twenty-nine jurisdictions spent less
than $io per capita and seventeen states spent between $io and $I5 per
capita. Only five jurisdictions spent more than $I5 per capita for criminal
defense services.
555. The survey was conducted at the request of the ABA's Indigent Defense Advisory Group,
which I chair, as explained at supra note 23. The Spangenberg Group is discussed at supra note 48.
556. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES, supra note 39.

557. Id. at

1-2.

558. The exact amounts in the new survey of indigent defense expenditures are $2,823,562,6i9 for
the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and an additional sum of $485,900,000 for the federal
Criminal Justice Act program. Id. at next to last page of survey. For some states, the survey reports
only estimated expenditures, "due to a lack of reliable data, either at the state or county level." Id. The
survey explains in footnotes the states for which estimates were used, how the estimates were determined, and discloses the one state (Michigan) for which no county expenditures are listed. Id. As a
result of the difficulty of gathering exact figures, actual expenditures for the states and counties are
probably somewhat higher than the numbers reported. On the other hand, if inflation were taken into
account, the increase in indigent defense funding since 1986 is less than appears at first blush since $i
billion in 1986 is worth $i,676,o9o,ooo in 2003 dollars. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Inflation Calculator, at http://www.bls.gov/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).
559. The U.S. Census Bureau reported the population of the country as 281,421,9o6 as of April i,
2000. See http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2ooo.html.
560. The exact sum is $9.94, determined by dividing $2.8 billion (the amount spent by states and
counties on indigent defense) by the population of the United States.
561. Although the report of The Spangenberg Group on the ABA's website, see supra note 556,
does not list per capita state expenditures, these computations are possible by dividing state populations into the total expenditures of each state.
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Since England does not have a means test for criminal legal aid, 62
provides solicitors for persons when they have not yet been charged with
an offense, 6 ' and routinely arranges for solicitors in police stations, 6 4 it is
not surprising that its per capita expenditures are higher than those in the
United States. However, these additional expense items do not fully explain the disparity of expenditures between the two countries. When the
means test was eliminated in England, the additional cost to the LSC was
about £65 million annually; "advice and assistance" expenses for persons
not charged with an offense is less than £3 million per year; and police
station representation costs about £165 million annually.' 6' If these expenditures were deducted for 2002-2003-a total of £233 million-66
England still would have spent $26.67 per capita for criminal legal aid.'
Nor are there other obvious explanations, such as the incidence of
recorded crime, that would account for England's per capita expenditures for criminal legal aid being so much higher than those in the United
States. 567 Instead, the real explanation for the disparity in defense expen562. See supra text accompanying note 198.
563. See supra text accompanying note 168.
564. See supra text accompanying note 372-90.
565. Telephone Interview with Tim Collieu, Criminal Defence Service (May 20, 2003).
566. This per capita figure was computed by deducting £233 million from total criminal aid expenditures of approximately £i.i billion, which yielded a net of £867 million in expenditures on criminal
legal aid. Given an exchange rate of $1.6i per pound, see supra note 206, total criminal legal aid in
U.S. dollars equals $i,387,2oo,ooo. This sum was then divided by 52,041,916, the population of England and Wales, see supra note 25, resulting in the sum of $26.67.
567. A report of the British Home Office, which contains data on England and Wales, as well as
the United States, explains that recorded crime fell by eight percent in England and Wales during
1996-2000. See Gordon Barclay & Cynthia Tavares, International Comparisons of Criminal Justice
Statistics 20oo (July 12, 2002), availableat http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb5o2.pdf. However, there were increases during this period in violent crimes but significant declines in motor vehicle
thefts (down by twenty-seven percent) and drug offenses (down by ten percent). Id. at i2-i5. In the
United States during 1996-2ooo, there was a fourteen percent decline in recorded crime, although
from 1995-I999 drug trafficking offenses increased by sixty-two percent. Id. at 3. Meanwhile, the
United States has a much higher homicide rate than England and Wales (5.87 per 100,000 population
in the United States compared to 1.5 per iooooo population in England and Wales). Id. at Io. The
United States also has a vastly larger prison population (1,931,859 in the United States in 2000 compared to 65,666 in England and Wales). Id. at i8. (Based on populations of 281,421,906 in the United
States, see supra note 559, and 52,041,916 in England and Wales, see supra note 554, this means that
o.68% of the U.S. population is incarcerated compared to only o.i2% of the population in England
and Wales.).
The report also discusses the pitfalls in making comparisons between countries:
Although most countries collect information on the number of crimes recorded or reported
by the police, absolute comparisons of crime levels are often misleading. Recorded crime
levels will be affected by many factors including: a) Different legal and criminal justice systems; b) Rates at which crimes are reported to the police and recorded by them; c) Differences in the point at which crime is measured.... ; d) Differences in the rules by which
multiple offences are counted; e) Differences in the list of offences that Eire included in the
overall crime figures; f) Changes in data quality.

Id. at 2.
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ditures between the United States and England is simply that England
spends more on criminal legal aid than this nation's counties and fifty
states, which collectively determine U.S. expenditures for defense representation. Indeed, England's commitment to legal services has resulted in
its spending more on public defense than on prosecuting criminal cases,
which is also in distinct contrast to the United States.? Despite complaints of solicitors about a lack of fee increases, England's criminal defense system is considerably better funded than is its U.S. counterpart.
B.

A CENTER FOR DEFENSE SERVICES
For many years, the U.S. government has funded the Legal Services
Corporation to assist poor persons needing legal assistance in civil matters. 69 The Corporation has endured even though the courts do not recognize a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.57° It is anomalous,

568. The prosecution of cases in England is handled by the Crown Prosecution Services, which
during 2ooi-2002 cost the government £400 million. This sum includes amounts spent to compensate
barristers who present criminal cases in Crown Courts on behalf of the Crown Prosecution Services. In
addition, £28 million was spent by the Serious Fraud Office and several specialized agencies that
prosecute offenses (e.g., the Customs and Excise Office). Combined, these sums for prosecuting cases
are less than half the amount spent on criminal legal aid in England during 2001-2002. Interview with
Derek Hill, supra note 462. In the United States, the cost of 2341 state and local prosecutor offices for
fiscal year 2001 was $4,680,ooo,oo0, and this sum does not include a figure for the cost of the ninetythree U.S. Attorney Offices administered by the Department of Justice. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001 67 (29th ed. 2001).
569. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000). During fiscal 2002-2003, England
spent a collective $1.358 billion compared to $9oo million spent by the United States. That amounted
to a per capita civil legal aid expenditure in England of $25.6o, versus a per capita civil legal aid expenditure in the United States of $3.16. Earl Johnson, Address at IOLTA Meeting during American
Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 8, 2003) (on file with Author). There have been a number of
efforts by Congress to limit the effectiveness of the Legal Services Corporation through funding cuts
and restrictions on types of cases and clients that attorneys may represent with the use of corporation
of funds. See Mauricio Vivero, From "Renegade" Agency to Institution of Justice: The Transformation
of Legal Services Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1325-33 (2002) (discussing the history of
the LSC and tension with Congress); Deborah M. Weissman, Law As Largess: Shifting ParadigmsOf
Law For The Poor, 44 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 737, 761-68 (2002) (discussing the efforts of the 104th
Congress to eliminate the Legal Services Corporation, and the resulting restrictions placed upon it);
James D. Lorenz, Jr., Almost the Last Word on Legal Services: Congress Can Do Pretty Much What It
Likes, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 295,302-303 (1998).
As early as 1968, the Congress began restricting the kinds of cases legal services programs
could handle and has been laying down prohibitions ever since.... Despite the continual
Congressional cutbacks on what legal services could do, they continued to receive larger
and larger annual appropriations from Congress until the first years of the Reagan administration; and legal services did not suffer a catastrophic funding loss until the 1965-1996 [sic]
Congress under Newt Gingrich when $122 million was cut from the legal services program.
Id. For a detailed list of annual appropriations to the LSC and the percentage change from the previous fiscal year, see LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ANNUAL LSC APPROPRIATIONS 1980-2001, at http://www.lsc
.gov/pressr/pralsca.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
570. See Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure to Recognize a Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317,317-18 (2001).
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however, that in the criminal area, where there is a constitutional right to
counsel, there is not a federal program to assist state and local governments in providing legal representation in criminal and juvenile cases.
For state and local governments, the right to an attorney is a major financial burden imposed upon them by U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning forty years ago with Gideon, and they have been struggling with
the burden ever since.
In 1979, in an effort to address the lack of federal support for indigent defense, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution, proposed by its Standing Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants
(SCLAID), endorsing "the establishment of an independent federally
funded Center for Defense Services. '5 7' The report that accompanied the
resolution explained its rationale:
The primary responsibility for providing defense services has traditionally fallen upon local governments. However, local governments are
the least capable fiscally to allocate sufficient financial resources for
the adequate provision of counsel. In some cases, there is the feeling
[N]early four out of five Americans mistakenly believe that the Constitution guarantees
free lawyers to poor people in civil cases as well as criminal cases.... Americans find it difficult to believe that our legal system does not recognize a right as fundamental as the appointment of counsel to represent indigent litigants. However, the stark reality remains that
U.S. citizens face losing their homes and other property, their compensation, and even their
children in court every day without the assistance of counsel, often when they have sought
and requested such assistance.... [V]irtually all other mature industrialized societies are far
more progressive than the United States in their protection of the right to counsel for all
members of society, regardless of income.
Id.; see also Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, ioGEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2003).
Indigent defendants are particularly vulnerable. An indigent civil defendant is brought into
court against his will. Unlike a plaintiff, who can often induce a lawyer to take the case
based on a prospect for recovery, the civil defendant generally lacks even that lure. The indigent civil defendant is alone, forced to confront a system in which "[tihe assistance of
counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." . .. [It is presumed that the]
right to appointed counsel comes only if the indigent person is in danger of losing his or her
personal freedom. This presumption has proved nearly impossible to overcome, and led to
the widespread notion that appointment of counsel in a civil case is "a privilege and not a
right."
Id.; Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 341, 341-61 (1985) (arguing for the right to counsel for indigent civil litigants in California,
based upon historical right to counsel in Europe).
571. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA PRINCIPAL INDI
GENT DEFENSE RESOLUTION No. I2I, at 1(979), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/i 2.pdf.
At the time of the resolution's adoption, there was a major federal program-the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)-to assist criminal justice systems of state and local governments. But few LEAA dollars were spent to help indigent defense. During 1972-1976, LEAA
spent more than $3 billion, but less than one percent of this sum (about $30 million) was devoted to

indigent defense. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE CTR. FOR DEFENSE SERVICES: A DRAFT DISCUSSION PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NONPROFIT CORP. TO
STRENGTHEN INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, at B-i (977).
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that it is unfair to place upon the local government the entire burden of
meeting the Supreme Court's mandate. Too often lack of political or
community support has resulted in only token funding of public defender programs. Whatever the causes, state and local governments
cannot solve the problem alone.572

The funding difficulties identified in 1979 persist, although there has
been a movement towards greater state financing of defense services and
hence reduced reliance upon county governments. Today, twenty-three
states provide all of the funding for defense services.' In the rest of the
states, a combination of state and county funds are used, except in Pennsylvania and Utah where no state funds are provided.574 It has long been
believed that shifting the burden of indigent defense financing from
counties to state governments would lead to additional funding for defense services. 7 This probably accounts in part for the increased funding
available in 2003 compared to 1986, as noted earlier.? 6 However, virtually every state confronted unprecedented fiscal problems in 2003, so
that most states now are no more capable than county governments to
provide adequate funds for defense services. 77
In December 1979, based upon the ABA's resolution, Senators
Dennis DeConcini (R-Ariz.) and Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced legislation, calling for a national Center for Defense Services-a
private corporation with a seventeen member Board of Directors ap-

572. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA PRINCIPAL INDIGENT DEFENSE RESOLUTION No. 121, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATS, at 3 (1979), available at

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/i2i.pdf.
573. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 39, table at end of document (50 State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services FY 2002) (unnumbered pages).

574. Id.
575. ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 22, Standard 5-1.6, cmt. at 27-28.

576. See supra notes 556-56 and accompanying text.
577. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET SHORTFALLS: STRATEGIES FOR
CLOSING SPENDING AND REVENUE GAPS I (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.nasbo.org/publications
.php (last visited Aug. 4, 2003).

The weak economy compounded by the events of September ii,200i and a declining stock

market severely strained state budgets in fiscal 2002. In most states, conditions are worse in
fiscal 2003. Economic growth is wavering, revenues are faltering, costs for health care (particularly Medicaid) and new homeland security continue to rise-further exacerbating fiscal
problems that plagued nearly every state in fiscal 2002.... Traditionally, when cuts are

made, K-12 education, higher education, Medicaid, debt service, public safety, and aid to
towns and cities have been exempted. Due to political pressures against tax increases and as
states exhaust budget reduction strategies, exempted programs are increasingly becoming
subjected to budget cuts.
Id.; NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES,
at ix

(June 2003), available at http://www.nasbo.org/publications.php

(last visited Aug. 4, 2003)

("States trimmed spending dramatically in fiscal 2003 and in governors' fiscal 2004 budget proposals....
Thirty-seven states reduced fiscal 2003 enacted budgets by nearly $14.5 billion-the largest
spending cut since 1979.').
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pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate."8 No more than
half of the members were to be from the same political party and at least
five members were to "have had substantial experience in providing or' Under the
ganized defender services."579
leadership of an Executive Director, the Center was "to make grants and contracts to [defense]
programs" that "substantially comply with nationally recognized standards," which were to be "approved by the Center or the Board as acceptable guidelines for the provision of defense services.""* In return for
receiving a grant or contract, the Center was authorized to require that
recipients furnish "matching funds."'"' In addition, the Center could
make grants or contracts for "research, or other technical assistance," as
well as "training and model demonstration projects in furtherance of the
purposes of this Act. ' 2 Finally, the Center would have been authorized
to make "grants or contracts, for the review, monitoring, and evaluation
of the provision of defense services."' 8
In 1998, the ABA passed another resolution embracing the principles on which the Center proposal was based. In this resolution, the
ABA called upon states and local jurisdictions "to adopt minimum standards for the creation and operation of its indigent defense delivery systems" and to "require substantial compliance with such minimum
standards ...as a condition for receiving funds."'"" The report accompanying the resolution noted that "[a]n approach linking funding to compliance with standards shows particular promise in fostering
improvements in indigent defense systems."'' To support its
6 point, the
report cited activities in Indiana and the work of the IPDC.
Just imagine what might have happened if a Center for Defense Services had been established, with adequate appropriations from Congress
during the past two decades. Funding nationwide would have increased
due to a combination of new federal monies and greater spending by the
states; defense representation would have been provided in compliance
with national standards as required by the Center, resulting in reasonable
caseloads for public defenders, assigned counsel, and contract attorneys;
578. Center for Defense Services Act, S.2170, 96th Cong. §§ 4(a), 5(a) (1979).
579. Id. § 5(a).
58o. Id. §§ 3(7), 7(a)(I).
581. Id. § 8(a)(2).
582. Id. § 7(a)(2).
583- Id. § 7(a)(3).
584. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS. ABA PRINCIPAL INDIGENT

DEFENSE RESOLUTION No. 115, at 1 (1998), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads
/sclaid/i 15.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2003).

585. Id. at 5.
586. Id. at 5-6.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:835

counsel would have been trained for the services they provided and their
qualifications would have matched the seriousness of the cases they were
called upon to represent; there would have been less disparity among
states in terms of their defense expenditures; fewer concerns about the
quality of defense representation in capital cases and other prosecutions;
fewer reversals of convictions; and fewer cases in which innocent persons
were wrongfully convicted. Finally, much like the CDS in England, the
Center could have begun to assess various means of delivering defense
services and evaluating the effectiveness of the legal representation provided. 58
CONCLUSION

Major goals of this Article have been to provide an assessment of
the difficulties facing indigent defense forty years after the Gideon decision and to compare defense programs in the United States with what is
done in the nation from which we derived our legal system. While criminal legal aid in England is not without problems,' 8' clearly it is far better
funded than defense services in the United States. 8' England's program,
moreover, contains features that we would do well to emulate, such as
permitting clients to select their own counsel."9 Also, England endeavors
to assure that quality legal representation is provided, which is something
to which governments in this country have paid insufficient attention.
While England's defense system is financed by its central government, funding in the United States derives from states and counties. Efforts to persuade these governments to allocate sufficient monies for
defense will surely continue, but now, with the perspective of forty years
since Gideon, it is clear that sole reliance on states and counties means
that defense services will be starved indefinitely for adequate financial
support. The best hope for significant improvement, while enforcing na587. The cost of a Center for Defense Services would be a modest expense in relation to the federal government's annual expenditures and the size of the nation's economy. In 2002, the federal government spent over $2.01 trillion and held over $3.5 trillion of debt. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2013 app. F,

at 148 (2003), available at

ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/4oxx/doc4o32/AppendixF-errata.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2003). The cost of the current United States involvement in Iraq is estimated to be about $6-9 billion per month. Letter from
Dan L. Crippen, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to the Honorable Kent Conrad, Chairman,
Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, and the Honorable John M. Spratt, Jr., Ranking
Member, Committee on the Budget, United States House of Representatives (Sept. 30, 2002) (on file
with Author). At this rate, one month's expense on the Iraq campaign should be more than sufficient
to fund the yearly expense of the proposed defense services center.
588. See supra notes 442-62 and accompanying text.
589. See supra notes 551-66 and accompanying text.
590. See supra notes 522-45 and accompanying text.
591. See supra notes 397-441 and accompanying text.
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tional standards to enhance the quality of representation, is for the federal government to provide assistance through a program like a Center
for Defense Services.9
The arguments in support of sufficient resources for the defense
function are compelling. The right to an effective lawyer is not just about
meaningful implementation of constitutional guarantees. Ultimately it is
about justice for persons charged with crimes and assuring that only
those who are truly guilty are convicted. No persons should be publicly
blamed and censured, let alone deprived of liberty or life, unless they are
guilty of the charged offenses. But to make the right to counsel meaningful-to make certain that the guilty are punished and to prevent miscarriages of justice-requires that governments establish and maintain wellfunded public defense systems that deliver quality legal representation.
Whether the United States will continue to tolerate a vast disparity between constitutional obligation and performance of counsel-whether
the United States can eventually achieve the promise of Gideon-says
much about the kind of society we are.

592. See supra notes 569-84 and accompanying text.
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